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Abstract 
This thesis discusses implications of framing bioethical concerns in international legal discourse. It 
starts from the observation that legal approaches to questions of bioethical relevance have become 
dominant frameworks for addressing many bioethical concerns at the international level. In 
particular, the UN General Assembly has long attempted to regulate human cloning processes 
through an international Convention. Similarly, UNESCO and the Council of Europe have both 
addressed a variety of bioethically relevant issues, such as the processing of human genetic data, 
the ethics of research or organ transplantation within international legal standards.  
It is in the context of this strong connection between international law, international legal 
discourse and bioethics that this thesis seeks to analyse what exactly happens when issues of 
bioethical relevance are discussed within such a framework, how this affects the way bioethical 
issues are conceptualized, conceived of and dealt with, and, ultimately, how well-suited or 
successful international legal discourse is in its attempt to resolve current bioethical questions. 
Following the methodological approach of discourse theory, this thesis bases its analysis on the 
assumption that where and when international legal standards, as manifestations of an 
international legal discourse, serve as framework for bioethical debate that also somewhat defines 
how bioethically relevant issues are approached, thought of and dealt with within that framework, 
that it somewhat determines what methods are used to resolve such issues and that it somewhat 
limits the range of conceivable and viable solutions to these issue.  
The thesis thereby does not aim to demonise or abrogate legal approaches to bioethics and it does 
not understand the implications discussed in this thesis to be necessarily good or bad. To the 
contrary, it will be shown that legal approaches to bioethics can and have contributed to the 
development of the field in several important ways. Yet, this thesis also shows that it is worthwhile 
to closely examine implications that follow from a specific legal approach to bioethical issues as 
these implications are not always easily perceived. Given the important, and often dominant or 
near exclusive role of international law and legal discourse in the area of bioethics as well as the 
former's strong influence on bioethical debates as a whole, the implications of addressing questions 
of bioethical relevance within an international legal discourse should at least be understood and 
acknowledged, a contribution that this thesis aims to make. Moreover, only if these implications 
are understood is it possible to ask whether engaging in that type of discourse is at all a valuable 
enterprise and whether or not international legal standards directly addressed to questions of 
bioethical relevance constitute a suitable means to effectively address questions in the area of 
bioethics. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decade issues of bioethical relevance have more and more come to be addressed 
within international legal standards1, including within human rights standards. For example, the 
UN General Assembly has long attempted to regulate human cloning processes through an 
international legal standard.2 The patenting of genetic material is equally dealt with in a legal 
framework, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) TRIPS agreements3. Similarly, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)4 and the Council of Europe5 
have both addressed a variety of bioethically relevant issues, such as the processing of human 
genetic data, the ethics of research and the transplantation of organs within several international 
human rights standards.6  
Yet the term bioethics is by no means clearly defined. In much of the recent philosophical, legal, 
political and scientific literature the term bioethics has become a buzz word, often with no or little 
defined content. In its broadest sense, bioethics is thereby understood as the subfield of ethics that 
investigates all ethical issues7 arising in the life sciences8, including most prominently medicine, 
                                                          
1
 In this thesis the terms "legal standards" and "legal instruments" are used interchangeably to refer to both legally 
binding and legally enforceable standards (hard law) and to legally non binding and non enforceable standards (soft 
law). For a discussion of the definition and difference between hard and soft law see chapter V. 
2
 See J. Achenbach/M. Clados, "Cloning, International Regulation", in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2008, online edition, [www.mpepil.com] (last visited 27.04.2012).  
3
 See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organisation of 15 Apr 1994, Articles 27-28 (hereinafter TRIPS Agreement), Annex 1C Legal 
Instruments Results of the Uruguay Round, 31, ILM 33 (1994), 81. 
4 See UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, C/Res.19, 1997, adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly, G.A.Res. 152, United Nations GAOR, 53rd Sess., UN Doc. 
A/RES/53/152, 1997 (hereinafter Universal Declaration on the Human Genome); UNESCO International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data, 32 C/Res.19, 2003 (hereinafter Declaration on Human Genetic Data); 
and UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, C/Res.24, 2005 (hereinafter UDBHR). 
5
 See the Council of Europe's European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the Dignity of the Human 
Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, ETS 
No.164, 1997 (hereinafter Oviedo Convention). 
6
 See also generally M. Clados, "Chances for and Limits of International Law and Legal Language in the Area of 
Bioethics", in: S. Vöneky/C. Hagedorn/M. Clados/J. von Achenbach, Legitimation Ethischer Entscheidungen im Recht - 
Beiträge zum Ausländischen Öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, 2009, 297 et seq. 
7 Ethics, as will be explained below in Chapter II, 2.1. is understood to be the systematizing, defending, and 
recommending of concepts of right and wrong behaviour. See J. Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Angewandte Ethik. Die 
Bereichsethiken und ihre theoretische Fundierung, 2005, 3. "Ethical issues" are then taken to be all issues 
that are of relevance to an ethical inquiry, i.e. all those issues where a systematization, defense or 
recommendation of a concept of right and wrong behaviour is being sought. 
8
 During negotiations of the UDBHR, note 4, the term "life sciences" was defined as "the sciences concerned with the 
study of living organisms. They encompass a broad range of disciplines that include, amongst others, biology, 
biochemistry, microbiology, virology and zoology. In recent years, many of these disciplines have increasingly focused 
on the characterization of the molecular events that define biological processes (often referred to as 'molecular life 
sciences')". Broadly speaking, life sciences include any study or research discipline that contributes to the understanding 
of life processes. They therefore include such diverse disciplines as the study of micro-biology, veterinary sciences, 
biology, virology, medicine, etc. See the discussions of the term in the Explanatory Memorandum on the Elaboration of 
the Preliminary Draft Declaration on Universal Norms on Bioethics, SHS/EST/05/CONF.203/4, 2005, at 19 (hereinafter 
Explanatory Memorandum).  
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health care and biology.9 Others, taking a narrower definition use the term to refer to ethical 
questions arising in and outside of the field of medicine, thereby including for example ethical 
questions related to animal rights, to general public welfare or ecology.10 Content-wise it seems 
that questions of bioethical interest are very often concerned with some of the most fundamental, 
oldest and most sensitive questions individuals, families, societies, cultures and nations may face, 
including questions about the meaning and value of life and death, about what it means to be a 
human being and about the possibility and permissibility of tempering with that very concept.11 To 
reach consensus on any of these questions, be that on the level of families or societies or at the level 
of national or international policy formation or law making, is often elusive. Moreover, bioethics is 
a fast paced subject field that depends on and has to accommodate rapid changes in science and 
technology.12 Together these characteristics render bioethics a challenging field of inquiry, 
particularly for international legal frameworks that seek to find global, meaningful and lasting 
regulations in the area.  
That international law, and particularly international human rights law, is nevertheless often the 
chosen avenue through which bioethical concerns are addressed at the international level is no 
coincidence. Both fields are heavily intertwined.13 They have common roots in, for example, the 
Nazi atrocities committed before and during World War II as well as in last centuries' human rights 
movements and body of human rights philosophy.14 Moreover, lawyers are often also bioethicists 
and serve on for example ethics commissions or bioethicists or ethics commissions are formally or 
informally consulted in the law making process.15 Furthermore, bioethical issues have often been 
framed or emerged for public discussions, be they led nationally or internationally, in legal terms, 
                                                          
9
 Cf. R. Audi, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 1999, 439. See also generally H. Kuhse/P. Singer, "What is 
Bioethics? A Historical Introduction", in: H. Kuhse/P. Singer, Bioethics: An Anthology, 2000, 3 et seq. 
10
 S. Post (ed.), Encyclopedia of Bioethics, 2003, 34. 
11
 UNESCO, Ethics of Science and Technology - Exploration of the Frontiers of Science and Ethics, 2006, 31, at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001454/145409e.pdf (last visited 27.04.2012). J. Heilinger, "Unterwegs zum 
neuen Menschen?", in: V. Gerhardt/J. Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Evolution in Natur und Kultur, 2010, 223, 223, citing the 
philosopher Ray Kurzweil as stating that "die vorrangige politische und philosophische Aufgabe des kommenden 
Jahrhunderts [wird] darin liegen zu definieren wer wir sind". See also A. Thyn, "Grundzüge einer Anthropoligie des 
Inter-Subjekts", in: V. Gerhardt/J. Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Evolution in Natur und Kultur, 2010, 261 et seq.; A. Jonsen, 
The Birth of Bioethics, 1998, 2; and D. Callahan, "Bioethics as a Discipline", 1 Hastings Center Studies, 1973, 66 et 
seq.  
12
 P. Newell, IDS Working paper 142: Biotechnology and the Politics of Regulation, 2002, vii, at: 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/index.cfm?objectID=FA0755E3-5056-8171-7B8A757CBE2523D4&pgno_pub=3 (last visited 
27.04.2012). 
13
 W. Van der Burg, "Law and Bioethics", in: H. Kuhse/P. Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, 2001, 49 et seq.  
14
 Jonsen, note 11, xii et seq. and 113-116. 
15 See for example the composition of the Deutscher Ethikrat which includes several members with legal 
training. Deutscher Ethikrat, at: http://www.ethikrat.org/ueber-uns/mitglieder/mitglieder-des-deutschen-
ethikrates (last visited 27.04.2012). On the potential role or influence of the Deutscher Ethikrat on law-
making processes see S. Vöneky, Recht, Moral und Ethik. Grundlagen und Grenzen Demokratischer 
Legitimation für Ethikgremien, Habilitationsschrift, 2010, Chapter 5, I and II, in particular II 2.3. See also S. 
Vöneky, "Völkerrecht und Ethik: Ethisierung des Völkerrechts", in: Ancilla Iuris, Spezialausgabe: 
Internationales Recht und Ethik / Special Issue: International Law and Ethics, 2012, at: 
http://www.anci.ch/doku.php?id=start 
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such as in the cases of Quinlan16, Cruzan17 or Schiavo18 and in legislative reform, such as for 
example the German regulation with regard to the import of embryonic stem cells19, and other 
legislative referenda.20 Finally, “the spirit of the law has penetrated into the bosom of many 
societies generally and bioethics, partaking in the habits and tastes of its time, has adopted and 
adapted to this style.”21 That is to say that in many democratic societies at least, there seems to be a 
trend towards using law to regulate more and more matters of social interaction instead of relying 
for example on churches, general morality or social forces to do so, a trend that has been extended 
to the area of bioethics. 
In order to understand how debates in the field of bioethics are affected by that they are often dealt 
with in a legal framework or through a legal discourse it first needs, however, some further 
clarification of the term discourse itself. This thesis follows an understanding of the term discourse 
as advanced by discourse theorists.22 Generally in discourse theory, discourses are seen as groups 
of statements, actions or symbols which provide the language or code for talking and thinking 
about a particular topic at a particular historical moment and place.23 Discourses are also seen as 
defining and producing the objects of knowledge and as functioning as the determinant of which 
language, manner, style and actions conform to, are valid or acceptable in any given discourse.24 
For example, discourses determine how to behave, what to wear, say and do in different 
institutions or situations, such as schools, churches, parliament or other government institutions, 
clubs, a family setting or at funerals, weddings, etc. Discourses deliver the vocabulary, concept, and 
acts needed to communicate within any of these given institutions.25 A legal discourse in analogy 
thus is a discourse that takes place within the field of law, i.e. it is the "legal" way of thinking about 
issues at stake and the analysis of concerns within legal language, logic and concepts.26 
Transferred to the area of bioethics that means that this thesis aims to understand how 
international legal discourse when concerned with issues of bioethical relevance, and the framing 
of bioethical concerns in the structure and logic of international law specifically affect bioethical 
debates. The hypothesis is that where and when international law and legal language serve as 
                                                          
16
 Quinlan v. US, 355 A.2d 647 N.J., 1976. 
17
 Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 1990. 
18
 Bush v. Schiavo, 861 So. 2d 505, Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 2005. 
19 "Gesetz zur Sicherstellung des Embryonenschutzes im Zusammenhang mit Einfuhr und Verwendung 
menschlicher embryonaler Stammzellen (hereinafter Stammzellgesetz – StZG)" of 28 June 2002 (entry into 
force 1 June 2002), BGBl. I 2277; and its subsequent change by the act of 14 August 2008, BGBl. 2008, 1708. 
20
 For further examples see A. Lohninger, Interdisziplinäre, Völker- und Europarechtliche Grundlagen der Gen- und 
Biotechnologie, 2007.  
21
 C. Schneider, "Bioethics in the Language of the Law", 24 The Hastings Center Report, 1999, 16, 16. See generally 
also M. Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse, 1991. 
22
 See discussion in Chapter II, 1.1. and 1.2. 
23
 S. Hall, Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices, 1997, 44. 
24
 Cf. for example M. Foucault, Power/Knowledge, 1980, 131 et seq. 
25
 M. Foucault, "Die Ordnung des Diskurses. Inauguralvorlesung am College de France am 2. Dezember 1970", in: M. 
Foucault, Die Ordnung des Diskurses, 1979, 1, 10 et seq. See generally E. Laclau, "Discourse", in: R. Goodin/P. 
Pettit/T. Pogge, A companion to contemporary political philosophy, 2007, 541 et seq. 
26
 See also Clados, note 6, 298. 
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framework for bioethical debate they also somewhat define how bioethically relevant issues are 
approached, thought of and dealt with, that they somewhat determine what methods are used to 
resolve such issues and that they somewhat limit the range of possible resolutions to these issue.27  
This thesis thereby does not aim to abrogate or even judge the suitability of legal approaches to 
bioethics. Rather it reflects on some of the implications that follow from such an approach and that 
are not always easily perceived. It is this thesis' hypothesis that legal discourse can and does 
contribute to bioethical debates in significant ways, but that it can also powerfully affect and limit 
such debates in several important ways. Given the important, and often dominant or near exclusive 
role of international law and legal discourse in the area of bioethics as well as the former's strong 
influence on bioethical debates as a whole, the implications of addressing questions of bioethical 
relevance within an international legal discourse should at least be better understood and 
acknowledged.  
 
An Outline of the Analysis  
This thesis proceeds in three parts. Part I is introductory, specifying the most basic terms and 
concepts used in this thesis. In particular, it provides in chapter I an overview of the field of 
bioethics. In order to do so it discusses several possible definitions of the term 'bioethics' (Chapter 
I, 1.1), analyses the field's foundations, including most prominently medical ethics and moral 
philosophy and outlines some of the events that are often depicted as highly formative of the whole 
discipline (Chapter I, 1.2). It also discusses some of the characteristics that, in many scholars' 
writing on the subject, are often ascribed to the field of bioethics, including the field's 
interdisciplinarity, the fast-moving context in which it operates and the perceived 'special' nature 
of questions that arise in the area (Chapter I, 1.3). As this thesis deals with legal discourses in the 
area of bioethics at the international level it is also important to discuss global perspectives on 
bioethics and the 'internationalisation' of bioethically relevant issues28 a task which is undertaken 
in chapter I, 1.4. Based on the preceding analysis a definition of the term bioethics as used in the 
context of this thesis is formulated in Chapter I, 1.5 that defines bioethics as “ethical issues related 
to medicine, life sciences and associated technologies as applied to human beings, taking into 
account their social, legal and environmental dimensions.”29 In using this definition this thesis 
follows UNESCO's definition of the term bioethics as put forward in its UDBHR. 
                                                          
27
 Ibid. On an analysis of national legal approaches and their effect on bioethics see Schneider, Bioethics in the 
Language of the Law, note 21. 
28
  See UNESCO, International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, 12
th
 session, 2005, at: 
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/SHS/pdf/Programme12IBC_enREV.pdf (last visited 
27.04.2012 
29
 See UDBHR, note 4, Article 1 para 1. It should be noted that because of this thesis' broad definition of the term 
bioethics, this thesis usually does not use the term bioethics per se but the expressions "issues of bioethical concerns" or 
"issues of bioethical relevance". It does so because the international legal standards examined here only deal with small 
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Chapter two then introduces the term discourse as is relevant to this thesis, providing an overview 
of various meanings and uses of the term, in particular the everyday understanding of the term and 
two more specialised meanings, that of discourse ethics and that of discourse theory (Chapter II, 1.1 
and 1.2) As this thesis derives its methodological approach from discourse theory the remainder of 
this chapter (Chapter II, 2) subsequently explains the concept of discourse theory in more detail.  
Having thus clarified the underpinnings, concept and methodological approach of this thesis the 
next part of this thesis, part II, introduces the legal standards directly and less directly addressed to 
matters of bioethical relevance as elements of the discourse that is under scrutiny. To that extent 
chapter III analyses whether or in how far international legal standards directly addressed to 
matters of bioethical relevance may at all be considered 'legal' and hence whether or to what extent 
it is justified to speak of a 'legal' discourse at all when referring to the discourse under scrutiny in 
this thesis. To that purpose this chapter first provides an introduction to the terms soft law and 
hard law. Since it is regularly debated what the term soft law means, what type of law soft law is 
and whether soft law constitutes law at all and as these questions therefore ask about properties of 
the institutionalised framework within which the presently examined discourse in the area of 
bioethics takes place these questions are also addressed here. The next subsections of chapter III 
then discusses reasons for soft law to emerge, provides a short overview of areas in which soft law 
instruments are frequently used and then provides a short definition of this thesis' understanding 
of the terms soft and hard law and categorises the standards dealt with in this thesis under either 
heading (Chapter III, 1.1 and 1.2).  Aiming to still better understand the next sections discuss the 
degree to which standards concerned with quetions of bioethical interest are binding and 
enforceable, how they diffcer in terms of impact, style and effect (Chapter III, 2).  
Chapter IV then introduces the legal standards in the area of bioethics and its legal and non-legal 
precursors. It thus first provides an overview of legal and non-legal precursors that together paved 
the way for some of the current international legal standards in the area of bioethics (Chapter IV, 
1). This is followed by an introduction to the Council of Europe's Oviedo Convention30, the first 
binding international or rather regional standard in the area of bioethics as well as to the 
additional protocols to this Convention31 (Chapter IV, 2.1) and by a discussion of UNESCO's 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
fractions of the wider range of issues that could potentially be dealt with under the heading of bioethics. The 
expressions "issues of bioethical concerns" or "issues of bioethical relevance" therefore recognize that the field of 
bioethics is much wider than the scope of international legal standards in the area. Ethical issues related to biomedicine, 
according to this broad definition, then also form one part of the wider scope of issues that can be addressed under the 
heading bioethics, while in reverse the field bioethics cannot be limited to ethical questions arising in relation to 
biomedicine only. In that sense it is coherent and correct for this thesis to refer to a "standard directly addressed to 
questions of bioethical relevance" when referring to the Oviedo Convention, note 5, one of the standards discussed in 
more detail in this thesis, which is formally only addressed to 'biomedicine'.  
30
 Oviedo Convention, note 5. 
31 Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being 
with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, ETS 
No.168, 1998 (hereinafter Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings). Additional 
Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and 
Tissues of Human Origin, ETS No.186, 2002 (hereinafter Additional Protocol concerning Transplantation of 
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standards in the area of bioethics, in particular the UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights32, the Declaration on Human Genetic Data33 and the Universal Declaration of 
Bioethics and Human Rights34 (Chapter IV, 2.3). The United Nations Declaration on Human 
Cloning35 as one further example of an international legal standard that is directly concerned with 
a question of bioethical relevance and that has been elaborated by yet another international 
organisation is also presented in this chapter (Chapter IV, 3.1). In the finals part of this chapter, the 
WTO's TRIPS agreement36 will be discussed as an example of an organisation and its standard that 
does not, at least not by its title, directly concern questions of bioethical relevance but that still has 
considerable influence on how some matters of bioethical relevance are ultimately resolved at the 
international level (Chapter IV, 3.2). In concluding this first introduction to how law and bioethics 
intersect at the international level the chapter also addresses the question of the extent to which 
issues of bioethical interest are already covered by norms of customary international law and 
general principles of international law (Chapter IV, 3.3).37   
As chapter IV more describes than analyses or compares standards relevant to the presently 
examined discourse chapter V discusses some of the shared characteristics of the international 
legal standards specifically directed to issues of bioethical relevance. Chapter V therefore starts 
with a discussion of one particularly noteworthy characteristic that can be found across all 
standards directly addressed to matters of bioethical interest, which is that they all use the same 
conceptual framework, i.e. human rights, through which they address issues of bioethical interest 
(Chapter V, 1). Having established the standards' affinity to human rights, chapter V then states 
some of the aims specified in the standards, including in particular their aim to promote respect for 
human dignity and to protect human rights (Chapter V, 2.1). The chapter's next subsection goes on 
to discuss some of the bioethical principles that are regularly promulgated in the standards, 
including for example the preservation of human dignity, the primacy of the human being over the 
sole interest of science and society and that biomedical activities should not harm patients or 
research subjects (Chapter V, 2.2). In the final section of this chapter the delimitations of and 
relationship between human rights on the one hand and the bioethical principles on the other are 
further analysed, showing that bioethical principles operate within a human rights framework and, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Organs and Tissues of Human Origin); Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine concerning Biomedical Research, ETS No.195, 2005 (hereinafter Additional Protocol 
concerning Biomedical Research); Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes, CETS No.: 203 - not yet entered into force (hereinafter 
Additional Protocol on Genetic Testing). 
32
 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4. 
33
 Universal Declaration on the Human Genetic Data, note 4. 
34
 UDBHR, note 4. 
35
 United Nations Declaration on Human Cloning, GA A/Res/59/280, 2005 (hereinafter UN Declaration on Human 
Cloning). 
36
 TRIPS Agreement, note 3, 81. 
37
 Given the limited scope of this work this thesis cannot analyse all relevant legal instruments in the area of bioethics 
but has to focus on some selected standards in the field.  
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as long as they do not conflict with human rights, complement or further specify these rights 
(Chapter V, 3). 
Having set the groundwork for the analysis of the implications of legal discourses in the area of 
bioethics Part III moves on to the actual analysis of the implications for bioethical debates. To that 
extend chapter VI further elaborates and defines the structure and epistemological grid-points of 
the presently examined discourse. In order to do so this chapter first embeds the standards in the 
area of bioethics in their wider human rights framework and, more specifically, in the traditions, 
socio-historical roots and philosophical underpinnings of human rights philosophy, in particular 
liberal and enlightenment traditions of thought, and natural rights ideas and philosophies as 
relevant to the human rights project (Chapter VI, 1). The assumption is that much of the structure 
or episteme through which human rights are taught and analysed have been growing historically 
and can only be fully understood if read against that backdrop. Having discussed the background 
to and roots of human rights the thesis briefly considers how these traditions live on in modern 
human rights law through forming part of the human rights nomos38, i.e. human rights' normative 
universe or the narratives that locate human rights (Chapter VI, 2.1). In the final section of this 
chapter several selected major epistemological grid points, constitutive of and important to a 
human rights discourse generally and to the one taking place in the area of bioethics in particular, 
are singled out and their meaning and scope is explained (Chapter VI, 2.2). First, the discourse 
uses a language of rights or principles and the subsection reflects on modern notions of rights and 
principles as far as relevant to a human rights discourse (Chapter VI, 2.2.1). Second, the role of 
human dignity as used in a human rights discourse needs further clarification (Chapter VI, 2.2.2). 
Third, the discourse uses the concept of sovereignty which also warrants further conceptual 
clarification (Chapter VI, 2.2.3). Fourth, the standards' references to notions of 'universal validity' 
are more closely examined (Chapter VI, 2.2.4). Finally, the standards in the area of bioethics 
heavily rely on the principle of autonomy, a concept that in its modern day form also needs some 
further reflection (Chapter VI, 2.2.5).  
Having established the properties and nature of the legal discourse that operates in the area of 
bioethics as well as having explained and characterised the grid points that operate in this 
discourse chapter VII then turns to a discussion of the implications of approaching issues of 
bioethical relevance through this discourse. It starts off by analysing implications of framing 
bioethically relevant issues in a framework of rights or principles. Among other implications it 
shows that rights or principles can sometimes be too rigid and simplistic to be really helpful, too 
indeterminate or conflicting with other rights to regulate much at all, and that excessive use of 
"rights talk" can make the use of rights or legal language generally ineffective (Chapter VII, 1). The 
second section deals with the implications of framing bioethical issues in standards that assign a 
strong role to the concept of human dignity, showing in particular that the lack of a clear definition 
                                                          
38
 On the term nomos see R. Cover, "Nomos and Narrative", in: M. Minow/A. Sardt et al., Narrative, Violence and the 
Law: The Essays of Robert Cover, 1995, 95 et seq.  
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of the concept of human dignity makes it difficult to determine who the bearer of that dignity is, 
what actions are in conformity with dignity and what role the state has vis-à-vis the protection of 
human dignity (Chapter VII, 2). The next section discusses implications of framing bioethical 
debate in a state centric framework. In particular this thesis shows that standards, because all 
states have to agree to these standards and cannot be bound against their will, are destined to 
result either in minimum consensus, vague formulas, or non or only partial regulation or that they 
often de facto hide several forms of hegemony, meaning that either more powerful states effectively 
dictate the outcome of negotiations or that negotiations are moved to forums in which certain 
states can exert greater powers (Chapter VII, 3). That the discourse to some extent invokes notions 
of universal validity of human rights also has several implications that are discussed in the fourth 
section, including that it is not quite clear what is actually meant by referring to the notion of 
universality, that it can be difficult to actually justify human rights' claim to universality and that it 
can sometimes conflict with the value of diversity (Chapter VII, 4). The final section deals with 
implications that flow from using the concept of autonomy in bioethical debates, showing in 
particular that the requirements of 'informed consent' and how they have or can be operationalised 
in day-to-day medical practice can be difficult and sometimes impossible to meet, that some 
demands of autonomy might be incompatible with human nature, and questioning whether 
patients should be forced to execute their autonomy even if doing so is against their wish (Chapter 
VII, 5). 
The final and concluding chapter of this thesis evaluates, to the extent possible, whether engaging 
in the type of discourse discussed here is at all a valuable enterprise. In that respect this chapter 
first shows some of the difficulties that arise if an empirical attempt is being made to assess the 
success of international legal standards directed to issues of bioethical relevance (Chapter VIII, 1). 
Concluding that a quantitative assessment does not say much about the actual success of standards 
and that a qualitative analysis is well beyond the scope of this project the remainder of this chapter 
offers some general reflections on the success of the standards. It shows that each of the aims 
stated in the standards needs further specification for an analysis of its success to become 
meaningful and makes some observations regarding the usefulness of international law and 
international human rights law in addressing questions of bioethical relevance (Chapter VIII, 2). 
 
Delimitations 
As with any work of such a scope several delimitations should be noted. For one, as stated before, it 
is not possible to treat the material exhaustively. This thesis certainly cannot claim to discuss all 
possible implications of legal discourse nor can it claim to deliver an ultimate account of discourse 
in the area of bioethics. Quite besides the fact that discourses are constantly changing and 
contested so that in effect also the implications of using a discourse are in constant flux such an 
enterprise would go beyond the limits of this thesis.  
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Secondly, as practical as the subject that is addressed in this thesis is, the bulk of this thesis' 
analysis and its major contribution is on a theoretical not an empirical level. It does not so much 
try to understand state practice of human rights in the area of bioethics or deal with specific 
bioethical problems. Rather, this thesis is about uncovering a structure that determines outcomes. 
Working at a high level of abstraction is thereby necessary. Nevertheless, high levels of abstraction 
come at a price. In this case the price to pay is that of being somewhat further removed from the 
specific, challenging and interesting problems that questions of bioethical relevance pose. 
Finally, for all its evaluation this thesis is not about determining whether legal approaches to 
questions of bioethical interest are right or wrong from a moral or ethical point of view. It is mostly 
concerned with how a certain structure causes certain outcomes and only to a very limited extent 
with the evaluation of this structure.  
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Chapter I An Introduction to the Field of Bioethics  
Bioethics has become a rather fashionable term in recent philosophical, legal, political, scientific 
and other literature, often with no or little defined content. This chapter discusses the meanings 
and scope of the term as is relevant to this thesis. 
 
1. Definitions of Bioethics 
In its broadest sense bioethics is the subfield of ethics that investigates all ethical issues arising in 
the life sciences39, including most prominently medicine, biomedicine, health care and biology.40  
The term has, however, never been uniformly or terminally defined. Etymologically it roots in the 
Greek words of bios – meaning life – and ethike – meaning ethics.41 As a neologism it was 
apparently first employed by the biologist Van Rensselaer Potter who used the term to refer by it to 
a new discipline which would build a bridge between the sciences and humanities and that was 
devoted to human survival and an improved quality of life.42 Shortly afterwards, however, the term 
was also used in a somewhat different sense by André Hellegers, one of the founders of the 
Kennedy Institute of Human Reproduction and Bioethics at Georgetown University. In contrast to 
Van Potters' broad vision of bioethics, Hellegers used the term more narrowly, referring by it to the 
ethics of medicine and biomedical research only.43  
The division and debate that already surrounded the term's inception is symptomatic for its 
subsequent development and current uses.44 Today varying definitions coexist that all include or 
exclude, and emphasise or minimize slightly different and sometimes more and sometimes less 
related aspects of what seems to be a diffuse and vast subject field. For example, the Encyclopaedia 
of Bioethics defines bioethics as the “systematic study of the moral dimensions – including moral 
vision, decision, conduct and policies – of the life sciences and health care, employing a variety of 
ethical methodologies in an interdisciplinary setting.”45 The International Association of Bioethics 
again somewhat more narrowly understands bioethics to be the “study of ethical, social, legal, 
                                                          
39
 The term "life sciences" does not have a fixed meaning. See text in note 8. 
40
 See the definition in Audi, note 9, 439. 
41
 R. Gillion, "Bioethics, Overview", in: R. Chadwick (ed.), The Concise Encylopedia of the Ethics of the New 
Technologies, 2001, 2, 2. 
42 Potter's definition reads as follows: "Biology combined with diverse humanistic knowledge forging a 
science that sets a system of medical and environmental priorities for acceptable survival." This is printed on 
the cover of V. Potter, Global Bioethics: Building on the Leopold Legacy, 1988; see also V. Potter, Bioethics. 
Bridge to the Future, 1971, 66; for further background see K. Kuhse/P. Singer, "What is Bioethics? A 
Historical Introduction", in: K. Kuhse/P. Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, 2001, 3, 4 et seq. or H. 
Kuhse/P. Singer, "Introduction", in: H. Kuhse/P. Singer (eds.), Bioethics. An Anthology, 2006, 1, 1-3. 
43
 R. Gillion, "Bioethics, Overview", in: R. Chadwick/D. Callahan/P. Singer (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, 
1998, 305, 306.  
44
 Ibid., 306. 
45
 W. Reich (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Bioethics, 1995, xxi. 
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philosophical and related issues arising in health care and the biological sciences.”46 And with a 
more practical and policy oriented focus the UNESCO defines bioethics as “ethical issues related to 
medicine, life sciences and associated technologies as applied to human beings, taking into account 
their social, legal and environmental dimensions.”47 In addition to these sample definitions there 
exists a variety of further definitions or conceptualisations of the term bioethics in the vast 
philosophical, legal, religious, political and other literature on bioethics.48  
The sheer numbers and ramifications of these definitions make prospects of formulating one 
terminal and neat definition of bioethics elusive. It is, however, possible to discern from these 
definitions some common characteristics of the field. This will be done once bioethics' origins and 
major foundations have been analysed in the next section.  
 
2. Origins of Bioethics 
Bioethics is conventionally said to have two origins, one lying in medical ethics and one in moral 
philosophy. 
2.1. Medical Ethics 
Medical ethics is commonly understood as all considerations about ethical implications of and 
within medical practice, dealing with questions of ethics49 as they arise with regard to, for example, 
the diagnosis and treatment of disease, health promotion and disease prevention, the relief of pain 
and suffering, and the care of the ill.50 Based on that understanding medical ethics has existed 
since the dawn of human history given that it can be assumed that all societies knew and know 
                                                          
46
 Constitution of the International Association of Bioethics, 1992, Article 2, at: http://bioethics-international.org/iab-
2.0/index.php?show=constitution (last visited 27.04.2012). 
47
 UDBHR, note 4.  
48
 It should be noted, however, that many books and articles and even some encyclopaedias on bioethics, philosophy or 
applied ethics stop short of formulating one definition of the term bioethics. Rather, they offer some general reflections 
on the history of bioethics, followed by several chapters on specific issues of bioethical relevance, such as abortion, 
euthanasia, genetics, etc. See for example B. Steinbock, The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics, 2007; N. Jecker/A. 
Jonsen/R. Pearlman (eds.), Bioethics. An Introduction to the History, Methods and Practice, 1997; or W. Korff/L. 
Beck/P. Mikat (eds.), Lexikon der Bioethik, 2002.  
49
 There are numerous ways of defining the terms "ethics" and "morality". For sake of clarity this thesis will distinguish 
between both terms in the following way: Morality is used to refer to a code of conduct put forward by a society or 
some other group, such as a religion, or a code of conduct accepted by an individual for his or her own behaviour. 
Ethics, in contrast, then is the science of morality. It involves systematising, defending, and recommending concepts of 
right and wrong behaviour and thus must be allocated one level 'above' moral considerations in the sense of that it 
validates, evaluates and tests moral codes. See J. Nida-Rümelin, "Theoretische und Angewandte Ethik: Paradigmen, 
Begründungen, Bereiche", in: J. Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Angewandte Ethik. Die Bereichsethiken und ihre theoretische 
Fundierung. Ein Handbuch, 2005, 2, 3 et seq. 
50
 For background see  M. Schöne-Seifert, "Medizinethik", in: J. Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Angewandte Ethik. Die 
Bereichsethiken und ihre theoretische Fundierung. Ein Handbuch, 2005, 552 et seq. It should be noted that 'medical 
ethics' itself, in the same way as bioethics, is not a static term. Rather its meanings and principal concerns have and 
continue to shift over time, place, and cultural, political and economic context. See J. Horner, "Medical Ethics, History 
of", in: R. Chadwick/D. Callahan/P. Singer (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, 1998, 165 et seq. 
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values to direct the provision of health care by such persons as shamans, midwives, priests, 
physicians, nurses and doctors.51  
Although bioethics to a large degree is equally concerned with these issues, it may not simply be 
equated with or reduced to medical ethics. Rather, bioethics is much wider than medical ethics. It 
emerged along with a variety of other branches of applied ethics, including for example clinical 
ethics,52 health care ethics,53 and research ethics54 in response to some of the revolutionary and 
fast paced scientific and technological discoveries and to some of the more general political and 
social developments that together unsettled the field of medical ethics from the 1940s onwards.55 
For example, the Nuremberg Doctors Trial of 1946/4756 that revealed the horrifying details of Nazi 
physician involvement in human experimentation and, several years later, the incidents described 
in the Beecher report57, revealing among other things that black men in Tuskegee (Alabama/USA) 
were not treated of syphilis to overview the “natural history of syphilis”, made apparent the lack of 
ethical guidelines in such fields as medical experimentation on human subjects. The discovery of 
the double helical structure of the DNA molecule in 1953 again opened the floodgates to a stream of 
scientific advances around such issues as biological organisms, gene defects, and gene 
modifications, thereby raising questions about the desirability of positive eugenics or the 
possibility of the creation of new life forms.58 Further discoveries in bacteriology, physiology and 
pathology also dramatically improved the ability of physicians to diagnose and treat their patients 
which then again raised difficult questions concerning the use of these new powers.59 In the same 
way did technical innovations, such as the invention of the dialysis machine, open up so far 
unknown treatment options in the area of life-extending measures, thereby raising fundamental 
                                                          
51 See V. Nutton, "The Rise of Medicine", in: R. Porter (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medicine, 2006, 46, 
50. Famous examples of such codes of ethical reflections in earlier societies are the Hippocratic Oath, 
commonly dated to around 400 BC, the Code of Hammurabi, Vedic and Sanskrit texts, such as Caraka 
Samhita and Susruta Samhita, and in writings of Chinese philosophers. See generally E. Keyserlingk, 
"Medical Codes and Oathes", in: R. Chadwick/D. Callahan/P. Singer (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, 
1998, 155 et seq.   
52
 Clinical ethics generally focus on hospital case decisions that are made with or without the help of ethics committees 
or review boards. Clinical medicine thereby is the field of activities that concerns the study of disease by direct 
examination of or interaction with the living patient. A. Jonsen/M. Siegler/W. Winslade, Clinical Ethics. A Practical 
Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine, 2002, 1. 
53
 Health care ethics generally focus on issues of access to health care, health care financing systems, rationing, and 
resource allocation. See R. Ashcroft, "Health Technology Assessment", in: R. Chadwick/D. Callahan/P. Singer (eds.), 
Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, 1998, 235, 235–236.  
54
 Research ethics focus on questions related to proper and ethically conducted research. See D. Elliott/J. Stern (eds.), 
Research Ethics. A Reader, 1997, 2. 
55
 See Gillion, Bioethics, Overview, in: R. Chadwick/D. Callahan/P. Singer (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, 
note 43, 307. 
56
 The proceedings are reported in the Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, 1945, UNTS 82 (hereinafter TMWC). 
57
 H. Beecher, "Ethics in Clinical Research", 274 New England Journal of Medicine, 1973, 1354 et seq.; See also 
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Final Report of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study Ad Hoc 
Advisory Panel, 1973.   
58 Jonsen, note 11, 2; J. Watson/F. Crick, "Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids. A Structure for Deoxyribose 
Nucleic Acid", 171 Nature, 1953, 737 et seq.  
59
 Jonsen, note 11, 5. See also J. Nida-Rümelin, "Ethik des Risikos", in: J. Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Angewandte Ethik. Die 
Bereichsethiken und ihre theoretische Fundierung. Ein Handbuch, 2005, 806 et seq.  
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questions about, for example, the ethical limits of such treatment.60 A final event noteworthy in 
that context is the still ongoing phenomenon of 'globalisation.'61 From the 1960s onwards in 
particular the increasing interconnectedness of global markets that also had an effect on 
pharmacological and other industries related to medicine as well as better means of world wide 
communication began to affect medical practice ever more strongly by e.g. facilitating worldwide 
access to medical plants, thereby raising questions about the ethics of patenting of certain plants, 
or about a just worldwide distribution of scarce medical resources.62  
Together these factors fundamentally changed the face of medical ethics and ultimately made it 
necessary to restate the field's traditional boundaries. Bioethics and a host of other fields of ethics, 
mentioned above, quickly emerged to fill the gap. If anywhere, bioethics contrasts with these other 
fields and with its parent field medical ethics by its specific focus on the ethics of biomedicine63, 
biomedical research64 and biotechnology.65 Since, however, also these terms lack a fixed meaning 
and since all of the newly emerging areas of ethics developed rather unstructured, filling gaps 
haphazardly and responding to needs as they emerged, they often considerably overlap among each 
other as well as with medical ethics.66 Any attempt to clearly demarcate them from one another 
and from medical ethics is therefore to some extent artificial.67  
                                                          
60
 Jonsen, note 11, 4; see also J. Dolgin/L. Shepherd, Bioethics and the Law, 2005, 5-6. 
61 For a compendium of several definitions of the term see J. Baylis/S. Smith (eds.), The Globalization of 
World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, 1997, 15. Despite the multitude of definitions and 
theories associated with the term "globalisation", for many scholars the term seems to be associated with a 
development where "impersonal economic and technological forces are growing ever more important ... 
[and] ultimately appear to outstrip the capacity of national governments or citizens to control, contest or 
resist that change." D. Held/A. McGrew/D. Goldblatt/J. Perraton, Global Transformations, 1997, 1. 
62
 On the issue of patents and their role in access to medicine see for example UNCTAD, Resource Book on TRIPS and 
Development: An Authoritative and Practical Guide to the TRIPS Agreement, 2005, Part 2. 
63 To date, as was the case with the term bioethics, there exists no one authoritative definition of the term 
biomedicine. W. Dorland, Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 2003, 30, for example defines 
biomedicine as "clinical medicine based on the principles of the natural sciences (biology, biochemistry, 
biophysics, etc.)" but for a broader discussion of the term's scope see the Council of Europe Steering 
Committee on Bioethics' Preparatory Work of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, CDBI/INF 1, 2000, 
iv et seq. and the discussion of the term in C. Hagedorn, Strategien der Dissensbewältigung. Ein 
Internationaler Vergleich von Rechtsetzungsverfahren im Bereich der Biomedizin, (forthcoming 
dissertation), chapter 1.  
64 Biomedical research is generally understood to be concerned with research around biological and 
physiological processes. Cf. A. Plomer, The Law and Ethics of Medical Research, 2005, xv, but see discussion 
of the term 'biomedicine' in note 63 above.  
65
 Biotechnology is generally understood as any technique that is used to make or modify products of living organisms 
in order to improve plants, animals or human beings or to generate unique organisms with new traits or organisms that 
have the potential to produce specific products. M. Reiss, "Biotechnology", in: R. Chadwick/D. Callahan/P. Singer 
(eds.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, 1998, 319, 319-320; for background see F. Francioni (ed.), Biotechnology and 
International Law, 2006. 
66 M. Grodin (ed.), Meta Medical Ethics: The Philosophical Foundations of Bioethics, 1995, 7 et seq.; see also 
Nida-Rümelin, Theoretische und angewandte Ethik, note 491, 64 et seq. and J. Nida-Rümelin, "Wert des 
Lebens", in: J. Nida-Rümelin, Angewandte Ethik. Die Bereichsethiken und ihre theoretische Fundierung. 
Ein Handbuch, 2005, 886 et seq.  
67
 In the context of this thesis a distinction will therefore only be drawn where such a differentiation helps clarify the 
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Overall, it may be safe to conclude that medical ethics constitute one principal origin of bioethics as 
well as that medical ethics' concerns often lie at the heart of bioethical considerations. Bioethics is, 
however, wider in scope than medical ethics as it not only incorporates medical ethics' concern 
with all ethical implications of and within medical practice but also includes such a broader range 
of subject fields as ecology, patient rights and environmental considerations. 
 
2.2. Moral Philosophy  
The second origin of bioethics is moral philosophy.68 Moral philosophy is conventionally 
understood as the branch of philosophy that is concerned with the systematising, defending, and 
recommending of concepts of right and wrong behaviour and the study of values and customs as 
well as the employment and application of concepts such as right and wrong, good and evil.69 The 
field is customarily divided in two parts: Meta-ethics and normative ethics, with the latter being 
again divided into normative theory and applied ethics. While meta-ethics is the analysis of the 
meaning and justification of ethical claims and the quest to understand the nature and properties 
of ethical statements and claims, seeking to answer such questions as “what is justice” or “what is 
time” or “what is good”, normative ethics pertains to the development of theories that 
systematically denominate right and wrong actions. Normative ethics therefore deals with the 
general principles, rules and guidelines that should be followed or the virtues that should be 
adopted and fostered. Applied ethics again is commonly understood as the attempt to implement 
either general ethical norms or general ethical theories with the aim of resolving specific practical 
problems.70  
The field of bioethics is usually classified as forming part of applied ethics. It qualifies as such 
because it is generally concerned with the study of ethical and moral issues that arise in the context 
of real and concrete activity, such as in the making of active decisions on whether or not to apply 
life-extending measures to a patient or in considerations surrounding such issues as removal or 
allocation of transplant organs.71 Moral philosophy's mounting interest in matters of bioethics 
must be understood in the context of some of the scientific and social developments, already 
mentioned above, that took place from the 1940s onwards.72 Particularly, the extraordinary 
technological progress of the 1950s and 60s, while opening up the opportunity for great medical 
benefit to thousands of people, also led to many critical ethical questions, such as the 
appropriateness of a “quality of life analysis”, or “expense analysis approaches” in the practice of 
                                                          
68
 The terms "moral philosophy" and "ethics" are used synonymously in the context of this thesis.     
69
 R. Norman, "Moral Philosophy, History of", in: T. Honderich (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 2005, 622 
et seq.; for background see Nida-Rümelin, Theoretische und angewandte Ethik: Paradigmen, Begründungen, Bereiche, 
note 49, 3 et seq.  
70
 See S. Darwall, "Theories of Ethics", in: R. Frey/C. Wellman (eds.), A Companion to Applied Ethics, 2005, Blackwell 
Reference Online (last visited 27.04.2012); see also Nida-Rümelin, Theoretische und angewandte Ethik: Paradigmen, 
Begründungen, Bereiche, note 49, 2. 
71
 M. Battin, "Bioethics", in: R. Frey/C. Wellman (eds.), A Companion to Applied Ethics, 2003, 295, 295-296. 
72
 See also UNESCO, International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, 12
th
 session, note 28. 
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medicine and allocation of resources.73 These questions, touching upon many of moral 
philosophers' primary areas of concern, i.e. on questions regarding the worth and meaning of life, 
consequently sparked these philosophers' interest also in the wider field of bioethics. The gradual 
awakening to environmental hazards in the 1960s equally called for moral philosophical reflections 
on such questions as how to assume responsibility vis-à-vis rapidly developing technologies.74 
Finally, the advent of the civil rights movement and the resurgence of the feminist movement in the 
1960s with their renewed questioning of patterns of discrimination and unfair standards of 
equality proved stimulating for moral philosophers' reflections – an enterprise that was soon 
extended into the bioethical field.75 As a result of all these factors, moral philosophers increasingly 
began to turn to the difficult and seemingly new76 moral concerns in the field of bioethics. 
Until today bioethics remains heavily indebted to moral philosophy and its methodological 
approach.77 The latter thereby stands for an approach that aims to resolve bioethical questions by 
applying, defending and recommending theories and concepts of right or wrong.78 Different 
conceptions of how to derive or the content of "right" or "wrong" can thereby be distinguished, 
including utilitarian approaches,79 absolute rules based approaches,80 principled based 
approaches81 or virtue ethics.82 These approaches, i.e. their theoretical underpinnings have 
differing ideas about what conduct, action or motivation might qualify as right (ethically valuable) 
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74
 Gillion, Bioethics, Overview, in: R. Chadwick/D. Callahan/P. Singer (eds.), Encyclopaedia of Applied Ethics, note 
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 Grodin, note 66, 5. 
76
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content/uploads/downloads/2010/11/jnr_freiheit_kausa.pdf (last visited 27.04.2012). 
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 J. Harris (ed.), Bioethics. Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 2004, 4. On the question of the role of philosophy in the 
area of bioethics see J. Nida-Rümelin, "Bioethik und Menschenwürde: Dokumentation einer Debatte", in: J. Nida-
Rümelin, Ethische Essays, 2002, 401, 409 et seq.; Nida-Rümelin, Theoretische und Angewandte Ethik: Paradigmen, 
Begründungen, Bereiche, note 49, 2 and J. Nida-Rümelin, „Der Ethische Diskurs in der Modernen Medizin", Vortrag 
im Max-Delbrück-Zentrum für Molekulare Medizin, MDC, Berlin, 2003, at: 
http://www.bioethikdiskurs.de/Buergerkonferenz/Vortraege/KummerRuemelin.html/Vortrag%20Nida-
Ruemelin%20offiziell.pdf/view (last visited 27.04.2012). 
78
 Cf. footnote 7. 
79 Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are among the most prominent representatives of this approach; see 
J. Mill, Utilitarianism, 1881; J. Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789; for background 
see R. Hare, "A Utilitarian Approach", in: H. Kuhse/P. Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, 2001, 80 et 
seq.; and for a critique see J. Nida-Rümelin, Kritik des Konsequentialismus, 1993.    
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 J. Boyle, "An Absolute Rule Approach", in: H. Kuhse/P. Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, 2001, 72 et seq.; 
for further background see J. Finnis, Moral Absolutes: Tradition, Revision and Truth, 1991. 
81 The probably most famous book on principled approaches to bioethics has been written by T. 
Beauchamp/J. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 2001; For a summary see J. Childress, "A 
Principle-based Approach", in: H. Kuhse/P. Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, 2001, 61 et seq.; for 
other principled approaches see W. Solomon, "Rules and Principles", in: W. Reich (ed.), Encyclopaedia of 
Bioethics, 1995, 470 et seq. 
82 J. Oakley, "A Virtue Ethics Approach", in: H. Kuhse/P. Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, 2001, 86 
et seq. 
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or wrong (ethically dismissible). Despite much debate as to the superiority of one of these 
approaches so far none of them has yet been acquired authority over all others.83  
 
3. Themes in the Field of Bioethics 
Besides its ties with medical ethics and moral philosophy, several common characteristics of the 
field of bioethics may be made out. 
3.1. Interdisciplinarity 
For one, while moral philosophy and medical ethics certainly assume a fundamental role in the 
development and analysis of the field of bioethics it should be noted that bioethics has never been a 
mere crossing of these two fields. Rather it is a complex interplay of various different disciplines 
including the disciplines of philosohy, law, religion, political science, anthropology, sociology, 
economics, humanities and many others.84 As regards law, for example, the bioethical debate has 
long found its way into court rooms and legislative processes, lawyers sit in ethics committees or 
hospital review boards, while ethicists, conversely, help elaborate legal regulations in the field.85 
That bioethics has to be dealt with on a public policy level is evident from e.g. ongoing discussions 
about how best to restructure public health care systems in several countries around the world.86 
And with regard to religions, bioethics has long been part of religious debates that have 
traditionally been interested in questions of life and death or the good life.87 At the national level 
considerations of religious beliefs or sentiments, on the other hand, have long been incorporated in 
bioethical debates and often into their legislative, political or policy extensions, for example when it 
comes to such issues as abortion, euthanasia and genetic manipulation.88 Even if at the 
international level bioethically relevant questions can never be left to the realm of one or another 
sectarian religion, religious considerations clearly still matter when it comes to negotiating 
provisions of legal instruments, including for example when it comes to such issues as human 
cloning, stem cell research or organ transplantation.89 
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 B. Brody, "Religion and Bioethics", in: H. Kuhse/P. Singer (eds.), A Companion to Bioethics, 2001, 41 et seq. 
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18 
 
 
 
All of these disciplines and their methodological approaches are thus relevant to the field of 
bioethics. Together they constantly shape and further develop the field of bioethics. This trend is 
also likely to stay: No discipline so far can claim a monopoly on bioethics.90 Also, there exists no 
unified professional group of “bioethicists” with their own permanent careers and distinctive (or 
consistent) professional ethos.91 Hence everyone – no matter from which disciplinary background 
– may declare him- or herself to be a 'bioethicist' and thus may take part in the field's 
development.92 It therefore seems that interdisciplinarity will remain one pronounced and 
important characteristic of bioethics. 
 
3.2. Fast-moving Character and the Problem of Dissent  
A second characteristic of bioethics is its fast-moving character. Bioethics, as discussed above is 
intimately linked with scientific and technological progress, in that it is concerned with the 
applications and the moral or ethical implications of this progress in real life situations.93 The 
faster the progress and the bigger its implications from a moral or ethical point of view the more it 
then also affects the field of bioethics. But fast progress not only implies that bioethicists constantly 
have to face up to ever new challenging questions. It also means that many of the answers already 
delivered in response to such questions might rather sooner than later loose their topicality and 
need to be revised.94 This is true as much for single decisions taken at the patient's bedside as it is 
for those taken on a public policy or legal level.  
For example, the scientific community several years ago considered it rather unlikely that 
embryonic stem cells could be produced without the destruction of embryos.95 It also repeatedly 
maintained that the successful cloning of mammals was – if at all ever to happen – very unlikely to 
take place within the next few years.96 Both propositions have been, at least partly, refuted by 
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recent developments in the field of genetics.97 Bioethicists, as much as scientists, politicians, legal 
professionals and in fact everyone will have to address the fundamental questions that travel in the 
wake of such developments.  
Yet, finding adequate answers to such developments often comes with some difficulty.98 That is so 
because there hardly ever exists consensus within any given society, nation, political party or any 
other relevant unit on the question of how to deal with such concerns.99 This may be so because 
either these units have not yet had the time to develop a common position on such issues or 
because some bioethically relevant issues might simply be too controversial for a consensus to 
build. Several long-standing debates in the area of, for example, abortion or embryonic stem cell 
research seem to support both views.100  
 
3.3. The “special” Nature of Bioethics 
Another characteristic often associated with the field of bioethics is that bioethics is often depicted 
as somehow 'more' special or 'more' different than other fields of ethics. The presumption seems to 
be that bioethically relevant questions generally form part of the most fundamental and sensitive 
issues individuals or societies might be confronted with and that bioethically relevant actions have 
the potential to influence humanity in its most profound sense.101 
Habermas e.g. argues that bioethics stand out from other fields of ethical inquiry because some of 
its practices such as positive eugenics102 – if applied – make it impossible for the human species to 
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live a moral life.103 The argument is that positive eugenics affect the self-conception of the 
autonomous person and thus inhibit that person from being an equal subject of the mutual 
communications processes in society necessary for a moral life.104  
In the same vein argues Michael Shapiro that bioethical concerns are of an exceptional nature and 
that they are different from other areas of applied ethics.105 According to Shapiro this is so as 
bioethics deals with those science technologies that fragment and reassemble life processes. While 
he concedes that technological revolutions are nothing new as such the intensification and possible 
radicalisation of this fragmentation and reassembly processes is new and radical as it is bound to 
result in a transformation of ourselves.106  
Francis Fukuyama again holds that bioethics is different as it often presents a special moral 
dilemma that arises from the fact that any reservation one might have about biotechnological 
progress needs to be tempered with a recognition of its undisputed promise.107 He further argues 
that bioethically relevant questions dissolved “one of the most basic and traditional of distinctions, 
that between what is given and what is done” and hence involved playing god.108 According to 
Fukuyama bioethics thus changes the “understandings of responsibility towards the entire 
humanity”109 and the environment within which we live. 
None of these arguments convincingly establishes that bioethical discourse is radically different or 
more special than discourses that take place in other fields of ethics,110 such as in the fields of the 
ethics of nuclear warfare or environmental ethics, where questions of similar scope must be 
addressed. Yet they reflect a general unease in dealing with many questions in the area of bioethics. 
That unease thereby seems to not so much stem from bioethics' otherness or in fact from any 
objectifiable argument about bioethics' special character. Rather it seems to arise from that 
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bioethically relevant questions very often imply fundamental questions about human's nature and 
self-understanding, about what we, as humans, want to be, about how we want to live and about 
the value of life.111 It is these fundamental questions and the deep seated emotions that they trigger 
that often render the resolution of bioethically relevant questions so difficult – be that justified 
from a rational point of view or not. 
 
4. The Internationalisation of Bioethics 
Bioethics increasingly has become relevant not only in a national but also in an international 
context. 
4.1. The Broadening in Scope of Bioethically Relevant Topics 
While the field might first have been conceptualised in the realm of medical ethics of the 
industrialised world, today bioethics has expanded well beyond this scope.112 In particular, 
bioethics has amplified the range of issues it is concerned with along three axes. On the one hand it 
has added to its agenda many ethical questions that are predominantly relevant in the context of 
developing countries, including questions related to inadequate reproductive health care, poverty 
and certain infectious disease or generally the gross lack of health care resources.113 Secondly, also 
issues of particular concern to certain trans-nationally defined groups of people, such as for 
example the specific concerns of women, indigenous people or those inflicted with HIV/Aids now 
feature more prominently on bioethical agendas.114 And finally, bioethics has broadened its list of 
concerns along with new scientific developments and their implications for the medical field or 
society as a whole. It, for example, has to address implications of new treatment options for 
diseases, of new findings in the field of genetics or in the field of assisted reproduction.115 
Bioethics has, however, not only added new issues to its list of concerns but has also broadened its 
perspective on already well established issues.116 The range of issues now no longer primarily or 
exclusively considered at the national but also at the international level is vast, including issues in 
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such diverse areas as reproduction,117 issues of organ transplantation,118 and issues related to the 
experimentation with human subjects.119 It should be noted, however, that none of these issues has 
a strictly defined national or international dimension. Rather different aspects of these issues are 
relevant at different levels.120   
 
4.2. The Increasingly Felt Need for a Global Perspective and Approach to Bioethics 
While the fact that often the same issues are addressed at a national and international level might 
suggest that an international approach to bioethics is redundant, several arguments indicate that 
some form of a global view on bioethics is necessary. For one, modern biotechnology is more and 
more becoming a global phenomenon in terms of research, production and trade.121 As Heiner 
Roetz remarks it is quickly mastered outside the traditional industrial countries and is being 
promoted in many parts of the world since it promises great social and economic benefit.122 
"Restrictions in one country may quickly lead to the relocation of research to more permissive 
regions"123 with a low degree of public information, less strict legal standards and less rigid 
enforcement of such standards.124 As local partners offer their capacities to enter into joint 
ventures with the foreign investors, it becomes less and less clear whose standards, values and laws 
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13505, 74 Fed. Reg. 10667, 2009. 
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count in these transactions.125 Besides a jurisprudentially inspired need for clarity in legal 
regulations, states also have a strong economic interest in exporting their own moral and legal 
standards. By this they prevent economical repercussions in their own country that could result 
from e.g. less restrictive standards in other states.126 
Also UNESCO's International Bioethics Committee (IBC)127 in a report on the possibility of a 
development of a Declaration on Bioethics notes a variety of factors, such as the import and export 
of embryos and embryonic stem cells, organs, tissues and cells  
“that have called attention to disparities between policies promulgated in the countries 
involved… [and that have] also raised questions about the need for harmony among the 
pertinent regulations in different countries.”128  
The report then goes on to list ten areas, including healthcare, genetic enhancement, gene therapy 
and genetic modification, research involving human subjects, and intellectual property rights, 
illustrating for each of these fields the nature and the range of problems “that confront us and 
[that] support the search for a common ground that can be the starting point for harmonizing 
divergent bioethical positions.”129 
Implicit in such reasoning is also one further argument in favour of a global approach to bioethics, 
namely that of global justice and fairness: Practices such as the undertaking of clinical trials or 
research surveys in poorer countries often with less strict regulations and lesser degrees of 
enforcement of ethical standards raise serious questions of global justice and therefore warrant a 
global approach.130 Similarly, technology and investment in scientific research is expensive. Even 
in technologically advanced societies and countries, the effects of advances in the medical science 
are likely to benefit only a minority of the population.131 In global terms this divide will be even 
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more dramatic between low-income and high-income countries.132 A final argument for some kind 
of a global approach is that modern biotechnology may really influence humanity in its most 
profound sense in that it could, for example, permanently alter the genetic make-up of the entire 
mankind.133 Positive decisions of such sincerity and scope cannot or at least should not be taken by 
individuals, corporate groups, scientific communities or countries.134  
Thus, the world's growing interdependency coupled with the fact that bioethics raise fundamental 
questions about human nature and about what it means to be human clearly warrant a global 
perspective on bioethics.  
 
5. Conclusion: A Working Definition of the Term Bioethics 
In the context of this thesis the term bioethics then will be used to mark a discipline that 
incorporates an inquiry into all situations where biology, medicine, biomedicine, clinical practice, 
genetics, and generally the life sciences are affected. In effect, this thesis thus follows UNESCO's 
definition of bioethics as “ethical issues related to medicine, life sciences and associated 
technologies as applied to human beings, taking into account their social, legal and environmental 
dimensions.”135 In their concretisation issues of bioethical relevance are then most often related to 
medicine and medical ethics, such as for example questions arising with respect to certain health 
care practices, public health systems or the treatment of certain diseases. But they may also be 
non-medical in the sense that they can for example include such concerns as patient rights, 
questions of general public welfare or ecology.  
For present purposes there is no need to go beyond this admittedly rather broad definition of the 
term bioethics. That is so for three reasons. For one, as could be seen above, attempts to abstractly 
and technically demarcate the discipline's exact boundaries are likely to fail sooner or later. 
Bioethics has always been and remains a dynamic field that expands and develops as science, 
technology and medicine progresses and as, in that wake, there arise ethical questions. Given the 
speed of this progress, its ramifications for other disciplines and the vast array of potential ethical 
questions to arise in response to it, any substantially narrow or dogmatic definition of the subject 
matter of bioethics is likely to fail or will soon have to be amended to meet new realities. Secondly, 
in the present context of this thesis it is much more important to have an understanding of the 
nature and general character of questions arising in the field of bioethics rather than to provide 
specific answers to specific questions or problems of bioethical relevance. This thesis is concerned 
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with the structures in which questions of bioethical relevance are being answered and the 
implications of these structures for how questions of bioethical relevance are being answered. For 
that the general character and nature of the subject field that is being addressed in these structures 
matters more than the specifics of that field. Finally, as this thesis is about international legal 
discourse in the area of bioethics it seems reasonable to adopt UNESCO's use of the term bioethics. 
As will be shown below UNESCO is one of the most active and relevant actors in the field of 
bioethics at the international level so that it seems suitable to follow UNESCO's lead in that 
respect. 
Having said that, in its discussions and case studies this thesis will often limit the range of issues 
that it will be concerned with to those issues and aspects related to the field of bioethics that are 
relevant or discussed at the international level and, particularly, in selected international legal 
instruments.136 These are mainly issues that are related to the field of medicine and medical ethics, 
including for example such issues as research on human beings, organ transplantation and human 
cloning processes. Topics not featuring in the relevant international standards, such as certain 
issues in the area of reproduction, animal rights and questions on the environment137 will be 
discussed only to the extent that they are relevant. For example, it might be that their absence from 
international legal standards is relevant to illustrate a point this thesis seeks to make.  
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Chapter II Legal Discourse 
Increasingly, bioethics has come to be addressed within legal contexts, including within legal texts 
such as statutes, acts, declarations, conventions, as well as through the case law of national and 
international courts. The language and logic of the law have thereby become dominant frameworks 
for addressing many bioethical concerns.138 Most prominently, UNESCO, the UN and the Council 
of Europe have issued several standards that specifically and directly are concerned with questions 
related to bioethics, to be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Besides there exists a wide 
range of standards that indirectly deal with questions of bioethical relevance, including for example 
several WTO agreements concerned with the patenting of for example medical treatment options 
or human rights standards that contain the right to access to adequate health care or standard of 
living.139  
Legal discourses thus often effectively frame debates in the area of bioethics. The use of the word 
'discourse' in recent social, legal, political and other theory has, however, become so pervasive that 
there is a need to clarify what this concept entails and how it is used in the context of this thesis 
before it may be further used in this thesis. This chapter therefore seeks to clarify scope and 
meaning of the term discourse. 
 
1. An Introduction to the Term Discourse  
Although the term discourse is widely used by for example the media and in day to day habitual 
language, it is rarely defined. Etymologically the term stems from the Latin word discursus, 
meaning 'argument', and/or from its related verb discurrere, meaning 'running to and fro'.140 
Today the term has various meanings. In its' common, everyday meaning, discourse is usually 
understood as a “continuous stretch of language containing more than one sentence, as in, for 
example, conversations, narratives, arguments, speeches.”141 Here, the term discourse simply 
stands for a succession of related and interconnected sentences,142 i.e. “the orderly expression of 
ideas in speech or writing….”143  
However, the term can also carry more specialised meanings. The literature generally distinguishes 
between two such specialised meanings, i.e. two approaches to the topic of discourse, that of 
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discourse ethics and that of discourse theory or discourse analysis.144 The latter roughly consists of 
the assumption that the performance and content of human language or other human interaction is 
determined by the structure in which it takes place.145 The former idea refers to the assumption 
that linguistic and communicative structures have moral implications as well.146  
 
1.1. A Brief Overview of Discourse Ethics  
As just mentioned, one specific approach to the study of discourses is discourse ethics, often very 
prominently associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas.147 Central to his theory is the argument 
that some presuppositions of discourse or of communications among reasonable people have 
universally valid moral content and that discourse that builds on these presuppositions leads to 
legitimate outcomes, such as legitimate norms.148 Discourse ethics is thus closely linked with the 
procedural aspects of a certain piece of communications and with the legitimating power of that 
procedure.149 The goal of Habermas's theory of discourse ethics is to clarify the presuppositions of 
the rationality of processes and thereby to establish an ethics of discourse that makes it possible to 
arrive at such legitimate valid norms that can be accepted by all involved.150  
Habermas argues that in making utterances, speakers at least implicitly raise different types of 
validity-claims, for example, claims to truth, normative rightness, sincerity or truthfulness. These 
validity claims, norms or maxims of action are, however, only morally legitimate, if they have been 
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constituted through an ethically correct process or procedure, i.e. in a moral practical discourse.151 
There are two principles of such a moral practical discourse, i.e. of discourse ethics that must be 
observed in order to arrive at legitimate norms. The first is that “only those norms are valid to 
which all possible affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourse (also often 
referred to as principle (D) i.e. discourse principle or principle of justification).”152 Secondly, a 
norm is justified and valid if the principle of universalization is met. That principle is expressed as 
“for a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects of its general observance for the 
satisfaction of each person's particular interests must be acceptable to all.”153 In essence, only those 
norms can claim to be valid that meet with the approval of all affected in their capacity as 
participants in a practical discourse.  
Such reasoned agreement, of course, can only take place if certain idealized properties of 
communication are met, i.e. if it takes place within an ideal speech situation that is freed from all 
external constraints and in which nothing but the force of the better argument prevails.154 The 
most important of these idealized properties are that no one capable of making a relevant 
contribution has been excluded, that participants have equal voice, that they are internally free to 
speak their honest opinion without deception or self-deception, and that there are no sources of 
coercion built into the process and procedures of discourse.155 Habermas' model of discourse ethics 
also rests on several strong assumptions about the capacity of persons for moral dialogue, 
including for example an individual's willingness to seek the input of others in forming one's 
conscience. Only if these conditions and assumptions are met will “the unforced force of the better 
argument prevail” and the resulting norm is legitimized, thus leading to a morally valuable 
norm.156  
Important and relevant as theories of discourse ethics are to the context of bioethics and the legal 
standards in that area, given this study's overall purpose this thesis will, however, focus on a 
different set of discourse studies which are conventionally subsumed under the heading 'discourse 
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analysis' or 'discourse theory'.157 That is, since this thesis is not concerned with legitimate, truthful 
or valid outcomes of the discourse that takes place in the area of bioethics but with the way the 
structure within which this debate takes place constitutes, constructs and limits the field of 
bioethics, this thesis will be concerned with discourse theory and analysis. 
 
1.2. A Brief Overview of Discourse Theory and Analysis 
Discourse theory or analysis is often famously ascribed to the work of such philosophers and 
thinkers as Michel Foucault, Jaques Derrida, and more recently Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe 
and Judith Butler.158 In essence, to these scholars language and other elements of discourse, such 
as non-verbal communications or physical acts or any other interaction between human beings, are 
not neutral means for describing or analysing the social, metaphysical and biological world. Rather 
they effectively construct, regulate and control knowledge and institutions159, as well as all human 
interactions. Discourse theory is concerned with the processes that produce such knowledge and 
institutions and that determine the form and outcome of human interactions.160 In contrast to 
discourse ethics discourse analysis then, however, asks not so much about legitimate or morally 
valuable ways of human interaction. Instead it tries to understand how a certain interaction, field 
of knowledge or institution came about or was constituted from the structures within which it took 
place.  
 
2. Discourse Analysis  
Foucault, one of the most prominent philosophers associated with discourse theory, holds 
discourses to constitute constructive phenomena, shaping the identities and practices of human 
subjects. In his study of various discourses he investigates the rules and practices that produce 
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meaningful statements and regulate discourses in different historical periods.161 Discourses to him 
are “groups of statements which provide a language for talking about ...a particular topic at a 
particular historical moment.”162 Discourses, Foucault argues, thereby construct the topic itself. 
They define and produce the objects of our knowledge.163 They determine the way a topic is talked 
about, reasoned about, resolved or analysed.164 In short, to Foucault nothing has meaning outside 
of the discourse that constitutes and constructs it.165  
Discourse then shows itself in and consists of the general domain of all statements or utterances, 
including speech and writing but also non-verbal communications, such as physical acts or visual 
symbol, in silence and generally in any other 'discursive practice', defined as any “habituated 
patterns of activity and thought, speaking and doing”.166 Thus a simple social practice such as 
shaking hands is as much part of a discourse that can be understood by others taking part in this 
discourse as are conversations, the wearing of specific cloths, such as ties or suits, or symbols, such 
as the displaying of the cross in some churches or class rooms.167  
Institutions, defined as fields that come with “persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe 
behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”168 such as for example the family, 
governmental institutions, a legal system, a church etc., play an important role in the development, 
maintenance and circulation of discourses.169 That is so because within institutions certain 
episteme, i.e. “classificatory grids” along which knowledge is ordered and meaning is allocated, 
operate.170 Episteme impose the framework of categories and classifications within which thought, 
communication and action are ordered, they are what “gives meaning to actions by relating them to 
their wider context of knowledge in a given context.”171 It is thus only by applying a certain 
episteme that a coherent interpretation of the social world becomes possible at all.  
One example of an imaginary episteme is provided by Foucault. It is that of an imaginary Chinese 
encyclopaedia which classifies animals as animals divided among others into a) belonging to the 
Emperor (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous (g) stray dogs…(n) that 
                                                          
161
 See for example M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge, 1998; -The Archeology of 
Knowledge, 1972; - Power/Knowledge, note 24.  
162
 Hall, note 23, 44. 
163
 Ibid. 
164
 M. Foucault, The Order of Things, 1970, 3. 
165
 Hall, note 23, 44. And A. Hunt/G. Wickham, Foucault and the Law, 1994, 14. 
166
 M. Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, note 161, 49.  
167
 H. Dreyfus/P. Rabinow, Michel Foucault, 1982, 155. 
168
 Keohane/Nye, note 159, 3. 
169
 Mills, note 140, 10. 
170
 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, note 161, defining episteme at 211 as "the total set of relations that unite, 
at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized 
systems; the way in which, in each of these discursive formations, the transitions to epistemologization, scientificity, 
and formalization are situated and operate". 
171
 Hunt/Wickham, note 165, 14. 
31 
 
 
 
look from a long way like flies.172 An example of a real-world episteme that is of relevance to the 
area of bioethics is the categorisation of diseases over centuries and in different societies, as 
evidenced for example in medical dictionaries or related records. The Greek physician Galen, for 
example, divided types of diseases based on the idea that bodies are ruled by four types of fluids, 
which determine an individual's personality and his or her reaction to various diseases.173 Another 
much observed categorisation of illnesses in 17th century Britain grouped diseases according to a 
patient's zodiac sign.174 The different categorisation or episteme applied in both, the fictitious and 
the real world example, make it clear that episteme generally are not fixed, premeditated or 
necessarily coherent categories of ordering knowledge. That is, any present reader's most likely 
initial response to the suggested episteme in Foucault's and the other stated examples will either be 
to consider them incoherent and arbitrary or to acknowledge that the offered categorisation of 
animals or diseases may have made or still make sense to someone part of the discourse that gave 
rise to this classification of animals or diseases, i.e. to someone living in the context, time and space 
in which this fictitious encyclopaedia or the above mentioned categorisation of diseases constituted 
common knowledge. If that, however, holds true for the stated examples it seems logical that other, 
more contemporarily used episteme, too, will seem equally incoherent and arbitrary if judged from 
someone outside of the particular discourse. That is so because according to discourse theory, 
episteme never exist self-evidently, primary or outside of human consciousness. Rather, human 
consciousness uses these categories or episteme to divide and order knowledge along certain, more 
or less arbitrarily defined grid-points, in an effort to make sense of the world.175 
Yet the stated examples also point to another finding which is that the 'institutions', in the present 
examples, the institutions of the study of diseases (medicine) or of the study of animals (zoology), 
in their respective forms are only constituted by an episteme, and, consequently, must be adapted 
or are sometimes rendered irrelevant if the episteme that construct and define them change or are 
no longer used. For example, today, the institution of medicine has generally expanded to include 
such areas as bacteriology, virology etc. while it commonly excludes fields of knowledge previously 
relevant to the subject, such as the study of star signs or the study of Galen's concept of body 
fluids.176 The institution of medicine thereby changes with the episteme that is used to think about 
medicine. In the same way are new institutions constituted by the development of new episteme, 
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while other institutions are rendered meaningless by the abrogation of a certain episteme. For 
example, gay or queer studies at Universities only came into existence because there exists a 
categorisation of human beings and their experiences along the line of sexual orientation. Would 
no one categorise human beings along the line of sexual orientation (or not anymore) or would a 
different categorisation of human beings and their experiences be applied altogether, for example 
one that categorises human beings along such lines as height, body weight or number of atoms in 
the body, the institution of gay or queer study would be rendered meaningless and likely be 
replaced by other institutions.  
In essence episteme and the discourses that are built on and around them enable and delimit 
fields of knowledge and inquiry.177 They govern what can be said, thought and done within 
institutions. They authorise some to speak, certain things to be said, thought and done and some 
views to be taken seriously while others are excluded, marginalised or prevented from being said, 
thought or done.178 For example, regular medical course curriculums at Universities, at least in 
most European Union countries, no longer teach Galen's concept of body fluid as a valid source of 
knowledge and any approbated physician trying to treat patients according to Galen's concept of 
body fluids would likely face charges of misconduct. Understood in that way it is obvious that 
discourses are inextricably linked to concepts of power and that power relationships necessarily 
show in discourse.179 Discourses never exist in a vacuum but are constantly conflicting with other 
discourses and other social practices.180 Power is what determines the dominant discourses, and 
their episteme, in this example power is what determines whether Galen (or homeopathy, for 
example) are considered relevant to medical studies. But such power, according to discourse 
theory, must not be confused with repression. Since discourse theory is not interested in which 
discourse is a true or accurate representation of the real world, power is neither good nor bad. 
Rather, it inevitably exists everywhere and inevitably shows in every form of social relations as the 
condition of all speech.181 Power produces reality and generates knowledge and truth-claims 
“...[] ...power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it served 
power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one 
another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations…[]…”182 
Knowledge can thus never "flourish independently of power. To understand the formation of any 
body of knowledge always involves the consideration of the power structures and dimensions 
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within which knowledge is produced. 183 Knowledge is a resource of power in the sense that 
experience always involves some kind of power/knowledge relationship.184 Similarly, truth-claims 
are wedded to the concept of power and hence part of discourses. Truth thereby is not the opposite 
of false or error. Truth regimes simply set out what truth is, i.e. the truth claims in which current 
power formations in discourses have resulted in  
 “Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: That is, the type of 
discourse which accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is 
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the 
status of those who are charged with saying what counts as truth.”185 
Knowledge, power and corresponding truth claims are thus fundamentally linked in discourse, in 
fact “power and knowledge are joined together in discourse…” 186 The questions of whether or not a 
patient's treatment based on Galen's idea of the physical body is considered sound or 'medical' is 
then not so much a matter of inherent moral truth or accurate representation of reality but a 
question of discourses and of the particular power/truth constellation displayed in them.   
However, while discourses are inevitable their specific power/knowledge and truth-claim set up is 
not.187 Exactly because the concept of a discourse is wedded to power and thus means the 
marginalisation of certain views there is always inbuilt in discourses a site of resistance: “Power 
reinforces it [discourse], but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it 
possible to thwart it.”188 Again, the question of whether or not Galen or homeopathy are 
considered 'proper' medicine is a question of the power set up and its corresponding truth claim. 
Yet particularly the example of homeopathy, which has long been excluded from European 
University medical course curricula but by now has become a much more accepted practice in these 
countries, also shows that discourses can change.189  
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3. Biopower 
In the context of discourse theory and the topical focus of this thesis one further concept 
promulgated among others by Foucault deserves mentioning, which is that of biopower. According 
to Foucault biopower is the "explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the 
subjugations of bodies and the control of populations".190 That is, through introducing biopolitics 
(the form of sovereign gouvernmentality that practices biopower) states seek to control and 
regulate all processes related to the ‘life sciences’, including most prominently questions that 
pertain to birth, death, sexualty, health, etc. The aim is the standardization or normalization of a 
population.191 Biopolitics is concerned with populations rather than individuals. Its legitimacy and 
general acceptance in populations usually derives from its claimed preoccupation with optimising 
lifes and life chances. That is, it is concerned with economic nurture and physical protection, rather 
than the threat of death.192 Biopower is connceted to a shift in sovereign powers from the ancient 
sovereign’s power to give and take an individual’s life to modern sovereign states power to ‘make 
life’ and ‘regulate death’. 
The goal of a population’s normalization and standardization is achieved through modern states’ 
regulation of all questions pertaining to ‘life processes’. For example, modern nation states endorse 
commonly applicable health care systems with mandatory enrolement schemes193 or vaccinations 
requirements194, define what a drug is and set rules for the use of it195 and regulate questions 
pertaining to abortion196.  These measures seek controll yet are often masked and hence may gain 
more easily acceptance as ‘concern for the prosperity of the population in all questions from birth 
to death’.197  
Medical and generally life-scienc related discourses thus constitute a site of power, where one 
discourse, for example a discourse that only allows abortion to be undertaken under very limited 
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circumstances, is endorsed and where technologies, such as for example those pertaining to the 
excessive application of pain relief for dying patients, become a tool of power used to control and 
exercise surveillance over a population. Often national laws are used to formalize these processes, 
including through laws that regulate abortion, substance (ab)use and health care reforms.198 
Foucault’s theory of biopower cannot be proven historically or otherwise and is subject to the same 
points of critique as his general concept of power.199 In the context of this thesis the concept of 
biopower is relevant as it generally undergirds this thesis‘ claim that more and more issues of 
bioethical interest are framed in legal terms: If states seek control over populations in questions 
pertaining to life processes then this will likely more often than not be done in a legal, binding 
form, i.e. a form that obliges the population to act in conformity to this legal text. The concept is 
also relevant in that Foucault’s concept of biopower gives one perspective on the current discourses 
led in the area of bioethics and as such is of interest to this thesis. Finally, the concept serves as 
trigger for many critical and interesting questions regarding current discourses in the area of 
bioethics, such as the qustion of whether it is at all desirable or necessary for states to set national 
or international norms in the area of bioethics.200 This thesis will thus often implicitly use and 
build on Foucault’s analysis of biopower and biopolitics in the chapters to follow. Yet, by limiting 
itself to an analysis of the implications of leading bioethics in a legal discourse at the international 
level, this thesis is not so much interested in one of the core question often debated in the context 
of the concept of biopower, which is whether or not the exercise of biopolitics and biopower, i.e. of 
control and surveillance, is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ and whether and how the particular discourse 
summarised by this concept should be changed and if so how. Instead this thesis will use Foucault’s 
concept of discourse and power and scrutinise implications of one particular discourse that takes 
currently place, without seeking to judge the outcome of the discourse itself. 
 
 
4. Conclusion: The Meaning of Discourse in the Context of this Thesis  
This thesis takes the approach associated with discourse theory and analysis while applying it to 
international legal standards in the area of bioethics. It understands discourses to be practices 
which humans impose on everything and by which humans make sense of the world. Discourses 
construct, regulate and control human interactions. Truth and morality are essentially constituted 
through discourse. 
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To the extent that it is possible to demarcate a field or institution of international law with its 
particular episteme and thereby a to some extent at least stable and, in the context of this thesis, 
distinct concept of legality, international legal discourse in the present context is understood as an 
institutionalized, i.e. international legal way of thinking about issues at stake and as the analysis of 
concerns within international legal language, logic and concepts. Of course, this so far circular 
definition hinges on the very concept and meaning of the term legality which is not a fixed term but 
can only be defined relative to a certain episteme, i.e. to the episteme that defines what is 
considered legal and what not.201 Moreover, the presently stated definition also recognises that at 
any time there are several international legal discourses competing with each other and that such 
legal discourses will differ over times, places, cultures, etc. It goes without saying that any legal 
discourse analysis that is based on the present understanding of discourses does not believe in the 
existence of a “right” or “correct” legal discourse. Rather, a multiplicity of legal discourses exists at 
any time which and they depend on episteme that underpin and define them and the specific 
power/truth relationships of the respective discourse. Legal discourse in this thesis therefore must 
be understood and is analysed “as a multiple and mobile field of force relations, wherein far-
reaching, but never completely stable effects of domination are produced”.202 Hence while this 
thesis depicts one version of a legal discourse this is not to be understood as a static field of inquiry. 
Only to the extent that such a fluid and never completely stable concept of a legal discourse allows 
for it, does legal discourses in the present context, by means of the specific episteme that construes 
it, define what is considered to be of legal relevance, what can be acceptably (legally) said about a 
specific topic and act as a determinant of a valid (legal) argument in that what is said and of the 
process of how such a (legal) argument must be made to be valid. 
With regard to the area of bioethics that means that the international legal discourse at work in this 
area, i.e. the way legal discourse construes and operates the area of bioethics, defines what is 
considered to be of relevance in that discourse, what can be acceptably said about issues of 
bioethical relevance, and how questions of bioethical relevance are to be addressed and to be 
resolved. It will be left to Part II to discuss in more detail the units of this discourse, their content 
and scope and the institutional framework within which this discourse takes place. Part III will 
then discuss the epistemological framework used in this discourse, how this discourse works to 
construe, discuss and resolve issues of bioethical relevance and some of the implications thereof. 
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Part II: 
Units of Discourse, the Institution of Law and the Episteme of 
International Legal Discourse in the Area of Bioethics 
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Chapter III The Institution of Law and the Legal Character of bioethically 
relevant Standards 
Since most international legal standards of interest to the present analysis, in fact all except for the 
ones issued by the Council of Europe, lack legal enforceability and remain legally non binding, 
these standards are conventionally classified as “soft law”.203 Soft law standards in turn are often 
located by scholars “in a grey zone between law and politics” and declared to be “neither strictly 
binding norms of law, nor completely irrelevant political maxims.”204 Most scholars would, 
however, also agree that “soft” law in actual practice often “acquire(s) considerable strength in 
structuring international conduct.”205 Since it is regularly debated what the term soft law means, 
what type of law soft law is and whether soft law constitutes law at all206 and as these questions 
therefore ask about properties of the institutionalised framework within which the presently 
examined discourse in the area of bioethics takes place these questions also have to be addressed in 
this thesis.207 That is, this chapter debates whether it is at all in order to refer to an international 
legal discourse when referring to the presently examined discourse that mostly builds on soft legal 
human rights standards (Chapter V) and if so (or if not) what type of discourse it is. Understanding 
the nature, kind and properties of so-called “soft law” will thus clarify what type of 'legal' discourse, 
if at all, is at work in the area of bioethics.  
 
1. An Introduction to the Term Soft Law 
1.1. Emergence and Range of Soft Law 
Soft law is often said to be a rather recent phenomenon, responding to the fact that the reality of 
international law-making has moved beyond the procedures that states traditionally agreed are 
“legislative,” that is, procedures identified by them as the appropriate means to create legally-
binding obligations. These procedures or sources of law, at least for the purpose of resolving inter-
state disputes, are identified in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(hereinafter ICJ).208 This Article provides that  
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The Court…[]… shall apply: 
a. international conventions
209
, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. []… judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the 
various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.  
 
According to the Statute conventions, i.e. treaties, and customary international law then constitute 
the primary and most relevant sources of international law. The inclusion into Article 38 of such 
sources as general principles, judicial decision and scholarly opinion, however, already indicates 
that international law cannot be reduced to treaties or international customary law only.210 It 
shows that international law is a complex, evolving and sometimes vague entity, the development 
of which partly is also a matter of discretion of international judges and scholars as authors of such 
'judicial decisions' and teachings.  
In addition, scholars over the last decades have noted that the categories of the sources of 
international law enshrined in the ICJ statute sometimes are no longer wholly adequate or 
sufficient in describing international legal reality.211 Rüdiger Wolfrum, for example, notes that 
international law has been expanded so that it today governs issues which would have been 
considered domestic affairs up to the middle of the 20th century and that new actors have become 
involved in the shaping of international norms apart from states, including individuals, groups of 
individuals, multinational organisations and other international non-governmental 
organisations.212 Besides, multiple arenas exist today for the application of international law, 
including for example the development of international law through the influence of national and 
regional courts and legal systems and the growing influence on international law through civil 
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society, so that it seems that the development and implementation of international law, are no 
longer exclusively reserved to the ICJ and its judges.213 Many of these developments have also been 
particularly instigated through the emergence, development and promotion of human rights 
norms.214 Quite apart from the questions of whether it ever has, what has traditionally been 
considered international law thus no longer adequately depicts reality. 
Alternative forms of international law making are then generally prospering in areas where states 
have not yet had the time or where they have yet been unwilling to formulate a formal and binding 
agreement on a subject, i.e. in those areas where there (yet) exists no customary international rule 
and/or where treaties are unlikely to come into existence.215 Also in areas, where there is a general 
need or desire for mutual confidence-building, a need or desire to stimulate developments still in 
progress but where there is also some concern that international relations otherwise will be 
overburdened by a legally binding and enforceable treaty, with the risk of failure and/or 
deteriorations in relations, alternative law making might present a 'compromise.'216 Alternative 
law-making is also often more attractive in areas where there is a need for simpler procedures than 
those required by treaties so that a more rapid finalization and implementation may be achieved.217 
Avoidance of for example a treaty form means that states are not bound by international rules 
relating to treaties, such as the rules regulating the termination218 and amendment219 of treaties 
which can be restrictive.220 States may also opt for alternative law making because they feel that 
the agreement in question still needs to be tested for its practicality or when it is unclear how long 
the situation that gave rise to the agreement will last. In such cases a treaty might foreclose the 
possibility for necessary change.221 Finally, alternative law making may be the choice if there is a 
need or desire to involve in agreements a broader range of stakeholders other than states, such as 
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organisations, communities, corporations etc. which cannot be included through traditional 
treaties that, as a rule, only bind states.222  
From the discussion thus far it is evident that the field of bioethics, as do areas of interest to human 
rights generally, make a good example of an area where soft law standards offer an attractive 
choice.223 For one, the field of bioethics has only rather recently come to the attention of 
international law makers. The perceived novelty of its subject matter as well as the sensitive and 
complex questions involved thereby result in that many states have not yet formed an opinion on 
how they want bioethically relevant topics to be dealt with.224 Prospects for reaching universally 
accepted treaties in the area are therefore rather limited. The process of drafting an alternative or 
soft law agreement then still might provide states with an opportunity to exchange opinions, to 
shape and share common values, to foster consensus and to negotiate substantive provisions 
without high risk of failure.225 Moreover, as could be seen in chapter 1, what is true in the area of 
bioethics today might no longer hold true tomorrow with new findings in related science and 
technologies changing the field of bioethics and by this challenging the adequacy of established 
normative order in that area.226 Here the flexibility of soft law may offer a more attractive 
governance option than many hard law standards. In analogy, soft law is an attractive choice for 
areas of human rights interests, such as a newly emerging “right to water”227, that have only 
recently gained prominence, where there is not yet consensus on how to deal with it or what it 
entails, where prospects of reaching agreement are fairly limited, where states want to exchange 
opinions and seek some form of agreement.  
Most such alternative international law-making, if it cannot be subsumed under either of the 
categories described in Article 38 of the ICJ, is then often generally referred to as 'soft law'. 
However, it should be noted that the term soft law so far lacks an authoritative definition and is, 
depending on which scholar uses it, presented in a nearly infinite variety of forms, including in 
forms that do not involve states. That is, as Christine Chinkin points out on the one end of the 
spectrum scholars have sometimes used the term "with regard to non-binding or voluntary 
resolutions and codes of conduct formulated and accepted by international and regional 
organisations228, statements prepared by individuals in a non-governmental capacity, but which 
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purport to lay down international principle"229 as well as action plans, guidelines and 
recommendations of international organisations, such as by the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (hereinafter IAEA), the United Nations Environment Programme (hereinafter UNEP) or 
the Food and Agricultural Organisation (hereinafter FAO).230 The terms soft law is also sometimes 
taken to refer to "declarations of intergovernmental conferences, such as the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development or the UNESCO UDBHR, and to resolutions of the UN General 
Assembly, such as those dealing with outer space, the deep seabed, or permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources."231 And it is sometimes used with regard to documents or standards agreed on at 
international conferences, such as Yalta232 and Potsdam233, the Conference for Security and Co-
operation/Organization for Security and Co-operation's (hereinafter CSCE/OSCE) Helsinki Final 
Act of 1975234 or at the level of the G7/8.235 Finally, at the very other end of the spectrum some 
authors even include certain 'soft' types of treaties in this category, a proposition that will be 
further discussed below.236  
 
1.2. Use of the Terms 'Soft Law' and 'Hard Law' for the Purpose of this Thesis 
Generally, it may be safe to say that as unique and manifold as the circumstances that lead to the 
adoption of international legal instruments that do not or barely at all fall under Article 38 of the 
ICJ statute as unique and manifold are the potential specifications of resulting agreements. 
Discussing the breadth of range of instruments potentially covered under the heading of soft law 
would go beyond the scope of this thesis. In the same way will it have to be left to other projects to 
elaborate a more concise and universally applicable definition of the term soft law. This thesis will 
merely define how it uses the terms soft and hard law with regard to standards in the area of 
bioethics. That should, however, not be interpreted as an attempt to lay down a generally 
applicable definition of the categories of hard and soft law.  
For clarity this thesis, in the following thus employs the following nomenclature with regard to the 
standards in the area of bioethics. The below (Chapter IV, 3) discussed UNESCO standards and the 
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UN cloning declaration, as they have been elaborated between states or rather their official 
extensions and by virtue of their legal non-bindingness and legal non-enforceability, constitute soft 
law. The Oviedo Convention (Chapter IV, 2) and the TRIPS agreements (Chapter IV, 4) constitute 
hard law as they are, formally at least, legally binding and legally enforceable treaties that are 
governed by the Vienna Convention and that have also been elaborated by states or their legal 
extensions. For the purpose of this thesis standards, statements, texts, or acts that have not been 
elaborated between states or their extensions in International Governmental Organisations, such 
as for example the below mentioned WMA Guidelines (Chapter IV, 1), will not be referred to under 
the heading of soft law. In short, all standards directly addressed to matters of bioethical interest 
that have been issued by states yet remain legally non binding and legally unenforceable are 
referred to as soft law. Legally enforceable and binding standards issued by the states are referred 
to as hard law. Nevertheless it should be noted that a categorisation as soft or hard law should not 
be confused with a general statement on the relevance of a standard for a legal discourse. That is, 
the label soft law does not necessarily preclude a soft legal standard from being relevant to a legal 
discourse. 
 
2. International Law and Legal Status   
The question about what type of standards, i.e. whether generally only hard law standards or also 
soft law (human rights) standards or both or none or only the latter, qualify as 'legal standards' and 
the question of whether or not it is justified to speak of a legal discourse if that discourse builds on 
hard or soft law or either or both type of standards can be answered or ascertained from two 
perspective. One is to define the discipline of law with a view to assessing whether soft or hard law 
standards form part of that entity of law. If either or both can be shown to form part of that entity it 
seems justified to also speak of the discourse that builds around soft or hard legal standards as a 
legal one. This approach will be discussed in the following sections. The other perspective, 
considered further below, is to assess the qualities of the soft and hard law standards in question 
and to understand whether they, based on an assessment of their properties, may be considered to 
be sufficiently 'legal' so that it seems justified to speak of an international legal discourse when 
referring to discourses that build on and around them.  
 
2.1. International Law's Distinct Feature 
The question 'what is (international) law' and hence the question about (international) law's 
distinct identity and of the boundaries of what constitutes 'legal', is as old as the field of 
jurisprudence. No school of jurisprudence, however, has so far provided an uncontested answer to 
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this question.237 With a view to assessing the possibility of a definition of complex terms, such as 
law, politics or morality, Ludwig Wittgenstein has convincingly argued that any such complex term 
that comprises several entities cannot be defined or connected by one essential common feature.238 
Rather, these entities exhibit a number of similarities, family resemblances, which usually overlap 
but which are not necessarily shared by all.239 As such neither law nor politics nor morality has one 
or a set of core features that can be found in all of the respective discipline's units and that hence 
clearly defines each of these disciplines and sets them apart from those belonging to other terms. 
Rather, terms like (international) law, politics, morality or ethics are fluid, their limits and borders 
cannot be decisively determined.240 A final definition of international law that is based on some 
inherent, objective and immutable characteristic of all pieces that together make up the field of 
(international) law is therefore impossible. However, even if such disciplines as 'law', 'politics' or 
'morality' cannot be clearly demarcated from one another based on some objective feature or 
characteristic that does not mean that terms such as international law are devoid of meaning. 
Rather, according to Wittgenstein, borders and limits of these terms can be drawn for certain 
purposes.241 This is, for example done when, as exemplified above, a definition of soft and hard law 
is undertaken for the purpose of an argument or this thesis. In analogy, soft law could simply be 
defined, for the purpose of this thesis, to be legal so that any discourse that builds around soft law 
standards would also have to be considered a legal one. Yet, stating a mere definition would say 
little about the qualities and characterisitcs of the thereby defined discourse.   
Moreover, in the light of this thesis’ methodological approach, another question might be asked 
and that is how (and why) definitional boundaries are drawn the way they are drawn and how it is 
that a discipline, that cannot be unequivocally defined through one or a set of certain objectifiable 
characteristics, nevertheless can generally be accepted and recognised as a distinct field of inquiry. 
In order to answer this question it can be helpful to return to discourse theory, discussed above. 
The argument there was that any discipline's, such as law's or politics' meaning, derives not from 
characteristics of the units of this discourse but from the discourse that constitutes them. That is, 
by using a certain episteme a discourse is built around it which then again defines the subject 
matter of the discourse itself. Once a discipline, such as law, is constituted in that way it is also 
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possible to understand the formation of a distinct disciplinary discourse that builds on that 
discipline and its units.242  
Judith Shklar makes a similar statement by referring to what she terms 'legalism'. According to 
her, for a text to be considered 'legal' it requires a certain mindset on the part of the observer or 
entity that chooses to treat and analyse the material as such. To treat documents, acts or 
movements as distinctively 'legal', according to Shklar, is a political choice. This political choice 
and the mindset that comes with it Shklar termed 'legalism'.243 Once this mindset is set to work law 
is treated as something distinct and by that a specifically legal discourse is constituted where law is 
defined and analysed “as if this could be done on its own terms”.244 Similarly, Koskenniemi holds 
that international legal discourse is inherent “political” in nature, yet interpreted by most scholars 
as an argumentative distinctive legal practice and as a unified legal discourse. Legal advisers, 
scholars and judges use the language of international law and, thus, constitute international law.245 
One example for how this is being done, i.e. how this political choice is facilitated and how a 
particular school of law is constituted through the application of a certain episteme, is provided by 
Armin von Bogdandy. Reflecting on the recognition of constitutional legal theory as a distinct area 
of study within positivist legal discourse he argues that 
“law is detached from social reality and tied to legal instruments that flow from sources of 
law. From this foundation, the positive material is transcended, not by way of political, 
historical, or philosophical reflection, but through structure-giving concepts such as state, 
sovereignty, treaty, peremptory norms, or monism and dualism. Even though many of these 
concepts, in retrospect, clearly have connotations in natural law they are conceived of as 
specifically legal [sic] and, thus, autonomous. As a consequence they fall under the 
exclusive competence of legal science. The highest scientific goal is to present, or rather: to 
reconstruct and represent law as complexes of systematically coordinated concepts. The key 
scientific competencies thus become abstraction, the development of concepts, and the 
corresponding arrangement of the legal material. In crafting such concepts, legal scholarship 
creates for itself an autonomous area of discourse and argumentation...[].
246
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In other words, an autonomous area of discourse is constituted because texts are transcended 
through structure giving concepts (an episteme) and thereby presented as legal.247 Applied to the 
area of international law generally that means that international law can and is regarded or treated 
as a discrete system and hence can be the basis of a distinctively legal discourse because prima 
facie neutral texts or generally utterances are transcended by being structured according to certain 
episteme, i.e. according to structure giving concepts, such as in the above stated example state, 
treaty, peremptory norm, etc. which then make the text legal or give it legal significance. Only 
based on this episteme is it possible to build a – to some extent – specific, distinct and autonomous 
discourse, a particularly international legal discourse. For the area of bioethics that means that if 
standards, according to the relevant structure giving concepts in the area, can be classified as law 
they may be considered law. The following sections will therefore turn to a discussion of certain 
aspects of this episteme of international law and, therein, to an assessment of the standards in the 
area of bioethics. 
 
2.2. The Properties of Standards in the Area of Bioethics 
In this section this thesis will then take the material texts in the area of bioethics, i.e. the standards 
in the area of bioethics and discuss them through the prism of several 'structure giving concepts' in 
order to assess whether they may be considered sufficiently legal so that it seems justified to refer 
to the discourse that builds around them in the area of bioethics as a legal discourse. The episteme 
used in the following section thereby will be a well established one. That is, this thesis uses the 
episteme encapsulated in traditional legal textbook discussions on how to distinguish between hard 
law, i.e. between what is conventionally considered international law, and soft law. Reflecting on 
whether or not the standards in the area of bioethics can be deemed to be sufficiently hard and 
thereby sufficiently 'legal', at least according to classical textbook analysis, will make clearer the 
type of legal or other discourse that is led through the standards in the area of bioethics, be that a 
legal, soft-legal or not-legal one.  
 
2.2.1. Non-Binding Non-Treaty Standard 
One property usually exclusively assigned to hard law and thereby to standards that conventionally 
are considered to be of legal relevance and status is that they come in the form of a binding treaty. 
Soft law in contrast is usually considered to be a legally non-binding instrument in a non-treaty 
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form.248 That is, although states have issued and formulated such instruments they are not legally 
bound by them and following soft law provisions is optional. Moreover, these agreements are not 
governed by international law i.e. by the provisions of the Vienna Convention for the law of 
treaties. Article 2 para 1 of the Vienna Convention defines a treaty for the purpose of the 
Convention as “an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed 
by international law whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments, and whatever its particular designation.” 249 It further states in Article 2 (1) b that an 
agreement is contractually binding and thus legally relevant for the purpose of the Convention only 
if the parties want it to be binding, if it is in writing and subject to international law. 250 In reverse 
most scholars agree that if the parties to an agreement "expressly or implicitly do not want a treaty, 
the provisions of the Vienna Convention do not apply."251 If an instrument is a treaty concluded by 
states, in writing and if states want it to be binding, by definition, it is then also binding law. If not, 
and if it cannot be shown to constitute part of international customary law252 or a norm of jus 
cogens253, international legal standards will often be placed in the category of non-binding soft law, 
the legal status of which is then subject to debate. 254  
Formally this distinction can certainly be applied to standards in the area of bioethics. With the 
exception of the Oviedo Convention all instruments in the area of bioethics remain legally non-
binding non treaty standards at least according to the Vienna Convention.255 That is so because 
there can be no doubt that states intended the declarations in the area of bioethics, to be discussed 
in the next chapter, to be non-binding non treaty standards. The question about the form of the 
future instrument in the area of bioethics was, for example, discussed in the Draft Report of the 
International Bioethics Committee on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on 
Bioethics. It states that the IBC's goal was to create an “international instrument” but that overall it 
was preferable to settle on a non-binding declaration.256 Intentions to create a non-binding non-
treaty instrument were even more explicitly voiced in the case of the UN Cloning Declaration.257 In 
contrast, in the case of the Oviedo Convention258 it is evident that states deliberatively opted for 
the form of a binding and enforceable treaty: Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Council of 
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Europe in the area of bioethics remained in the non-binding area of recommendations and 
declarations.259 The drafting of a Convention only became a real option when in the 1990s the 
Council's Committee of Ministers explicitly formed CAHDI/CBDI and asked it to examine the 
possibility of preparing a framework convention.260 The fact that until then the field of bioethics 
was regulated by recommendations indicates that states here again clearly and intentionally opted 
for a treaty.  
Since it is the intentions of states that determine whether or not a binding treaty has been 
established the Oviedo Convention must formally be regarded as a binding treaty under the Vienna 
Convention whereas other Declarations in this area formally may not be regarded as such. Yet, by 
itself this fact does not say much about the standards' relevance to a legal discourse. That is so for 
several reasons. For one, the line between what is and what is not legally binding runs not always 
along the line of whether or not a treaty is regarded as a binding treaty under the Vienna 
Convention.261 As Hillgenberg notes there is no provision of international law which prohibits non-
treaty agreements as legally relevant and binding sources of law262 some agreements involving 
states, such as for example agreements between states which are governed by municipal law, are 
binding and legally relevant even if they are not considered a treaty for the purpose of the Vienna 
Convention.263 Moreover, it is at least debatable whether declarations are necessarily legally non-
binding. Both, treaties and soft law agreements can as Hillgenberg notes be "based on a 
coincidence of declared intentions. Since the decisive factor in international law, and especially in 
the field of international agreements, is the intention of states, there appears to be no reason for 
why states should be denied the possibility to take on a commitment with lesser legal consequences 
than a treaty would have"264, i.e. to commit to a binding commitment below treaty level.265 In such 
a case there may well be a binding agreement but one which is only of limited legal effect.266 
Declarations, such as the UDBHR and other non-treaty agreements may also be binding in a less 
than legal way. There can be normative statements which derive their bindingness not from a legal 
source but from other sources such as reciprocity or moral commitment.267 Another point of note is 
that soft law instruments may become legally binding. As Boyle notes this can happen when they 
"are used as mechanisms for authoritative interpretation or amplification of the terms of a 
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treaty",268 are incorporated into the terms of a treaty by implied reference,269 or when they are 
taken as a first step in a process eventually leading to the conclusion of a treaty or the emergence of 
a customary international law.270 Diana Sheldon has shown that the latter function of soft law is 
particularly prevalent in the area of human rights, where soft law is used “primarily as a precursor 
to binding treaties.”271 In the area of bioethics it is, for example, arguable that some of the 
principles, such as those on informed consent, endorsed in the precursors to contemporary 
standards in the area of bioethics and the early UNESCO Declarations272 were later affirmed in the 
legally binding Oviedo Convention.273 One further indication of that the distinction between what 
is and what is not legally binding according the Vienna Convention is not absolutely telling with 
regard to legal status is the fact that states entered declarations of vote on the UDBHR, equalling in 
many respects the way states enter reservations with regard to treaties.274 This suggests that they 
expect the UDBHR to have or to develop some binding and normative force and hence to be (or 
become) of some sort of legal status.275 
On the other hand the mere status of a binding treaty is also not an authoritative statement on the 
relevance to a legal discourse of a specific treaty.276 In the case of the Oviedo Convention it must 
for example be noted that several of its provisions are vaguely and cautiously worded.277 Such 
provisions then raise some uncertainty as to whether any real obligations are created by them at 
all, as well as whether it is at all possible to breach such treaty provisions.278 Also, if the 
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justification for non-fulfilment, or where withdrawal from or implementation of a treaty is largely 
left to the discretion of the state under obligation, as it is the case with regard to the Oviedo 
Convention, it is arguable that no or only a semi-binding treaty has been formed.279 Here it is 
arguable that “the mere use of a treaty form does not of itself ensure a hard or binding 
obligation.”280 
To conclude, the simple rule that legally binding treaties are always legally relevant and hence 
relevant to a legal discourse and that in reverse legally non-binding instruments are not legally 
relevant and not relevant to a legal discourse is in many ways too simple. Rather, simply because a 
standard is soft law and not legally binding according to the Vienna Convention does not mean that 
it cannot be legally relevant and/or the foundation of a legal discourse. The fact that the soft law 
standards in the area of bioethics are not legally binding thus does not per se prevent them from 
giving rise to a legal discourse nor does the fact that the Oviedo Convention is binding per se 
mandate it to give rise to a legal discourse. 
 
2.2.2. The Level of Enforceability 
A second distinction between soft and hard law which is also usually taken as an indicator of soft 
and hard law's legal (ir)relevance, is that only hard law is legally enforceable. That is, soft law 
instruments generally do not stipulate for any legal way to enforce their provisions. Hard law in 
contrast is legally enforceable, for example, in courts or equivalents. If a hard law provision is 
breached an injured State may even take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for 
an internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations, i.e. may 
itself breach international law.281 
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Again, formally this characteristic holds true with regard to declarations and conventions, 
including those in the area of bioethics. The UDBHR, for example, if breached, stipulates for no 
legal consequence. No state could take another state to court in order to have the provisions of the 
UDBHR enforced on the 'perpetrating' state. Similarly, no state could legally demand the 
imposition of sanctions on another state in order to press for the implementation of the 
Declaration's provisions. The Oviedo Convention, in contrast, stipulates for a variety of 
enforcement methods, including in Article 25 the application of sanctions in the event of 
infringement of the provisions contained in the Convention. Other hard law standards in the area, 
such as for example WTO agreements, come with mandatory dispute resolution processes. 282 
Practically speaking, however the difference at least between the Oviedo and the UNESCO 
standards, should not be overstated and again is of limited informative value with regard to the 
question of whether or not it is justified to speak of a legal discourse when that discourse builds 
(also) on legally non enforceable standards. First, in contrast to the theory behind it, practically, 
the legal enforcement of provisions seems to be only of limited relevance. In cases like the Oviedo 
Convention, for example, the likelihood that a treaty will give rise to court proceedings or sanctions 
is so low that it might as well be said that enforcement structures are de facto non-existent. One 
reason for that is certainly the aforementioned weak and cautious wording of the Oviedo 
Convention which then makes it difficult to breach its provisions at all.283 In fact, in many ways the 
Convention itself seems so softly and vaguely worded that what is apparently a treaty in fact is 
devoid of legal content.284 Moreover, even with regard to those provisions of the Oviedo 
Convention which might be specific enough, such as in the area of informed consent to trigger legal 
action in case of infringement285 it seems unlikely that any state would refer to sanctions to enforce 
them. States' tendency not to resort to sanctions if their aim can also be achieved via other, usually 
softer means stems from the fact that the application of sanctions often hurts the state imposing 
the sanction as much as the state against which they are directed if they lead to a deterioration of 
relations between the states.286 Another reason is that sanctions are hardly ever effective.287 Thus, 
even if states in theory can rely on sanctions and other means to enforce a treaty the supposed 
efficacy of sanctions has been frequently challenged and their use, at least at the multilateral level, 
has remained fairly limited.288  
States instead often have replaced conventional dispute mechanisms by the establishment of 
mechanisms that monitor compliance with international legal standards on a permanent basis, and 
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thus prevent or deter as much as possible deviation from standards.289 The establishment of such 
formal and informal mechanism can, however, also be observed in the area of soft law. States for 
example rely on a variety of non-legal compliance inducing strategies at their disposal including 
most prominently naming and shaming strategies,290 strategies which are also available with 
regard to soft law. Finally, it should be noted that courts have referred to both soft and hard law 
instruments in the area of bioethics. Like the Oviedo Convention, the UDBHR was thereby cited as 
a relevant standard with no apparent distinction as to its legal standing.291 Moreover, the European 
Court of Human Rights has already referred to the Oviedo Convention as a standard in cases where 
Member States of the Council of Europe were involved that had not ratified, in this case France292 
or not even sign it, in this case the United Kingdom.293 The fact that the courts referred to both 
types of standards in an indiscriminate way and even considered standards applicable to states that 
had not ratified or signed them implies that the court does not think it necessary to always draw a 
distinction between formally legally binding and enforceable and formally legally not binding and 
not enforceable standards. In both instances the standards in question were used as legal 
instruments from which states should derive normative guidance.  
To conclude, legal enforceability certainly is not all that is to be said about law and is not 
necessarily indicative of legal relevance. Moreover, practically the difference between what is and 
what is not legally enforceable is not always easy to discern. Most importantly, as shown by the 
courts lack of legal enforceability certainly does not by itself mean that soft law standards in the 
area of bioethics cannot give rise to a legal discourse.   
 
2.2.3. Effect and Impact 
A further distinction sometimes made between soft and hard law and thereby between legal 
(ir)relevance is that the former is usually said to be of limited effect and impact. Since states are 
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free to follow the provisions of a soft law instrument the effect of these instruments is said to be at 
best unpredictable.294 Hard law in contrast is generally perceived to have a significant impact on 
states' behaviour.  
Depending on what is involved, treaties and/or customary law in fact often are more effective than 
soft law instruments.295 That is so according to Boyle because they usually indicate a stronger 
commitment to the principles or rules in question and to that extent carry greater weight than a 
soft law instrument.296 But the assumption that treaties are necessarily more authoritative is 
misplaced".297 In most cases as Boyle points out "treaties do not generate or codify customary or 
other hard law because of their binding form but because they either influence state practice and 
provide evidence of opinion juris" for new or emerging rules, or because they are good evidence of 
what the existing law is already".298 In many cases this is no different in the case of non-binding 
and non enforceable soft law instruments.299 They are generally the more effective the more they 
reflect an already existing agreement in a certain area of law and the better they are suited to 
influence states' behaviour.300 In the area of bioethics instruments of the hard and the soft law 
seem to be most accepted and effective in those respects where they endorse already established 
principles of international law. That is for example the case when it comes to the principle of 
autonomy and its formulation in the rules regarding the area of informed consent.301 They are less 
strong when it comes to endorsing new, contested principles, such as protection of the integrity of 
future generations or the recognition of previously expressed wishes with regard to a medical 
intervention.302 Yet that assessment applies to all standards, not only the soft law standards which 
somewhat defies the original statement that held that only hard law standards are effective.  
The exact demarcation line between hard and soft law measured by the effect of an instrument 
becomes even further blurred in those cases in which the potential force of a treaty is heavily 
qualified by reservations or when there is a need to wait for ratification and entry into force of that 
treaty and/or when only few states agree to the terms of that treaty.303 Soft law's authority in 
contrast is likely to increase if it is able to secure immediate consensus support among states and 
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other stakeholders so that it becomes immediately valid.304 The UDBHR for example was accepted 
by all of UNESCO's member states – even if qualified through declarations of vote-, whereas the 
Oviedo Convention was not signed or ratified by a number of states, including the United Kingdom 
and Germany. Such signing patterns might even indicate the lesser force of the latter agreement, 
whereas, in comparison, UNESCO's soft law declarations show immediate support from all states, 
which also implies some authority at least. 
Finally, hard and soft law can, as indicated above, both be influential because states perceive it to 
be so. In the absence of a reliable international police to enforce the law, much depends upon a 
commonly shared belief that states' conduct will definitely be constrained by the commitments 
states have accepted, either by specific consent or by virtue of their membership in a rule regime 
such as the United Nations. In the interstate community, the belief that pacta sunt servanda, that 
treaties are binding, and not just when they are convenient or advantageous is largely responsible 
to making these agreements work.305 The same reasoning can be true in the area of soft law. If 
states perceive to be bound by the terms of the UDBHR then it seems that there will be little 
difference between the Oviedo Convention and the UDBHR. Both will and are followed because 
they are perceived to be binding and to entail some sense of obligation not because they come in a 
certain form.306 
Hence quite besides the fact that higher impact and effect do not necessarily attach to hard law 
only a standard's limited effect and impact does not necessarily mean that the standard in question 
does not give rise to a legal discourse. 
 
2.2.4. Coming into Existence, Content and Style 
A further alternative view on soft law focuses on where and how different types of instruments 
come into existence as well as on their content and style. Soft law is thereby generally seen as being 
more readily agreed on and entered into than hard law.307 The requirement of a signature and a 
certain number of ratifications from states to become binding, as is for example the case with 
regard to the Oviedo Convention308, thereby certainly requires more of a state than merely 
accepting a standard in that it asks a state to undertake a positive act to affirm a standard and in 
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that it opens the states' performance to public and often democratic scrutiny whereas no such 
requirements apply in, for example, the case of the UNESCO instruments. However, while the act 
of signing and opening up for ratification a document might rightly be said to raise the threshold of 
a state acceding to an agreement, at least in terms of effectiveness of the document such an act does 
not necessarily make a difference. First, as was the case with the Oviedo Convention, it might mean 
that fewer states actually commit to the provisions of the treaty. Secondly, the ratification process 
often draws out the time until a document becomes effective, whereas the Declaration became 
effective immediately. 
Further, soft law also usually is said to be more prevalent in certain areas, such as environmental 
law, whereas hard law is seen to regulate 'important' areas, such as economics and trade. Since the 
area of bioethics is addressed by both types of standards that differentiation, however, does not 
seem to apply to this area of standard setting. In fact, the Oviedo Convention and the UDBHR are 
concerned with very similar topics. Merely few issues, such as organ transplantation or concerns 
for the environment are addressed within either the Convention or the UDBHR only.309 Given the 
potential range of issues that could have been dealt with under the heading bioethics or 
biomedicine, the number of similar topics addressed in both documents seems rather remarkable.  
A further contrast, so Boyle, is sometimes established between ”rules”, involving clear and 
reasonably specific commitments which are supposed to be found in hard law provisions, and 
“norms” or “principles”, which, being more open-textured or general in their content and wording, 
are conventionally understood to be soft.310 However, quite besides the fact that the categories 
“rules”, “principles” and “norms” are not easily demarcated, as they have hazy boarders and often 
considerably overlap311 both types of instruments in the area of bioethics seem to operate on the 
same basis in that they are based on similar principles, which are generally seen to be more 
characteristic of soft law documents.312 Moreover, instruments of both the soft and hard law use 
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similar language and similar expressions, and strength of wording.313 And indeed, with the 
exception of the provisions on informed consent314, overall the language of all instruments might 
best be described as aspirational in that it speaks of overall goals and long term objectives rather 
than of strict rules and clear guidelines or of specific, detailed propositions.   
Given the similarities between both types of standards in the area of bioethics it seems reasonable 
to assume that both should be able to give rise to the same type of discourse be that a legal or not 
legal one. 
 
3. Conclusion: The Legal Character of Instruments in the Area of Bioethics 
From all that has been said so far all standards in the area of bioethics to varying degrees and with 
regard to different aspects can be considered both, hard and soft and thereby conventionally be 
understood to be of greater or lesser legal relevance and status. On one hand, the UNESCO 
standards for example are not so legal in the sense that they are not legally binding or enforceable. 
But also the Oviedo Convention can be considered to be rather soft in that it is binding and 
enforceable only to a limited extent, in that it is rather weakly worded and in that its effect so far 
seems to have been as limited or broad as that of the soft law standards in the area. On the other 
hand, standards are legal to the extent that they are a clear expression of states' intention and there 
can be no doubt that states, with regard to both the UNESCO standards and the Oviedo 
Convention, intended to create instruments that go beyond mere moral or political relevance. 
Secondly, standards in the area of bioethics are legal in the sense that they already have and are 
likely to further develop some binding force. States already comply with them to some extent or 
fear that at some point these standards develop legal force. In many cases the instruments already 
help shape or even set the normative order in the area of bioethics. Moreover, they are legally 
relevant because courts and states refer to them and take actual guidance from their provisions. 
States' and courts' perceptions of these instruments therefore indicate that they are or may come to 
be of legal relevance. The legal nature of the standards also becomes evident when they refer to and 
endorse a long existent body of legal human rights norms, when they take the form of classical legal 
instruments such as a treaty, and by means of their wording.  
Overall, similarities in terms of form, content, style, impact, effect and relevance across all 
standards in the area of bioethics, no matter whether they are conventionally considered soft or 
hard, is noticeable and rather striking. To speak of a legal discourse only in those cases where it 
builds on hard law, i.e. on the basis of the Oviedo Convention therefore seems somewhat artificial. 
In the context of this thesis, the soft law standards, in addition to the hard law standards, are then 
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considered to be legally relevant albeit enforceable and binding only to a limited extent. That is, 
this thesis treats the soft law standards in the area of bioethics not as a mere expression of political 
or moral will but as –albeit not legally binding and enforceable - extensions to the traditional 
sources of international law and therefore as legally relevant. In the case of both the soft and hard 
law standards in the area of bioethics a legal discourse takes place to the extent that the standards 
use legal terminology and form, are based on some of the premises that define international law, 
including that they are made by states and applied in between states, that they are human rights 
standards, use a language of rights and are based and endorse human rights principles and values. 
The next chapter will further elaborate on the properties of the type of international legal discourse 
that takes place in the area of bioethics.  
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Chapter IV International Legal Standards in the area of Bioethics and their 
legal and non-legal precursors 
This chapter introduces some of the international legal standards that have a more or less direct 
bearing on questions of bioethical relevance. To that end, this chapter first provides some examples 
of how international law and the field of bioethics continuously intersect, gives an overview over 
some of the standards that have a bearing on questions of bioethical relevance and then reflects on 
whether such questions are already dealt with under general international law.  
 
1. Precursors to Legal Standards Directly Addressed to Issues of Bioethical 
Relevance 
1.1. The Trial at Nuremberg  
Despite its origin in and longstanding relation with medical ethics and moral philosophy bioethics 
is often said to have only properly emerged out of and into a legal context with the so called 
Nuremberg doctors' trials.315  
The Nuremberg doctors' trials of 1946, a military tribunal at Nuremberg, opened criminal 
proceedings against 23 Nazi medical professionals for war crimes and crimes against humanity.316  
It thereby revealed some of the horrors of Nazi physician's involvement in human experimentation 
and other cruelties against their patients.317 As part of their attempt to establish the rule of law in 
the face of the outrageous 'medical' practices and unprecedented abuse the judges developed a set 
of 10 standards setting out 10 fundamental ethical standards based on “principles of the law of 
nations as they result from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of 
humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience.”318  
The standards have later come to be known as the Nuremberg Code. Of the 10 principles of this 
Code, the absolute requirement of informed consent receives the most treatment. According to the 
Code consent must be voluntary, competent, informed, and comprehending.319 The second most 
important condition promulgated by the code is the need for scientifically-valid research designs 
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that have the real potential to produce fruitful results for the good of society.320 Other fundamental 
principles include that the experiment must be designed and conducted to minimize the research 
subject's pain and suffering, that experiments that are likely to result in injury or death to the test 
subject should not be conducted and that any risk to be applied to the subject must be weighed 
against the 'humanitarian' importance of the data sought.321  
Although the Nuremberg Code never became part of binding international law in that it does not 
give rise to legal obligation for states to adhere to its provision or in that observance of its 
provisions could be legally enforced against states322 it is regularly cited as one point of birth of 
modern bioethics as well as one foundational cornerstone of modern bioethical thought.323 This is 
so because it was there that bioethics was first approached by a formal, state endorsed and 
internationally highly visible forum that 'codified' principles of bioethics within an official, widely 
recognised and internationally applicable document. As a result, the Nuremberg Code has been one 
source of guidance of many of the modern legal instruments, binding and non-binding, in the area 
of bioethics.324 The concept of informed consent featuring so prominently in the Code, today, for 
example, constitutes a fundamental principle recognised in all bioethical instruments.325 Also the 
ethical requirements related to the treatment of patients have clearly left their imprint on all later 
documents in the area.326 
 
1.2. Declarations of the World Medical Association 
Other prominent, though not legal327 precursor to current legal instruments in the field of bioethics 
are the World Medical Association's (hereinafter WMA) Declaration of Geneva328, adopted in 
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September 1948 and the Helsinki Declaration on Ethical Principles for Medical Research Involving 
Human Subjects (hereinafter Helsinki Declaration) adopted in 1964.329 The principles enshrined in 
the Helsinki Declaration, with some limitations require among other things, that research on 
humans should only be performed by qualified individuals and that the potential benefits of the 
experiment be balanced against the risks to the research subject.330 Since its initial adoption in 
1964, the Declaration of Helsinki has been amended five times, most recently in 2000.331 As it 
stands today, it provides 16 basic principles governing medical research involving human subjects 
and further five principles governing medical research combined with medical care. 
Although WMA standards are legally nonbinding and legally unenforceable332 the principles set 
out in the Declarations have contributed to the shaping of modern bioethical thought and legal 
standards in the area of bioethics.333 They have done so because they, together with the Nuremberg 
Code, were the first to establish basic ethical principles and procedures in many areas of bioethical 
relevance in a codified and internationally relevant text.334 They also reaffirmed once more the 
connection between bioethics and human rights, thereby linking the field of bioethics even more 
closely to a legal context.335 
 
1.3. International Human Rights Standards 
As will be further explored over the next sections, chapters and throughout this thesis international 
human rights standards, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereinafter 
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UDHR)
336
, have been most influential on current legal approaches to the area of bioethics and 
generally bioethical thought. In fact, UNESCO's International Bioethics Committee (hereinafter 
IBC)
337
 claims that modern bioethics is “indisputably founded on the pedestal of the values 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”338  
The promotion of human rights as an aim is mentioned in the Charter of the United Nations 
(hereinafter UN Charter) and it is one of the purposes of the United Nations (hereinafter UN) as 
such.
339
 The importance attached to human rights was later given legal expression in the UDHR 
which was adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly and which sets forth the 
inalienable rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every human being without regard to his 
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.
340
 It found further recognition in the adoption of two International Covenants, 
one on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPT)  and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(hereinafter ICESCR).
341
 Many of these standards' provisions could be interpreted as having some 
bearing on issues of bioethical relevance. The right to life, liberty and security of persons, the right 
not to be held in slavery and freedom from torture as well as the principle not to be discriminated 
against could be relevant to discussions around such issues as medical research on human research 
subjects, organ transplantation or access to essential medicines.
342
 Also particularly relevant to the 
context of bioethics is Article 25 of the UDHR which proclaims the right to “a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, 
housing and medical care and necessary social services”343 which has subsequently been enshrined 
in several other human rights standards.
344
 Taken together, a growing body of international human 
rights treaties and non binding standards detail the obligation of states to respect, protect and fulfil 
human rights, many of which can be interpreted as having meaning also in the area of bioethics. 
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That is so even though traditional interpretations, by, for example, governments of these rights and 
their scope have been rather narrow. With regard to the right to life and the right to health, which so 
far, for example, has not been interpreted to include a right to access to essential medicines, Holger 
Hestermeyer argues that  
“a distinction between a 'right to life' and 'life' is … artificial ….also, there is no reason why 
a lack of food or medical services should be less significant for the right to life than 
insufficient penal laws on murder. To be effective the right to life has to extend to the basic 
conditions of life, the components necessary for survival, even if that part of the right is to 
some extent coextensive with economic, social and cultural rights.”345  
Thus, the fact that so far the legal human right to life, as for example stated in Article 6 of the 
ICCPR346, has been narrowly interpreted does not mean that the right to life is not relevant to 
bioethical debates nor that it could not be taken as the basis of future legal discussions in the area. 
In any event, however, the sheer existence of human rights that are meant to safeguard individuals' 
well being and to protect them against abuses by the state has clearly provided the ferment and 
stepping stone from which the more recent human rights standards in the area of bioethics could at 
all develop. The discussion of health, health related, environmental and of other questions arising 
in the life sciences within a human rights framework, for example, certainly has had an influence 
on that issues of bioethical relevance are acceptably dealt with in human rights frameworks.  
 
1.4. Conclusion 
Several international agreements and standards had or have a strong bearing on the development 
of contemporary standards in the area of bioethics. The first two standards that were mentioned in 
this context, the Nuremberg Code and the Helsinki Declaration of the WMA, are legally non 
binding and non enforceable standards that, as will be seen below, have nevertheless clearly helped 
shaping current standards in the area of bioethics. They have done so by being among the first 
internationally relevant text that codified standards in the area of bioethics and by linking them to 
a context of human rights and human rights principles. Human rights law in contrast, being in 
some cases legally binding and enforceable treaty law and in some cases non legally binding and 
non enforceable expressions of states' intention, has been most influential to the development of 
current standards in the area of bioethics, mostly so by giving issues in the area of bioethics a 
conceptual framework within which these issue can be addressed. 
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2. Contemporary Instruments in the Area of Bioethics 
In the following some of the most relevant international legal standards in the area of bioethics will 
be discussed. This chapter will start with a discussion of the standards of the Council of Europe as 
these standards to date constitute the only legally binding and enforceable instruments in the area. 
It will then move on to discuss some of UNESCO's legally non-binding and non-enforceable soft 
law standards addressed to the area of bioethics.  
 
2.1. The Council of Europe Instruments in the Area of Bioethics 
The Council of Europe is one of various international organisations that have come to concern 
themselves directly with questions of bioethics. Founded in 1949, the Council of Europe seeks “to 
achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the 
ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social 
progress. This aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council … and in the maintenance 
and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and other reference texts on the 
protection of individuals.”347 It has 47 member countries and five observer countries, including the 
United States, Canada and Japan.348 The Council's primary aims are to protect human rights, 
pluralist democracy and the rule of law, to promote awareness and encourage the development of 
Europe's cultural identity and diversity and to find common solutions to the challenges facing 
European society, particularly discrimination against minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, 
bioethics and cloning, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, organised crime and corruption, 
cybercrime, violence against children. The Council moreover seeks to consolidate democratic 
stability in Europe by backing political, legislative and constitutional reform.349 
Over the last 20 years the Council of Europe has also increasingly addressed itself to bioethical 
issues.350 Its motivation to do so stems from the recognition that “biological and medical research 
has produced spectacular advances in the health field, but [that] it also raises questions concerning 
a number of fundamental values, such as the individual, the family, health, private life, human 
rights and human dignity.”351 Where the Council has addressed issues of bioethical relevance it has 
done so with a particular view to “protect the individual's dignity and fundamental rights with 
regard to the application of ordinary medicine and new medical techniques.”352 According to its 
own mission statement it thereby seeks to “strike a balance between freedom of research and 
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protection of persons, while fostering reflection and public discussion, ensuring respect for 
fundamental values, and arbitrating between different viewpoints and interests by drawing up 
principles and legal standards which reflect these values.”353  
To facilitate its work in the area of bioethics the Council has set up an Ad hoc Committee of experts 
on Bioethics (hereinafter CAHBI) which became in 1992 the Steering Committee on Bioethics 
(hereinafter CDBI)354. Its task are (i) “to study the set of problems posed for law, ethics and human 
rights by progress in the biomedical sciences; (ii) to help harmonising the policies of member 
States as far as possible and, if necessary, framing appropriate legal instruments; and (iii) to co-
operate with other steering committees and ad hoc committees in the implementation of the 
Projects involving several fields of activity.355 The work of CAHBI, and then of the CDBI, has led to 
the adoption of several Recommendations of the Committee of Ministers356 in the area of bioethics 
and to the elaboration of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine (hereinafter Oviedo Convention)357, the first and so far only 
international treaty in this field. The Oviedo Convention is also special in that it is one of only two 
international instruments that have so far attempted to approach bioethics in a comprehensive 
manner, seeking to address a variety of bioethically relevant issues within one coherent approach 
and under the head of one instrument. 
 
2.1.1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and the Dignity of the 
Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine  
The Oviedo Convention was adopted on November 19, 1996 by the Council of Ministers of the 
Council of Europe and opened for signature on April 4, 1997 in Oviedo.358 It took effect on 
December 1, 1999 with the 5 necessary ratifications.359 It has since been ratified by 21 European 
states as well as it has been signed by further 13 states. Notably the Convention has not been signed 
by a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
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Russia.360 The Convention is open to signature from non-member states of the Council of 
Europe361. So far, it is the only international treaty in the field of bioethics.362  
The Convention was drafted in an attempt to design an instrument that establishes a common 
European minimum level of protection concerning the application of biology and medicine.363 To 
this purpose the Convention sets out prohibitions against the misuse of biological and medical 
advances and deals with a variety of issues including access to healthcare, consent requirements, 
privacy, protection of the human genome, organ transplantation, and rules concerning scientific 
research. As evidenced by its title, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine thereby aims 
to fit into the framework of European human rights law. It should be noted that the Oviedo 
Convention does not use the term bioethics. Although the word bioethics was first to be included in 
its title, eventually it was repelled from the document. This was done so as it was felt that the term 
bioethics was not clear enough, not even to specialists and thus might lead to confusion364. While 
the documents' subject matter makes it fair to subsume the document's discussion under the 
heading “bioethics”, it must be noted that the choice of the word biomedicine was deliberate and 
that this implies a different focus than the use of the much broader term bioethics.365 
Chapter I of the Convention first of all enshrines the dignity and identity of all human beings366 
and stresses the supremacy of the interests and welfare of the human being over the sole interests 
of society and science.367 It further states that Parties, taking into account health needs and 
available resources, shall take appropriate measures to provide equitable access to healthcare of 
appropriate quality.368 Finally, Article 4 stresses the important role of professional obligations and 
standards. Chapter I thereby reflects the most basic concepts of the Convention. The entire 
Convention and its Protocols have to be read and interpreted in the light of these first principles.369  
Chapter II is among the most detailed of the Convention. It specifies the obligation to obtain free 
and informed consent to any medical intervention from persons concerned.370 Article 6 allows 
medical treatment on a person unable to consent, such as a minor or a person with a mental 
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disorder, only “for his or her direct benefit.”371 In such cases an intervention may only be carried 
out with the authorisation of that person's legal representative or appropriate authority.372 A 
person who has a mental disorder may be subjected, without his or her consent, to an intervention 
aimed at treating his or her mental disorder only where, without such treatment, serious harm is 
likely to result to his or her health.373 
The issue of informed consent also features in the fifth Chapter, which is also again more detailed 
than many of the Convention's other chapters. It addresses the issue of “scientific research” and 
enshrines the principle of freedom of research.374 But it also states several conditions that have to 
be met for research to take place. These include the need to obtain the potential research subject's 
free and informed consent.375 Articles 17 and 18 lay down general rules, as well as special 
provisions regarding persons not able to consent to research and embryos in vitro.376 A person not 
able to give consent may be the subject of research only if it has the potential to produce real and 
direct benefit to the person's health, if the research cannot be carried out on individuals capable of 
giving consent, if the legal representative consents, and if the person involved does not object. 
Exceptionally, however, the requirement of direct benefit to the subject may be lifted if the research 
“has the aim of contributing … to the ultimate attainment of results capable of conferring benefit to 
the person concerned or to other persons in the same age category or afflicted with the same 
disease or disorder or having the same condition .”377  
The other chapters of the Convention address various further themes of the bioethical debate. 
Chapter III enshrines rights to privacy and to information concerning one's health, stipulating that 
everyone has the right to respect for his or her private life in relation to information about his or 
her health and that everyone is entitled to know (or to reject) any information collected about his 
or her health.378 Chapter IV deals with the human genome, prohibiting “any form of discrimination 
against a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage”379 as well as “the use of medical 
techniques to enable selection of a future child's sex.”380 Furthermore, article 12 prescribes that 
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genetic testing may be performed for health care purposes or for scientific research only.381 The 
seventh chapter deals with organ and tissue removal from living donors for transplantation 
purposes382, with the prohibition of financial gain383 and with the adequate disposal of a part of the 
human body.384 Chapter X advocates the promotion of a public debate and consultation on the 
issues addressed within the Convention.385   
The Convention so far is the only legally-binding and enforceable international text in the area of 
bioethics. Chapter VIII thus deals with possible infringements of the provisions of the Convention, 
providing that states should have in place appropriate judicial protection to prevent or to put a stop 
to an unlawful infringement of the rights and principles set forth in the Convention and the 
possibility to compensation for those who suffered undue damage.386 Article 25 foresees the 
possibility of sanctions against states to be applied in the event of infringement of the provisions 
contained in the Convention. Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights may be asked to 
give advisory opinions on legal questions connected with the interpretation of the Convention.387  
Overall, the Convention has been designed to serve as framework Convention only. Chapter XII 
therefore foresees the possibility of concluding further protocols that clarify and specify issues at 
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stake388. To date four such additional protocols have been concluded.389 They will be briefly 
discussed in the following sections.   
 
2.1.2. Additional Protocols 
The four additional protocols to the Oviedo Convention build on the principles embodied in the 
Convention. Only states that have signed the Oviedo Convention may also sign the Protocols.390 
The provisions of the Protocol then must be regarded as additional articles to the Convention. The 
Oviedo Convention's provisions apply accordingly.391  
 
2.1.2.1. Additional Protocols to the Oviedo Convention with regard to the Application 
of Biology and Medicine on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings 
The Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention on the prohibition of cloning human beings was 
signed in Paris on 12/02/1998 and came into force on 1/3/2001 by the necessary five ratifications 
including four member states of the Council of Europe.392 Until now, 16 states have ratified and an 
additional 15 have signed the Protocol. Notably the Protocol has not been signed by a number of 
countries, including Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Russia.393 Like 
the Oviedo Convention it is legally binding and legally enforceable for those states that adhere to 
it.394 
The Protocol remedies the Oviedo Convention's lack of any specific provision with regard to the 
cloning of human beings.395 Article 1 para 1 prohibits “any intervention seeking to create a human 
being genetically identical to another human being, whether living or dead.” The expression 
“human being genetically identical to another human being” is thereby defined as a human being 
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sharing with another the same nuclear gene set.396 Beyond that, however, the Protocol does not 
provide a definition of the term “human being”.397 The exact scope of the prohibition of cloning of 
human beings can thus only be assessed by referring to domestic law. The Government of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands has, for example, already declared in relation to Article 1 of the 
Protocol, “that it interprets the term “human being” as referring exclusively to a human individual, 
i.e. a human being who has been born.”398 According to this definition only the practice of 
reproductive cloning that would result in the birth of a human being genetically identical to 
another human being is banned. Therapeutic cloning processes that e.g. merely clone embryonic 
stem cells for later uses would still be allowed. 
Despite this definitional loophole the protocol has and can generally been applauded for providing 
a complete, unequivocal and unambiguous ban on human cloning, which is simple to understand 
and therefore easy to administer. On the other hand it must be noted that a complete ban might in 
fact be premature. For example, could embryonic stem cells regularly be produced without the 
destruction of embryos it might also be ethically justifiable to clone such cells.399 Moreover, the 
cloning debate as led in the present context misses one crucial point of the debate. This is the need 
to explicitly confirm the human rights of cloned humans.400  While it seems most people believe 
that clones are automatically bestowed with such rights, there may be others who disagree. Overall 
it seems that the protocol has not been the last word on the issue of human cloning. 
 
2.1.2.2. The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin  
The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on Transplantation 
of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin was opened for signature to the Signatories to the Oviedo 
Convention, in Strasbourg, on 24 January 2002.401 It entered into force on 1 May 2006. To date it 
has been ratified by 12 countries and an additional 8 have signed it. Notably the Protocol has not 
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been signed by a number of countries, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Russia.402 It is legally binding and legally 
enforceable for those states that adhere to it.403  
In contrast to the Oviedo Convention the Additional Protocol is not only concerned with living 
donors but also regulates the removal of organs404 and tissues405 from deceased persons or the 
implantation of organs or tissue from such persons.406 The Protocol makes explicit in Article 1 that 
“Parties to this Protocol shall protect the dignity and identity of everyone and guarantee, without 
discrimination, respect for his or her integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with 
regard to transplantation of organs and tissues of human origin.” It then goes on to specify general 
principles, such as equitable access to transplantation services for patients, transparent rules for 
organ allocation, health and safety standards, the prohibition of financial gain by donors, and the 
need for donors, recipients, health professionals and the public to be properly informed, the 
prohibition of financial gain, confidentiality, and sanctions and compensation.407 It also contains 
specific provisions covering the removal of organs from living and deceased persons.  
As regards living donors transplantations should only be carried out for the therapeutic benefit of 
the recipient, after a risk assessment for the donor has been undertaken408, where there is no 
suitable organ or tissue available from a deceased person and where no other alternative 
therapeutic method of comparable effectiveness is available.409 The prior, free and informed 
consent of the donor is necessary.410 Organs and tissue may not be removed from a person unable 
to consent.411 Under very limited condition, however, the removal of regenerative tissue from a 
person who does not have the capacity to consent may be carried out.412 
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As regards deceased persons, organs or tissues shall not be removed unless the person has been 
certified as dead413 by law and unless consent or authorisation required by law has been obtained. 
The removal shall not be carried out if the deceased person had objected to it.414  
It can be debated whether the protocol is clear on the consent requirements regarding the removal 
of organs from the body of a deceased person. It is for example not entirely clear whether or not 
opt-out systems, where consent to the removal of organs is presumed until a person has specifically 
withdrawn his or her consent to such a procedure, are compatible with the Protocol.415 Herman 
Nys notes that this uncertainty “creates a lot of confusion…[that] will not contribute to the wished 
harmonization of the rules governing the removal or organs and tissue throughout Europe.”416 
Overall, however, the document so far seems to have remained rather uncontroversial.417 
 
2.1.2.3. The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research  
The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning 
Biomedical Research was opened for signature on 25 January 2005418 and entered into force on 1 
September 2007, after 5 ratifications.419 To date the Protocol has been ratified by 6 states and 
signed by 16 states.420 It is legally binding and legally enforceable for those states that adhere to 
it.421 
The Protocol covers the full range of research activities in the health field involving interventions 
on human beings but excludes from its scope research on embryos in vitro or on foetuses and 
embryos in vivo.422 Chapter II contains general provisions, affirming the primacy of the human 
being participating in research over the sole interest of science or society.423 It also enshrines the 
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freedom of research424, stipulating that risk and burden to participants must be limited,425 and 
mandating the approval by a competent body after independent examination of its scientific merit 
as well as professional standards of obligations.426 
Chapter III mandates the use of independent ethics committees to examine the potential research's 
ethical acceptability.427 Chapter IV deals with information and consent laying out the requirements 
for free, informed, express, specific and documented consent to participation in research.428 Article 
15 and 16 deal with special provisions concerning those unable to consent, thereby basically 
following the provisions set out in Chapter V of the Oviedo Convention.429 
Issues of confidentiality and the right to information are dealt with in Chapter VIII, enshrining in 
Article 25 the confidentiality of any information of a personal nature collected during biomedical 
research and giving participants the right to know any information collected on their health. 
Research on women during pregnancy and breastfeeding, persons in emergency situations, and 
prisoners is subject to additional requirements.430 Article 23 of the Additional Protocol requires 
that research does not “delay nor deprive participants of medically necessary preventive, diagnostic 
or therapeutic procedures” and that members of control groups shall be assured of proven medical 
methods. Still, placebo studies are permissible if no effective methods exist, or if withdrawal or 
withholding of such methods only present an acceptable risk or burden. Article 29 of the Additional 
Protocol extends its applicability to research conducted or sponsored by persons within the 
jurisdiction of a member state but carried out in a state not party to the Protocol. Chapter X 
concerns infringement of the provisions of the Protocol and holds that parties shall provide 
appropriate judicial protection to prevent or to put a stop to an unlawful infringement of the rights 
or principles set forth in the Protocol and for the possibility of compensation for damage and 
sanctions.431 
Overall the Protocol has been assessed positively for seeking to strike a balance between freedom of 
research and the safeguarding of fundamental rights in the field of biomedical research.432 It has 
also been positively noted that until today, the Additional Protocol in conjunction with the Oviedo 
Convention constitutes the most explicit and demanding source of international law pertaining to 
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research on humans, containing the most developed and comprehensive international code of 
protective provisions that is available in the field.433  
 
 2.1.2.4. The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine concerning Genetic Testing for Health Purposes 
The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning Genetic 
Testing for Health Purposes was opened for signature on 27 November 2008.434 It will enter into 
force on the condition that 5 states, including 4 member states, ratify the protocol.435 To date the 
Protocol has been ratified by 1 state and signed by 4 further states.436  
The Protocol sets out ethical and legal provisions to be applied to genetic testing carried out for 
health purposes. It includes principles about information concerning human genetics and its 
testing, informed consent, the advice necessary concerning genetic information and the quality of 
services. Chapter I defines the object and scope of the Protocol, clarifying that Member States shall 
protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without 
discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms437 with 
regard to genetic tests438 carried out for health purposes.439 Article 2 makes it clear that the 
protocol does not apply to genetic tests carried out on the human embryo or foetus and to those 
carried out for research purposes.440 Chapter II sets out general provisions, including that the 
welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science,441 and 
prohibiting discrimination and stigmatisation on the grounds of genetic heritage or 
characteristics.442  
Chapter III of the Additional Protocol concerns the quality of genetic services, demanding of 
Member States to ensure that genetic services are of appropriate quality, in particular that genetic 
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tests meet generally accepted criteria of scientific validity and clinical validity; that laboratories are 
subject to regular monitoring; and that persons providing genetic services are appropriately 
qualified.443 Article 6 further demands that clinical utility of a genetic test should be an essential 
criterion for deciding to offer this test to a person or a group of persons while Article 7 asks for that 
genetic tests are performed under individualized medical supervision.  
Chapter IV deals with questions of genetic counseling and informed consent. Article 8 states that 
the person undergoing a test shall be provided with prior appropriate information in particular on 
the purpose and the nature of the test and that for predictive tests,444 appropriate genetic 
counseling should be made available. Article 9 holds that a genetic test may only be carried out if 
the person concerned has given his or her free and informed consent. Genetic tests on persons 
unable to consent may only be carried out for that person's direct benefit and if authorization from 
the entity responsible for this person has been obtained and after that entity has been provided 
with appropriate prior information. Wishes relating to a genetic test expressed previously by an 
adult at a time where he or she had capacity to consent shall be taken into account.445   
In the case of minors a genetic test shall be deferred until that person has come of age unless that 
delay would be detrimental to his or her health or well-being.446 If such a test is undertaken the 
authorization of the entity responsible for the minor has to give his or her authorisation, however, 
the opinion of the minor shall be taken into consideration as an increasingly determining factor in 
proportion to his or her age and degree of maturity.447  
Chapter VI deals with the specific case of genetic tests on persons unable to consent being carried 
out for the benefit of family members. Here, Article 13 provides that exceptionally, and by 
derogation from the provisions of Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Oviedo Convention and of Article 10 
of the Additional Protocol on Genetic testing, a genetic test may be legally carried out, for the 
benefit of family members, on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, if certain 
conditions are met, including that the purpose of the test is to allow the family member(s) 
concerned to obtain a preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic benefit that has been independently 
evaluated as important for their health, or to allow them to make an informed choice with respect 
to procreation448; the benefit envisaged cannot be obtained without carrying out this test449; the 
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risk and burden of the intervention are minimal for the person who is undergoing the test450; the 
expected benefit has been independently evaluated as substantially outweighing the risk for private 
life that may arise from the collection, processing or communication of the results of the test451 and 
authorisation by the appropriate responsible entity has been given.452  
Article 14 provides that tests on biological materials when it is not possible to contact the person 
concerned and where that person has not expressedly opposed such a test may be carried out in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality, where the expected benefit cannot be otherwise 
obtained and where the test cannot be deferred. Tests on deceased persons for the benefit of a 
family member may also be carried out if the consent or appropriate authorisation required by law 
has been obtained.453  
Chapter VII ensures respect for private life and right to information, stating in Article 16 that 
everyone has the right to respect for his or her private life, in particular to the protection of his or 
her personal data derived from a genetic test and that everyone undergoing a genetic test is entitled 
to know and not to know any information collected about his or her health derived from this 
test.454 Biological samples obtained through tests have to be used and stored in a secure and the 
confidential manner.455 
Chapter VIII is concerned with genetic screening programmes for health purposes. Such 
programmes may only be implemented if it has been approved by the competent body, following an 
independent evaluation of its ethical acceptability and fulfillment of certain specific conditions, 
including that the programme is recognized for its health relevance for the whole population or 
section of population concerned; that the scientific validity and effectiveness of the programme 
have been established.456 Finally, Article 20 lies down that the public shall have appropriate access 
to objective general information on genetic tests, including their nature and the potential 
implications of their results.  
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Overall the Protocol has been noted positively for dealing, for the first time at the international 
level, with directly accessible genetic tests for which a commercial offer has been or could develop 
in future.457 It has also been noted as an effort to counter the lack of a coherent regulatory 
landscape in Europe when it comes to genetic testing.458 On the other hand, the lack of support for 
the Oviedo Convention and for the protocol from such countries as the United Kingdom and 
Germany has been said to considerably weaken the protocol's impact.459 Moreover, it has been 
submitted that it may take several years before the additional protocol enters into force while the 
field of genetic services provision, blossoming now in unprecedented ways, might warrant a more 
immediate legal regulation.460 Finally, it has been criticized that it is not quite clear what is being 
regulated by this additional protocol. According to the scope of this protocol, it should apply “to 
tests, which are carried out for health purposes, involving analysis of biological samples of human 
origin and aiming specifically to identify the genetic characteristics of a person which are inherited 
or acquired during early prenatal development.461 However, as Nys remarks, "some direct-to-
consumer companies make a distinction between services that directly affect healthcare decision 
making (which might fall under the additional protocol) and making health-related claims (which 
might not fall under the additional protocol)".462 For example, so Nys, the genome scanning 
company 23andMe has been recorded to argue that the “genetic information provided…about 
potential health conditions should not be used to estimate your overall risk of future disease” and 
that it is not “intended to be medical advice.”463 Here and in analogous cases it is not quite clear 
whether the protocol applies.464 
 
2.1.3. First Conclusions with regard to the standards set by the Council of 
Europe 
In summarizing these first introductory notes on the Oviedo Convention and its Additional 
Protocols the following can be ascertained. The Oviedo Convention and its Protocol so far are the 
only legally-binding and enforceable international legal instrument in the area of bioethics. That is, 
the Convention and its Protocols are legally binding and enforceable treaty law with regard to those 
states that have signed up to them.465 Yet, it should also be noted that the Oviedo Convention is 
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mostly limited in scope to the countries that are members of the Council of Europe and its 
observatory states. The Convention therefore cannot claim to set universal or global standards in 
the area of bioethics but it does so in a geographically very limited scope. Furthermore, it must also 
be noted that the above discussed instruments have not been ratified by a number of countries, 
including most notably Germany, the United Kingdom and Russia. The fact that these countries 
have not signed the Convention considerably weakens the Convention’s potential impact and 
standing. It also means that the Convention does not embody a true European, let alone global 
consensus on questions of bioethical interest. Rather, important questions, such as for example the 
question of the admissibility of medical research on persons not able to give informed consent, 
remain contested and not resolved through the Convention.  
It is further worth noting that the Oviedo Convention has been designed to serve as framework 
Convention only. The Convention thus merely seeks to establish a common European minimum 
level of protection concerning the application of biology and medicine, while it is left to states 
parties to arrange more extensive protection.466 It thus does not aim to give a detailed bioethical 
roadmap of action. The advantage to this is that many states were able to agree to the Convention 
even though it dealt with often critical and highly contested questions. Yet the price to pay was to 
foresake clear and precise regulations for often rather vague and minimalistic standards. Moreover, 
as the example of Germany and the United Kingdom illustrate, even minimum standards can go 
too far for certain states and thus do not guarantee universal ratification. 
Because of its framework and minimum standard setting character Chapter XII of the Convention 
explicitly foresees the possibility of concluding further protocols that clarify and more specifically 
formulate certain issues at stake.467 To date four such additional protocols have been concluded 
with regard to the issue of human cloning, on transplantation of organs and tissues of human 
origin, on biomedical research and, though not yet entered into force, on genetic testing for health 
purposes. The four additional protocols to the Oviedo Convention build on the principles embodied 
in the Convention. Only states that have signed the Oviedo Convention may also sign the 
Protocols.468 The provisions of the Protocol then must be regarded as additional articles to the 
Convention and the Oviedo Convention's provisions apply accordingly.469 
It is furthermore worth reiterating that the Convention and its Protocols are limited in scope to 
issues of bioethical interest. To that aim they set out prohibitions against the misuse of biological 
and medical advances and deal with a variety of issues including access to healthcare, consent 
requirements, privacy, protection of the human genome, organ transplantation, and scientific 
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research. The Oviedo Convention and its Protocols thereby enshrine a number of bioethical and 
legal principles and human rights and postulate certain aims that will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next chapters.  
Finally, as evidenced by its title, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and its 
Protocols aim to fit into the framework of European and international human rights law. In fact, 
the Convention is the first multilateral human rights treaty that specifically addresses biomedical 
concerns. While some of the principles enshrined in the Convention were already included in more 
general terms in previous international human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR and ICESCR470, 
as briefly discussed above, "this is the first time that these rights have been developed and 
assembled in one single multilateral binding instrument entirely devoted to biomedical issues"471. 
The actual meaning and the wider implications of this will be extensively analysed in the next 
chapter and, more specifically in chapter VII. 
 
2.2. UNESCO Instruments in the Field of Bioethics 
2.2.1. UNESCO 
The United Nations Social, Educational and Cultural Organization (hereinafter UNESCO) has been 
among the first international organisations that explicitly addressed themselves to issues of 
bioethical relevance. Also, next to the Council of Europe it has been the only international 
organisation that has attempted to deal with the whole field of bioethics, i.e. biomedicine, within 
one instrument. The choice of UNESCO as the platform for standard setting in the area of bioethics 
might not be the most obvious. At first glance, such organisations as the World Health 
Organisation (hereinafter WHO) may indeed seem much more suitable to deal with bioethics.472 
However, by virtue of its constitutional objective to promote “collaboration among nations through 
education, science and culture” as well as its operational experience in the facilitation of cultural 
exchange and ethical reflection”473 it has been given authority by States to negotiate the 
codification and implementation of international instruments in the area of bioethics.474 According 
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to UNESCO, the fact that bioethical issues “deeply root in the cultural, philosophical and religious 
bedrocks of various human communities is [moreover] reason enough for [the Organization], the 
only one whose fields of competence include the social and human sciences …[]… to take the lead 
in this initiative.”475  
To fulfil its mandate UNESCO has, over the last 30 years, held symposiums on social and cultural 
changes brought about by scientific progress and has monitored the human rights implications of 
advances in genetic science.476 In 2002 UNESCO further reinforced the importance of this area of 
work by making ethics one of the five priorities of the Organization.477 Over the years UNESCO has 
demonstrated its standard-setting role in bioethics, mainly through the adoption several major 
instruments in the area.478 To facilitate its work in this area UNESCO had already in 1993 formed 
the International Bioethics Committee (hereinafter IBC), a group of currently 36 international and 
independent experts in the fields of medicine, biology, genetics, philosophy, anthropology, law and 
other human and social sciences to respond to the ethical concerns raised by progress in genetic 
science and to promote international debate and worldwide dialogue.479 The IBC thereby provides 
one of the few institutionalized global forums directly devoted to bioethical reflection. It meets at 
least once every year and produces advice, recommendations and reports on specific issues that are 
adopted by consensus. While the IBC is staffed with independent experts the Intergovernmental 
Bioethics Committee (hereinafter IGBC), created in 1998 under Article 11 of the Statutes of the IBC, 
is comprised of 36 representatives of Member States.480 Representatives meet at least once every 
two years to examine the advice and recommendations of the IBC.481 It informs the IBC of its 
opinions and submits these opinions along with proposals for follow-up of the IBC's work to the 
Director-General for transmission to Member States, the Executive Board and the General 
Conference.482  
The following section will first discuss the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights (hereinafter UDBHR) as the arguably most comprehensive, most important and 
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most recent standard elaborated by UNESCO in the area. The next sections will then respectively 
discuss in reverse chronological order the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data and 
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.  
 
2.2.2. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
At its 31st session in 2001, the General Conference invited the Director-General to submit “the 
technical and legal studies undertaken regarding the possibility of elaborating universal norms on 
bioethics”.483 In October 2005, the General Conference of UNESCO then adopted the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights by acclamation.484 From the inception of the drafting 
process, the IBC maintained that the international instrument would not take the form of a treaty 
but rather a legally nonbinding declaration expressing broad principles.485 At the same time, the 
IBC acknowledged that a declaration could serve as a model for a binding treaty. 486 To date no 
such binding treaty has followed however. 
The Declaration is divided into six sections, general provisions, principles, application of 
principles, dissemination and final provisions.  
The first section starts by defining the scope of the declaration, providing in Article 1 that the 
Declaration deals with “ethical issues raised by medicine, life sciences and associated technologies 
as applied to human beings taking into account their social, legal and environmental 
dimensions.”487 As was the case with the Oviedo Convention here, too, there was some discussion 
about the term bioethics and about the question of whether or not to use the term at all. That the 
UDBHR finally settled on the term and this definition must be understood in relation to the 
Declaration's aim to take a broader approach encompassing also developments that take place 
outside medicine in society as a whole.  
It also makes clear that the declaration is primarily addressed to states but as appropriate also 
provides guidance to decisions or practices of individuals, groups, communities, institutions and 
corporations, public and private.488 Article two goes on to define the aims of the Declaration, which 
are, inter alia, to provide a universal framework of principles to guide States in the formulation of 
their legislation in the area of bioethics, to promote respect for human dignity and to protect 
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human rights, by ensuring respect for the life of human beings, and fundamental freedoms. It also 
recognizes the importance of freedom of scientific research but stresses the need for such research 
and developments to occur within the framework of ethical principles. Finally, it aims to promote 
equitable access to medical and scientific developments as well as the sharing of such knowledge, 
to foster pluralistic dialogue about bioethical issues and to underline the importance of 
biodiversity.  
In Article 3 to 17 the Declaration mandates respect for several principles. Most prominently, 
human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected as is the priority 
of the interests of the individual over the sole interest of science or society.489 In applying and 
advancing scientific knowledge benefits to patients and other affected individuals should be 
maximized and any possible harm be minimized.490 Article 5 requires that the autonomy of 
persons to make decisions is to be respected. Any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic medical 
intervention is only to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent of the person 
concerned. The informed consent requirements are somewhat weaker in the case of scientific 
research where the Declaration states that it should (as opposed to is) only be carried out with the 
prior, free, express and informed consent of the person concerned.491 The information should be 
adequate, provided in a comprehensible form and include modalities for withdrawal of consent.  
For persons unable to consent Article 7 provides that authorization for research and medical 
practice should be obtained in accordance with the best interest of the person concerned. Research 
should only be carried out for his or her direct health benefit and if there is no research alternative 
of comparable effectiveness with research participants able to consent. Research which does not 
have potential direct health benefit should only be undertaken with the utmost restraint, exposing 
the person only to a minimal risk and minimal burden and, only if the research is expected to 
contribute to the health benefit of other persons in the same category, subject to the conditions 
prescribed by law and compatible with the protection of the individual's human rights. It is 
important to note states widely differed with regard to the question of the admissibilty of research 
on subjects unable to consent, pushing some to enter explanations of vote to clarify their 
interpretation of this issue.492 Refusal of such persons to take part in research should be respected. 
In these provisions the Declaration thus equals roughly the provisions of the Oviedo Convention 
and its Protocol on biomedical research.493 It is, however, less strongly worded.494  
Article 8 through 17 set out further principles. Article 8 mandates respect for human vulnerability 
and personal integrity in applying and advancing scientific knowledge. According to Article 9 
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privacy and confidentiality of the persons concerned and of their personal information should be 
respected. Article 10 enshrines the fundamental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights 
and Article 11 provides that no individual or group should be discriminated against on any 
grounds. The remaining Articles demand respect for cultural diversity and pluralism495, solidarity 
and cooperation,496 restate the importance of achieving the highest attainable standard of 
health497, and call for a sharing of benefits of medical research and knowledge498 as well as for the 
protection of future generations, including the protection of the environment, the biosphere and 
biodiversity.499  
Articles 18 through 21 deal with the application of the principles. Decision making should be 
undertaken in an attitude of professionalism, honesty, integrity and transparency.500 There should 
also be a dialogue between professionals and society as a whole.501 The establishment of 
independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees is recommended.502 Finally, 
transnational research should be consistent with the principles set out in the Declaration.503  
Article 22 makes clear that the Declaration relies on UNESCO, the IBC, the IGBC, and member 
states to promote and disseminate its principles and procedures in accordance with international 
human rights law.  
Overall the Declaration is most notable for that by its text, UNESCO Member States, for the first 
time, commit themselves and the international community to respect and apply fundamental 
principles of bioethics.504 It is also notable for that it was a document that was adopted by 
consensus. However, the UDBHR remains a legally non binding and non enforceable declaration 
that therefore also does not legally obligate states that have agreed to it.   
 
2.2.3. International Declaration on Human Genetic Data 
In view of the complexity and scale of research in genetics, the Director-General of UNESCO in 
2001 asked the IBC to examine the possibility of drafting an international instrument on human 
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genetic data.505 In 2002 a first draft was sent to Member States of UNESCO, intergovernmental 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, specialists, professional research associations and 
many other organizations. As part of this consultation, a Public Hearings Day was held on 28 
February 2003 in Monaco, and associations and institutions representing aboriginal groups, the 
handicapped, doctors and the private sector expressed their views.506 A revised version was 
subsequently adopted unanimously and by acclamation as the International Declaration on Human 
Genetic Data at UNESCO's 32nd General Conference on 16 October 2003.507 The adoption of the 
Declaration by UNESCO by acclamation should, however, not be confused with universal 
acceptance. States, such as the United States of America which in 2001 were not a member of 
UNESCO, have hence also not adopted and are not bound, morally or politically, by the provisions 
of the Declaration.  As the other UNESCO standards the Declaration is legally non-binding and 
non-enforceable.508 
The Declaration has 5 parts. In the first section, entitled general provisions, it specifies the 
Declaration's aims, which are in particular “to ensure the respect of human dignity and protection 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the collection, processing, use and storage of human 
genetic data, human proteomic data and of the biological samples from which they are 
derived…[]…in keeping with the requirements of equality, justice and solidarity, while giving due 
consideration to freedom of thought and expression, including freedom of research.509 It thereby 
undertakes to define the principles that should guide States in formulating their legislation and 
their policies on these issues.510  
Building on the premise that human genetic data are special and that such data deserves to be 
treated special,511 the Declaration sets forth a number of limitations and obligations for the 
collection, processing, use and storage of such data. Art 5 defines that such data may be collected, 
treated, used and stored for various purposes, including diagnosis and health care, research, 
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forensic medicine and criminal proceedings or “any other purpose consistent with Human Rights 
principles.”512  
With regard to procedures the Declaration calls for collecting, treating, using and storing data on 
the basis of transparent and ethically acceptable procedures.513 It proposes that independent, 
multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees should be promoted and established at national, 
regional, local or institutional levels.514 It also recommends that states should endeavour to foster 
all forms of ethics education and training as well as encourage information and knowledge 
dissemination programmes about human genetic data.515 Every effort should be made to ensure 
that human genetic data are not used in any discriminate way or in any way that infringes human 
rights of the individual.516 
In section B the Declaration sets forth more specific limitations and obligations for the collection of 
genetic data. Informed and free consent should be obtained for the collection of such data.517 A 
person not able to consent should as far as possible take part in the authorization procedure of the 
collection of such data. Persons concerned have the right to decide whether or not to be informed 
of results.518 Appropriate genetic counselling should be provided.519  
Part C defines limits of the admissible processing of such data. The privacy and confidentiality of 
individuals and their genetic data should thereby be protected.520 They, for example, should not be 
disclosed to third parties, in particular, employers, insurance companies, educational institutions 
and the family.521 The accuracy, reliability, quality and security of these data should also be 
ensured.522  
The permissible uses of human genetic data is regulated in section D. It limits the purposes of use 
to those stipulated for in Article 5. Any changes to that should be compatible with the prior, free, 
informed and express consent of the person concerned or must correspond to an important public 
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interest reason and be consistent with the international human rights law.523  The cross-border 
flow of human genetic data should be supported to foster international medical and scientific 
cooperation and to ensure fair access to these data.524 Scientific and cultural cooperation, in 
particularly between industrialized and developing countries.525  
Section E deals with the storage of human genetic data. Such data should be monitored and stored 
within a framework that is based on the principles of independence, multidisciplinarity, pluralism, 
non-discrimination, and transparency as well as the other principles set out in the Declaration.526  
In the final sections the Declaration recommends that states should endeavour to provide ethics 
education, training and information.527 Again it relies on UNESCO, the IBC and the IGBC to 
contribute to the implementation of the Declaration and the dissemination of the principles set out 
therein.528 
Overall the Declaration is important as it provides one of the few international points of reference 
in the area of collection and use of human genetic data.529 However, it has also been noted that the 
subject of genetics has regularly been subject to dramatic changes instigated by new findings in the 
natural sciences.530 As such the Declaration will be in need of frequent adaptations to 
accommodate the new realities. 
 
2.2.4. Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
In 1997 UNESCO's General Conference unanimously and by acclamation adopted the Universal 
Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights.531 The Declaration was subsequently 
adopted and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly.532 The Declaration was drafted to 
anticipate the international social, economic, and political implications of the “Human Genome 
Project”, a worldwide initiative, completed in 2003, to map and sequence the entire chain of 
human DNA.533 As the other UNESCO instruments discussed in this section it operates on the 
bases of broad statements that lay out universal bioethical principles but does not address the 
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details of practices to which such principles might apply.534 Throughout its text it postulates a 
priority for the respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity of individuals 
over research and research applications.535 
It contains seven chapters covering such areas as human rights, human dignity and rights of the 
persons concerned, including the issue of informed consent and privacy of genetic data; 
cooperation between industrialized and developing nations, and research on the human genome.  
Section A makes clear that the human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of 
the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a symbolic 
sense, so the Declaration, it was the heritage of humanity.536 Article 2 repeats that everyone has a 
right to respect for his or her dignity and for his or her human rights regardless of his or her 
genetic characteristics.  
Section B sets out certain rights of the persons concerned. It stipulates that research on the human 
genome, as well as treatment or diagnosis thereof should minimize risks and maximize benefits to 
persons concerned.537 Prior, free and informed consent shall be obtained.538 Research which does 
not have an expected direct health benefit for a person unable to consent may only be undertaken 
by way of exception if the research is intended to contribute to the health benefit of other persons 
in the same age category or with the same genetic condition.539 Article 8 even provides the 
possibility for reparation for any damage sustained as a direct result of an intervention affecting a 
person's genome.  
Section C provides limitations for research on the human genome. Such research may not prevail 
over respect for the human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity.540 Benefits from 
advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome, shall be made 
available to all. The Declaration also enshrines freedom of research as long as it is compatible with 
human rights.541 
Conditions for the exercise of scientific activity are set out in section D. These must be carried out 
in a manner of meticulousness, caution, intellectual honesty and integrity. 542 The Declaration 
recommends the establishment of independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees 
                                                          
534 Ibid., 510.  
535
 See for example Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4. 
536
 Ibid., Article 1. 
537
 Ibid., Article 5 clause a. 
538
 Ibid., Article 5 clause b. 
539
 Ibid., Article 5 clause e. 
540
 Ibid., Articles 11 and 12. 
541
 Ibid., Article 13. 
542
 Ibid., Article 13. 
88 
 
 
 
to assess the ethical, legal and social issues raised by research on the human genome and its 
applications.543 
Section E emphasizes the principles of solidarity and international co-operation that should guide 
the set up, undertaking, and use of findings of international and national research on the human 
genome.544  
The Declaration is notable for being the first global and one of the most thorough initiative to 
address human rights implications with respect to genetic advances for both, research itself and the 
application of findings. As all instruments in this field it will, however, need to be adapted to new 
scientific developments.545 
 
2.2.5. First conclusions with regard to the UNESCO Instruments in the Field of 
Bioethics 
In conclusion to these first introductory notes to the UNESCO standards in the area of bioethics 
several things are worth emphasising. First of all, the three UNESCO standards, the UDBHR, the 
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and the International Declaration on Human 
Genetic Data are all legally non binding and legally non enforceable standards. That is, even though 
states have drafted and agreed to them no state can legally demand of another state to fulfil the 
provisions set out in the standards and no state can threaten another state with legal action in case 
of breach of a provision. As such these standards can still develop considerable normative force, 
however, they must be considered to constitute "soft law" standards, a term whose content and 
implications will be further explained and analysed above in chapter III. Nevertheless, the UDBHR 
in particular should be noted for that here for the first time, nearly all States of the international 
community of states have committed themselves to respect and apply the principles and rights set 
out in the Declaration.546 
Furthermore, all three UNESCO standards must be noted for that they explicitly deal with a 
number of issues of bioethical relevance. While the Declaration on the Human Genome and the 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data are more focused respectively on genetic research and the 
protection of the human genome the UDBHR certainly seeks to set a more comprehensive 
framework for dealing with issues of bioethical interest. Like the Oviedo Convention, discussed 
above, the UDBHR sets out provisions against the misuse of biological and medical advances and 
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deals with a variety of issues including access to healthcare, consent requirements, privacy and 
scientific research. Yet it also goes beyond the Convention in including such issues as 
environmental questions and sustainable development. It moreover goes beyond the Oviedo 
Convention in that it, to some extent at least, seeks to address also non-state actors.547  
Thirdly, all standards by UNESCO, in the same way as those by the Council of Europe, enshrine 
certain bioethical principles and have certain distinctive aims that will be further discussed in the 
next chapter. Also in parallel to the Council of Europe standards do all UNESCO standards address 
the issues of bioethical relevance that they are concerned with through a human rights framework. 
The exact meaning of this and the implications of this will be discussed over the next chapters. 
 
3. Other international Standards concerned with Areas of Bioethics 
Besides the Council of Europe and UNESCO a variety of other entities have been concerned with 
questions of bioethical relevance. Examples include the Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice for 
Trials on Pharmaceutical Products, adopted by the World Health Organization in 1995548, the 
Guidelines for Good Clinical Practice, adopted by the International Conference on Harmonisation 
of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use in 1996,549 various 
World Health Organisation resolutions on for example the issue of human cloning and the UN 
Declaration on human cloning (hereinafter Cloning Declaration), adopted in 2005.550 The latter 
will briefly be discussed below.  
 
3.1. The UN Cloning Declaration 
The Cloning Declaration resulted from intense discussions over a period of 4 years. In 2001 the 
General Assembly decided to follow a proposal by France and Germany to prepare an international 
convention against the reproductive cloning of human beings.551 The working group and Ad Hoc 
Committee that was thereafter established met in 2002 to consider the elaboration of a mandate 
for the negotiation of an international Convention against the reproductive cloning of human 
beings.552 Subsequent negotiations in 2002 and 2003 within the working group, however, soon 
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proofed that consensus on merely the content of a mandate for the negotiation of such a treaty was 
elusive, with discussions beginning to revolve around mainly two irreconcilable positions.553 One 
side suggested a ban on reproductive cloning554 but would allow member States to make their own 
decisions on therapeutic cloning.555 The counter-proposal recommended a complete ban on both 
reproductive and therapeutic cloning.556 Negotiations were subsequently postponed until 2004. 
Realizing that states were unlikely to reach an agreement on the issue of human cloning, the 
General Assembly then decided to establish a Working Group to finalize the text of a non binding 
declaration on human cloning.557 In 2005 the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on 
Human Cloning by a recorded vote of 84 to 34, with 37 abstentions.558  
The Declaration calls upon member states to “prohibit all forms of human cloning inasmuch as 
they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection of human life.”559 It furthermore calls 
upon member states to adopt “all measures necessary to protect adequately human life in the 
application of life sciences” and “the measures necessary to prohibit the application of genetic 
engineering techniques that may be contrary to human dignity”.560 As an instrument of the soft law 
the Declaration does not bind Member States, yet urges Member States “to adopt domestic 
legislation compatible with the Declaration's text.”561  
The wording of the Declaration is ambiguous and reflects the controversies that also dominated the 
negotiations on the failed treaty. As a result, the Declaration, for one, does not explicitly and 
unqualifiedly prohibit human cloning, neither for reproductive nor therapeutic purposes. Nations 
that support a comprehensive ban of all forms of human cloning consequently can thus interpret 
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the Declaration's provisions so as to call for an absolute prohibition on all forms of human cloning, 
including therapeutic cloning. 562 In contrast, states in favour of a ban of reproductive cloning only 
can generally interpret the Declaration as prohibiting only those cloning processes that they 
consider contrary to human dignity, i.e. those used for reproductive cloning.563 Moreover, the term 
'clone' is not defined, thus providing leeway for those states to engage in therapeutic and even 
reproductive cloning processes, that define the term 'clone' as applicable to those 100% genetic 
replicates only where egg and nucleus have been derived from the same female donor.564 Also, the 
Declaration refrains from providing a definition of the controversial terms “human being”, “human 
dignity”, and of the moment when a “human life” begins, thus leaving it to member states to decide 
what might constitute adequate protection measures, at which stage of a human life –however 
defined- they should apply and which processes might be considered contrary to human dignity.565  
Given these ambiguities the Declaration has sometimes been demurred as an ineffective and 
political instrument that confirms absence of rather than actual agreement in the area of human 
cloning.566 Overall, the Declaration's subject matter has made it the subject of much debate among 
scholars and practitioners. The fact that it has not been able to effectively and clearly regulate even 
the issue of reproductive human cloning has thereby been met with some bewilderment, given that 
most of the world's states seem to agree on that proposition. It has also been noted that due to the 
adoption of the Declaration, the United Nations will no longer formally consider the issue of 
human cloning regulation until a member state raises the issue again.567      
 
3.2. International Forums indirectly concerned with Bioethics: The Example of 
WTO and the TRIPS agreement 
Besides the international bodies that directly address bioethically relevant issues in one or several 
of their instruments there exist also several international entities that regularly address questions 
of bioethical relevance, however, without expressly acknowledging to doing so and without 
elaborating specific instruments on the subject matter. Since these entities often have considerable 
influence on how issues of bioethical relevance are de facto dealt with these entities and their 
(indirect) bearings on issues of bioethical relevance deserve mentioning.  
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Bioethics' broad scope thereby translates into that a broad range of international organisations fall 
into this category. For example, the international Tribunal for the Law of the Sea established by the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea addresses bioethically relevant questions when it 
comes to such issues as extinction of species or pollution of the seas.568 One further example to be 
discussed in more detail in the next section is the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and in 
particular its' Agreement on Trade Related to Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPS 
agreement).569 Another prominent and relevant example is the Convention on Biological Diversity 
which aims at the conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of the components of 
biological diversity, and a fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources.570 Of these, the WTO TRIPS agreement will be exemplarily discussed in the next 
sections.  
 
3.2.1. The World Trade Organisation 
The WTO came into being on January 1, 1995 as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (hereinafter GATT).571 GATT was concluded in 1947. Until the WTO was created during 
the Uruguay discussion round between 1986 and 1994 GATT functioned as a quasi international 
organization.572 WTO then is an international organization that is concerned with liberalizing and 
facilitating trade. It is also a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements and a place for 
them to settle trade disputes in this area.573 In case of trade disputes, the WTO provides a 
compulsory dispute settlement process where resolution can be reached through bilateral 
consultations or expert panel rulings. Failure to comply with the rulings may result in the 
imposition of sanctions by the WTO's dispute settlement body.574 WTO as an international 
organization is not bound by human rights treaties. However, its members are bound in as far as 
they have signed and ratified the relevant human rights treaties.575 
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WTO is concerned with all issues of bioethical relevance as far as they concern trade. It is thus 
relevant to the international regulation of bioethical issues as far as the trading of such goods as 
genetic material, technical equipment relevant in the context of biomedical research or the trading 
with hazardous material etc. is concerned. It is also relevant regarding the issuing patents for 
concepts and ideas in such areas as life organism or technical and scientific techniques used in 
several process of bioethical relevance. Another area where WTO is relevant to bioethics is health 
and safety restrictions on agricultural products.576 In one way or another WTO is therefore 
concerned with many areas of bioethics, although it has never for itself claimed or acknowledged a 
role in these processes.577 
 
3.2.2. The TRIPS Agreements  
The TRIPS Agreements establish certain intellectual property rights, including in the area of patent 
protection, copyrights and trademarks that signatories must provide through domestic 
legislation.578 TRIPS were negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations 
under the auspices of the WTO. Over one hundred countries signed TRIPS on April 15, 1994.579 
The Agreement provides for enforcement measures through its use of civil and administrative 
procedures and remedies. Provisions on criminal procedures are also included.580 Additionally, 
TRIPS provides for dispute settlement between countries. Disputes arising between WTO members 
in relation to TRIPS are subject to the WTO's compulsory dispute settlement procedures.581 
Ultimately, the violation of TRIPS may result in the suspension of WTO privileges.582 The 
obligations in the TRIPS agreement apply equally to all members.583 Developing countries are, 
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however, given a grace period of between one to eleven years depending upon the country's 
economic status to phase in all of TRIPS' standards.584  
Of particular relevance to the bioethical debate are inter alia those provisions that deal with patent 
provisions. Under Article 27(1) of TRIPS, “[p]atents shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application.” Article 70(8) specifically requires members to adopt 
a procedure for collecting pharmaceutical patent drug applications.585 Patents are to run for at 
least twenty years from the date of patent application collection. However, TRIPS expressly grants 
member states the right to exclude inventions from patentability under certain conditions.586  
Some of these possible exclusions have bioethical aspects.587 Members of the WTO “may exclude 
from patentability inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation 
of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment”588. In particular, “diagnostic, 
therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals” and “plants and animals 
other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the production of plants or 
animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes” may be excluded.589 
Exceptions, however, must be rather narrowly construed. The term “necessary” does not 
encompass an exclusion based solely on a domestic law prohibition, i.e. an exclusion may not be 
made merely because the exploitation is prohibited by the law of a member state.590 The 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter ECJ) which has 
been concerned with the terms ordre public and morality591 and that of GATT592, which has been 
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concerned with the word 'necessary', further indicate that the scope of admissible exceptions is 
very limited. The scope of exceptions is highly relevant from an ethical point of view. It, for 
example, decides whether pharmaceutical companies have the right to hold exclusive access to 
their products for a set amount of time or whether developing countries may invoke an exception 
on moral grounds that would allow it to produce generic versions drugs without paying intellectual 
property rights.593 It is also relevant to the question of whether or not biotech companies should be 
allowed to use indigenous people's traditional knowledge in developing and then patenting medical 
drugs.594 Similarly, by allowing a state to exclude from its patent scheme products that, for 
example, only have been made possible by a wilful destruction of embryonic stem cells so that the 
biotech firms investing in such research could not recover its costs invested in the research, TRIPS 
could also considerably impact the proliferation such research.  
The example show that WTO has considerable influence on how issues of bioethical relevance are 
resolved at the international level, what kind of research is being promoted and who profits from 
new developments. WTO's role in these processes is interesting: WTO is inherently about trade 
liberalization, not about an ethically sensitive regulation of bioethical issues. When dealing with 
the rules of trade between countries WTO's objective is hence to create a secure trading 
environment for producers of goods and services mainly through economic liberalization and not 
about the most commendable ethical outcome.595 Moreover, by not making explicit WTO's 
involvement in questions of bioethical relevance WTO's role in these processes and questions goes 
largely unnoticed.   
 
3.3. General International Law 
To conclude the overview of relevant international legal standards this final section also addresses 
the question of whether issues of bioethical relevance can also be dealt with under general 
international law, i.e. other than treaty law or soft legal standards.  
Apart from what is enshrined in treaty and non-treaty human rights standards, issues of bioethical 
relevance can also gain relevance through customary international law.
596
 That is, customary 
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international law can be relevant as far as it covers the same norms that international human rights 
treaties and standards specify. That is so because customary international law can have a separate 
existence (apart from human rights law), even if it covers the same norms and binds the same 
state.
597
 The separate existence of a norm under customary international law is for example relevant 
in those cases where states have not ratified a treaty or merely signed a non-binding standard as 
customary law binds all states no matter whether they have signed it, unless they have persistently 
objected to it.
598
 Moreover, as opposed to general treaty law, there is no question of whether or not 
customary law has to be incorporated into national law – it is immediately binding no matter 
whether it has or has not been incorporated into national law. Finally, the question of the existence 
of customary law is relevant as customary law can modify treaty rules.
599
 Thus, if it can be shown 
that there exist customary international norms with regard to the human rights enshrined in the 
above discussed standards, these norms must be taken to be binding, no matter whether a state has 
signed or ratified the relevant human right standard and no matter whether a state has incorporated a 
norm into its national law. Customary international law can, of course, also be relevant to the extent 
that it establishes norms that exist in addition to what has been specified in the area of bioethics in 
human rights standards, for example if it could be shown that there exists a customary international 
rule regarding the questions of abortion of euthanasia that would then oblige states to apply this 
norm in their territory irrespective of whether or not there exists a written or other agreement to that 
extent. 
Following the traditional doctrine, the existence of customary international law depends on the 
fulfilment of two preconditions. One, there has to be an established, widespread, and consistent 
practice on the part of states.
600
 Secondly, there has to be evidence of an opinio iuris as the 
conviction that such practice reflects, or amounts to, law.
601
 Both concepts, consistent state practice 
and opinion juris, however, are far from being clear in terms of what amounts to either. The content 
and exact meaning of the affix 'consistent' in the expression 'consistent state practice', for example, 
has been widely debated as has the question about what and which practices qualify as state 
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practice. It is also not clear what amounts to proof of opinion juris.
602
 While it seems clear that a 
state concerned has to feel “that it is conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation”603 it is by no 
means clear how and through which act such a “feeling” is shown.604 
Generally with regard to both premises, consistent state practice and opinion juris in the area of 
human rights, it may be fair to say that there is hardly any other area of law in which so many 
standards have been developed that consistently reaffirm and cross-reference the principles and 
norms enshrined in other human rights documents, in particular the UDHR and the Covenants. This 
indicates that at least on paper there is a 'consistent state practice' and, by means of their 
formulation as human rights standards, opinion juris with regard to those human rights norms that 
are enshrined in these standards.
605
 As such an argument can be made that human rights generally 
can be regarded as norms of customary international law. As far as these norms are relevant to the 
context of bioethics, briefly discussed above, norms enshrined in these standards could then also be 
interpreted to be part of customary international law. On the other hand should it be noted that the 
existence of this dense fabric of human rights texts and standards and states' repeated affirmation of 
them has in no way hindered states from engaging in often widespread and systematic abuses even 
of some of the most fundamental human rights, including that of the right to life and to be free from 
torture.
606
 Actual state actions as opposed to what states say and what they sign in terms of 
international legal standards thus seem to suggest that there exist no customary norms. 
Nevertheless, having said all that by now it seems that the overwhelming majority of scholars and 
states agree that at least some parts of the UDHR and the Covenants constitute customary 
international law.
607
 The standards in the area of bioethics, to the extent that they replicate these 
parts enshrined in the UDHR and the Covenants thus could be argued to be customary international 
law. This would, however, only apply to the extent to which norms replicate those norms in the Bill 
of Human rights, not to the extent that the standards in the area of bioethics deviate from those 
standards or establish new human rights. For example, the right to life is generally accepted to 
constitutes a norm of customary international law
608
, however, a specific adaptation of this right, for 
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example to cover embryos or embryonic stem cells or to grant access to drugs and medicine would 
not constitute customary international law. 
It could further be argued that several human rights that form part of the category of jus cogens
609
 
can be said to have a bearing on bioethical discussions. A norm qualifies as jus cogens if it is a 
fundamental principle of international law which is accepted by the international community of 
states as a norm from which no derogation is permitted.
610
 As such norms of jus cogens always 
qualify as norms of international customary law while the latter is not confined to the category of 
jus cogens. Acts of torture, for example, no matter whether they take place in a context of medical 
experiments (and hence in an area relevant to the field of bioethics) or not are prohibited by the 
fundamental principles of law enshrined in the concept of jus cogens as are acts of slavery or 
genocide. Jus cogens is, however, a category of crimes reserved for only the most gross and blatant 
human rights violations, such as genocide and crimes against humanity, which reflects the 
importance of these crimes and their universal condemnation.
611
 To the extent that questions of 
bioethical relevance mount up to such gravity they may be considered under the law of jus cogens. 
Outside of the category of the gravest human rights violations jus cogens, however, cannot offer 
protection to crimes or offences committed in areas of relevance to bioethics. While certain cases of 
gross abuse of the doctor-patient/research relationship, such as the above mentioned crimes 
committed by Nazi physician, may certainly be considered to fall into the area of norms of jus 
cogens, overall it must be doubted whether states, in any near future, would be willing to extent the 
notion of jus cogens to cover for example such conduct as the wilful destruction of embryonic stem 
cells or euthanasia, under the heading of jus cogens. That is partly so because many of the cases in 
the area of bioethics, which could potentially be linked to the category of jus cogens concern those 
marginal human beings in regard to which it is not clear which level of protection international law 
awards them. If it is not even clear whether or how general international law or international human 
rights law applies, it is even less clear so with regard to norms of jus cogens. Another reason is 
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certainly states' general unwillingness to expand and thereby potentially dilute the category of jus 
cogens.
 612 
Finally, it should be mentioned that international criminal law can be relevant to issues of bioethical 
interest to the extent that international criminal law provisions cover issues of bioethical relevance. 
The positive sources of international criminal law, dealing with international crimes committed by 
individual persons, most importantly war crimes and crimes against humanity, can be found in such 
a range of standards and statutes as the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide in 1948
613
, the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
614
 and the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court.
615
 International criminal law deals with the most serious crimes considered of concern to the 
international community as a whole, including crimes against humanity and war crimes. Unlike the 
International Court of Justice which has jurisdiction over states, the courts and tribunals dealing 
with cases of international criminal law have jurisdiction over individuals.
616
 To the extent that 
crimes of humanity or war crimes can be construed to be of relevance to matters of bioethical 
interest international criminal law may well be relevant to issues of bioethical relevance. Cases and 
crimes dealing with forced impregnation, forced motherhood, or slavery, as far as relevant to 
international criminal law, could be relevant to questions of bioethical interest. However, as was the 
case with norms of jus cogens, international criminal law has been developed and hence so far been 
applied to cases of some of the gravest breaches of international criminal law. For the same reasons 
as issues of bioethical issues will hardly be dealt with under the norms of jus cogens will they then 
hardly be dealt with under international criminal law.  
Concerning the existence of customary international norms outside of long grown and well 
established human rights norms, such as those of the UDHR and Covenants, it seems highly 
doubtful whether provisions that are for example enshrined in the Oviedo Convention, the UDBHR 
or the cloning declaration constitute norms of customary international law by themselves.
617
 Given 
the obvious lack of consistent and harmonic state practice with regard to many issues of bioethical 
relevance it is difficult to sustain an argument in favour of a customary international law regarding 
any of these issues. However, some scholars nevertheless argue for the existence of a customary 
prohibition of for example the cloning of human beings, arguing that opinio iuris not state practice 
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showed such a rule. The argument is that customary international law is established instantly on a 
declared universal conviction that something is legal or illegal under existing international law, 
compatible or incompatible with basic values of the international community or that it is itself a 
basic value of the international community.
618
 According to these scholars, this opinio iuris can be 
deduced from non-binding universal instruments, such as resolutions of the UN General Assembly. 
On this basis it is argued that universal soft law instruments which label reproductive human 
cloning as contravening human dignity and human rights such as e.g. the UNESCO Human 
Genome Declaration, WHA Resolutions 50.37
619
, and UN GA Resolution 59/280
620
, evidence a 
universal opinio iuris which declares the illegality of reproductive human cloning under 
international law because of its incompatibility with human dignity as a basic value of the 
international community. Analogous arguments can be made with regard to norms established in, 
for example, the UNESCO standards in the area of bioethics, for example regarding such issues as 
stem cell research or informed consent. However, to assume that non-binding instruments, 
supplemented by one binding instrument such as the Oviedo Convention is prove of states' 
conviction of the existence of an enforceable customary rule with regard to the norms enshrined in 
the UDBHR is rather untenable given that states deliberately chose the form of soft law instruments 
and one regionally confined Convention to deal with issues at stake, which altogether rather 
supports the view of a lack of consensus among states and hence lack of customary international 
norms regarding issues dealt with in these standards.
621
 Therefore, it seems that so far at least, 
customary international law does not offer much with regard to issues of bioethical relevance.  
Finally, general principles of international law could be relevant to the area of bioethics to the 
extent that they enshrine principles relevant to the area. General principles can be derived in a 
variety of ways, most prominently from the existence of a rule in several municipal laws of states or 
from general principles of international law.
622
 In particular, if most states could be shown to 
endorse basic human rights in their national legislations or, even more specifically, the norms 
enshrined in the UNESCO standards, that could be taken to show that there are either general 
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human rights principles or more specific principles in the area of bioethics that apply to issues of 
bioethical relevance.
623
 The wide acceptance of human rights in national and international standards 
makes it convincing to accept basic human rights as general principles of international law.
624
 
Again, however, that does not mean that these norms can suddenly be extended to apply to all areas 
of ethical interest or that they are accepted as general principles by states when tailored specifically 
to the area of bioethics. The right to life for example, even though it might in some states be 
interpreted to serve as foundation for a right to access to medicine is far from being enshrined and 
interpreted as such in all or even most national laws and hence cannot be claimed to lay the basis 
for a general principle of access to medicine. Rather the opposite seems true: given the diverse 
range of state opinions and national regulations with regard to matters of bioethical interests no 
general principles regarding such issues as cloning for therapeutic purposes, stem cell research, 
abortion, euthanasia etc can be deduced. General principles of international law thus can offer 
something to bioethical debate to the extent that they enshrine general human rights principles. The 
specific principles set out in the standards in the area of bioethics or specific interpretations of 
general human rights principles, however, can not yet be taken to constitute general principles of 
international law.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The preceding chapter has shown that at least from the Nuremberg Doctor's Trial onwards, 
bioethics and international law have been heavily intertwined. Particularly, the Nuremberg Code, 
the UDHR and the Helsinki Declarations have done much to provide modern standards in the area 
of bioethics with their current face.  
Moreover, international standards concerned with questions of bioethical interest exist in many 
areas of international law. Given bioethics' broad scope, in fact, many international legal standards 
in some way of another deal with questions of bioethical relevance. The standards discussed above 
can be divided into two groups of standards. One is the group of standards directly addressed to 
matters of bioethical relevance, including all standards by the Council of Europe and by UNESCO, 
discussed above, as well as the UN Declaration on Human Cloning. These standards can be 
distinguished from other standards in that they, in their title and subsequently in their content are 
clearly addressed to matters of bioethical relevance. All these standards are framed in the language 
of human rights and endorse similar bioethical principles and aims. Yet they can be distinguished 
internally in that some of these standards, i.e. all of those issued by the Council of Europe are 
legally binding and enforceable on its Member States, while the UNESCO standards and the UN 
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Cloning Declaration remain legally non enforceable and non binding. The other standards 
mentioned above, including most prominently the WTO standards must be considered to 
constitute examples of standards that have a significant bearing on matters of bioethical interest 
while they are not directly addressed to such matters. 
Finally the above chapter showed that customary international law, international criminal law and 
general principles of international law can be relevant to matters of bioethical interest to the extent 
that they endorse general human rights norms that can have a bearing on issues of bioethical 
relevance. However, the specific adaptation of these norms to issues of bioethical relevance is not 
covered by customary international law, international law and general principle of international 
law so that little normative force can be derived from these standards when it comes to regulating 
issues of bioethical interest  
 103 
 
Chapter V Aims and Principle of International Legal Standards Directly 
Addressed to Matters of Bioethical Relevance 
As the preceding chapter was more descriptive of standards directly addressed to bioethical 
interest than analytical this chapter compares and discusses some of the similarities that can be 
found in all standards directly addressed to questions of bioethical interest. For one, this chapter 
establishes that all standards directly addressed to questions of bioethical relevance are framed as 
human rights instruments. That is, all international legal standards directly addressed to issues of 
bioethical relevance are at their heart human rights standards in that they build on and root in 
established human rights standards, endorse human rights principles and follow general human 
rights doctrine. Yet the standards also, while clearly operating within a human rights framework, 
secondly, endorse several aims and principles that somewhat go beyond traditional human rights 
doctrine in that their content differs from what has been enshrined in the UDHR and the above 
mentioned Covenants on Civil and Political and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These aims 
and principles do not contradict human rights provisions or principles, nor override them. Rather 
they coexist with human rights and, where necessary or possible, supplement them.625 This chapter 
will explain and further elaborate these two characteristics and their relationship. 
 
1. The Standards as Human Rights Instruments 
1.1. A Primer on the Positive Sources of International Human Rights 
Most of the positive international human rights standards only came into existence after World 
War II when the international law regime, among other things, sought to react to the atrocities and 
genocidal rule of the Nazi regime. It did so by establishing a number of rights that seek to protect 
individuals from abuse by its government, so called human rights.626  
The promotion of human rights as an aim was first enshrined in the UN Charter and it is one of the 
purposes of the United Nations as such.627 To achieve this purpose the UN Charter and its 
members628 commit themselves to promote higher living standards, to find solutions to 
international economic, social and health problems and to universal respect for human rights. The 
UN Charter also endows the General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council 
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(hereinafter ECOSOC) with competencies in the human rights field.629 Additionally ECOSOC is 
required to set up commissions in economic and social fields for the promotion of human rights.630 
Even though states according to the Charter are only obliged to promote rather than to abide by 
human rights and even though the Charter did not specify in detail what was covered by human 
rights, UN involvement in human rights law has contributed tremendously to that human rights 
received and continue to receive a prominent space in international forums, negotiations and 
deliberations as well as to their successful further development as part of the wider field of 
international law.631 The trial and judgement of the international military tribunal at Nuremberg of 
major war criminals632, expanding individual criminal liability from such crimes as piracy to 
crimes against humanity and thereby “catapulting individuals onto the international stage” added 
further fuel to the embryonic international human rights movement.633 
The importance attached to human rights was subsequently given legal expression in the UDHR 
adopted in 1948 by the United Nations General Assembly, setting forth “the inalienable rights and 
fundamental freedoms of each and every human being without regard to his race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.”634 As a resolution of the General Assembly the UDHR is not legally binding. Seeking the 
recognition of human rights within legally binding instruments, the UN eventually adopted two 
International Covenants on human rights, one on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR)  
and one on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter ICESCR).635 The rights enshrined in 
the former instrument, sometimes referred to as “first generation” human rights, are meant to 
protect an individual's liberty from undue interference from the state, specifying such rights as the 
right to life, liberty, freedom from torture, etc. The latter group of rights, sometimes referred to as 
“second generation” human rights, is meant to promote the social, economic and cultural well-
being of the individual. They include such rights as the right to food, health, social security, 
housing etc.636 The division of rights into two separate Covenants is mostly owed to then political 
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be misguided. See for example CESCR General comment 9, note 311.  
105 
 
 
 
and ideological rifts between 'West' and 'East'. Socialist countries mostly understood both 
categories of rights to be on equal footing, yet often claimed that social, economic and cultural 
rights to be a prerequisite to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. They sought to have both 
types of rights in one comprehensive human rights document.637 Western states, inspired by the 
French revolution and the US Bill of Rights, generally preferred civil and political rights, arguing 
mostly that only civil and political rights were justiciable, could be immediately given effect and 
required the state to abstain from interfering with individuals whereas social and economic rights 
required a state to engage in bringing goods to the individual.638 The latter view ultimately 
prevailed and two distinct Covenants were opened up for signature. Despite numerous resolutions, 
proclamations and declarations affirming that both sets of rights are universal, indivisible, and 
interdependent the distinction between them endures with socio economic and cultural rights long 
being somewhat neglected by states and in negotiations.639 Over recent years ICESCR rights, 
however, they have received more attention from states as well as from scholars and NGOs.640  
Since the Covenants numerous additional human rights instruments, binding and non-binding, 
have come into existence. Some of these cover new subject field, such as sustainable development 
or the environment, or rights pertaining to different right holders, such as groups. However, the 
three original documents discussed above, have remained the centrepiece of human rights, 
reflected in that they are sometimes referred to as the “International Bill of Human Rights”.641 All 
standards in the International Bill of Human Rights (hereinafter Bill of Human Rights) provide for 
individual human rights that can be invoked to protect an individual against abuses perpetrated by 
a state. Generally, obligations are owed erga omnes, i.e. between states that have signed or ratified 
the instruments, which also means that states are the addressees of these rights and that it is 
mostly states that can allege a breach of the rights enshrined therein. The UDHR as a non-binding 
declaration does not dispose over any enforcement mechanisms, although it has been argued that 
by now most of its provisions forms part of customary international law and as such constitute 
binding law that and create legal obligations.642 The ICCPR and ICESCR in turn, as legally binding 
treaties undoubtly create binding obligations on states. They, however, dispose over different 
enforcement mechanisms. That is, the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR establishes an 
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individual complaints mechanism, allowing individuals, under certain conditions, to complain to 
the Human Rights Committee about violations of the Covenant.643 The ICESCR to this date 
disposes over no such mechanism.644 Differences between both Covenants are also reflected in the 
key provision of these instruments, i.e. in their respective Articles 2(1). In the case of the ICCPR it 
holds that “each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant”. Article 2 (1) of the ICESCR, in contrast recognizes that the obligation of state parties 
stated in that Covenant is subject to the availability of resources (to the maximum of its available 
resources) and second the obligation is one of progressive realization (with a view to progressive 
realization), a formulation which has often been interpreted to either provide a lesser degree of 
obligation or at least has given rise to endless speculations as to the exact meaning and level of 
obligation enshrined in ICESCR.645 In response the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (hereinafter CESCR) in various non-binding Comments has subsequently showed that the 
formulation “progressive realization” is not devoid of meaning and that instead, states have to take 
steps to the realization of the right in question within reasonable time while using reasonable care 
in trying to achieve this aim.646 General Comment No 3 ICESCR also makes it clear that the 
Covenant impose obligations with an immediate effect. Having said that, questions around the 
justiciability of, exact obligations created by and the best way of implementation of ICESCR (and 
often ICCPR) rights persist.647 Also human rights philosophy and jurisprudence generally still pose 
difficult and largely unresolved conceptual questions, such as the question of whether human 
rights really impose obligations erga omnes partes or how to deal with rights of groups or 
populations through a framework of individual rights.648 Despite these debates, however, human 
rights have become a firmly established part of the wider field of international law and they are 
applied to ever more expanding fields of international law.   
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1.2. Standards in the Area of Bioethics as Human Rights Standards 
Many standards directly addressed to matters of bioethical interest, including the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and the Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine and 
the Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights make it already in their title clear that 
they concern not only bioethical issues but also human rights or rather human rights in the area of 
bioethics.649 However, the titles say little about the actual relationship between bioethics and 
human rights within these standards.650 For example, the connector “and” between Bioethics and 
Human Rights or between the Human Genome and Human Rights in the titles of the UDBHR and 
the Declaration on the Human Genome respectively leaves it open to speculation whether and/or 
to what extent bioethics and human rights are similar, the same or just two random areas of 
interests that are bound together in a Declaration.651 This relationship will be further explored 
throughout this chapter. 
In addition to references in the title, all international legal standards directly concerned with 
questions of bioethical relevance make explicit reference in their Recitals to a number of 
international human rights instruments, including the UDHR652, the ICCPR and ICESCR653 and on 
the regional level, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms654 and the European Social Charter655. For example Recital 1 of the International 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data, Recital 2 of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome 
and Human Rights and Recital 5 of the UDBHR specifically recall the UDHR and the Covenants as 
'guiding standards'.656 Also the Oviedo Convention and its additional protocols refer to these 
human rights standards at similarly prominent places.657  
Furthermore, all instruments directly addressing questions of bioethical relevance refer to human 
rights in their provisions. For example, Article 2 (c) of the UDBHR specifies the Declaration's aims 
as “to promote respect for human dignity and protect human rights, by ensuring respect for the life 
of human beings, and fundamental freedoms, consistent with international human rights law”. 
Article 3 (1) states: “Human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully 
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respected.” Overall, twelve of the UDBHR's 28 articles refer to human rights generally.658 
Similarly, Article 1 of the Declaration on Human Genetic Data reads as follows “The aims of this 
Declaration are to ensure the respect of human dignity and the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the collection, processing use and storage of human genetic data….” 
Overall, 13 of its provisions refer to human rights.659 In the case of the Declaration on the Human 
Genome eight articles refer to human rights.660 Merely the Oviedo Convention, apart from its title, 
does not mention the term 'human rights' itself in its provisions. As will be discussed in more detail 
below it does, however, refer to specific human rights, including the right to privacy or the right to 
bodily integrity and makes frequent references to the core principle of human rights doctrine, that 
of human dignity.661  The high frequency by which reference to human rights takes place and the 
prominence allocated to the protection of human rights as a major aim of all instruments make it 
clear that the link between the legal standards in the field of bioethics and human rights is 
everything but a coincidence. Rather, the former are clearly meant to build on and extend the 
existing human rights body and thought and to ensure human rights' protection in the field of 
bioethics.  
A further indication for that the standards specifically addressed to the matters of bioethical 
relevance are at their heart human rights standards is their repeated reference and the importance 
attached to the concept of human dignity.662 Human dignity has always been a most important 
concept to human rights discourses and the concept is deeply embedded in modern human rights 
thinking. It should be noted, however, that the concept of human dignity when used in 
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international legal texts, is more of an ethical than a legal principle.663 That is, in contrast to for 
example the legal guarantee that human dignity receives in Article 1 of the Grundgesetz for the 
German Federal Republic (German Constitution),664 on the international level, the legal status of 
the concept of human dignity remains the subject of some debate. One of the first documents 
mentioning the concept is the Charter of the United Nations stating in its second preambular 
paragraph that the Peoples of the United Nations are determined “to reaffirm faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of human person”.665 Here, human dignity is portrayed as 
one of the primary ends of the United Nations and as one of the foundations of the international 
legal order. The concept of human dignity is further mentioned prominently in Article 1 of the 
UDHR666 which states that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights". Yet, 
the UDHR is a non legally non binding and non enforceable document and the UN Charter is 
formally binding only in regard to its operative part; it is not formally binding in regard to its 
Preamble. Moreover, when explicitly used in legally binding and enforceable international human 
rights standards, such as the ICESCR or ICCPR, the concept of human dignity is always used in a 
more specific way, i.e. connected with a certain right. For example the prohibition of torture is 
justified by reference to the concept of human dignity. In respect to these more specific 
formulations human dignity can be said to have been transformed into a legal right yet apart from 
these specific formulations it must be considered to be an ethical concept enshrined in 
international human rights standards.667 Nevertheless, the frequent references to the concept in 
the standards in the area of bioethics show that these standards deliberately seek to embed 
themselves in human rights thought and traditions. 
In the standards, human dignity is named explicitly in the title of the Oviedo Convention, in its 
preamble and in its Article 1, specifying the purpose of the Convention as - among others - 
protecting the dignity and identity of all human beings.668 Also the UDBHR puts the promotion of 
respect for human dignity as one of its aims listed in Article 2 as well as on the top of the list of 
principles it endorses in Articles 3 - 17.669 The Declaration on the Human Genome again titles 
Section A of its provisions with “human dignity and the human genome”, making it clear in Article 
                                                          
663
 Cf. N. Petersen, "Human Dignity, International Protection", in: R. Wolfrum (ed.), The Max Planck Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, 2008, online edition, [www.mpepil.com] (last visited 27.04.2012) and Wolfrum/Vöneky, 
note 565, 137.  
664 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz, GG) of 23 May 1949. As this provision 
belongs to the few norms of the German constitution which cannot be subject to change, it is a powerful 
instrument that must be taken into consideration even when reviewing constitutional amendments. 
Moreover, it can be invoked in courts.  
665
 UN Charter, note 208, Preamble. 
666
 UDHR, note 270, in its Preamble even starts with the emphasis on human dignity. It reads: "Whereas recognition of 
the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation for 
freedom, justice and peace in the world." 
667
 ICCPR, note 341, Article 10 and ICESCR, note 341, Article 13.  
668
 In the Oviedo Convention, note 5, the term dignity is also mentioned in Recital 10. While it receives no further 
explicit mentioning in the Convention the concept's importance is still obvious given that it is the overall purpose of the 
Convention to protect the dignity of the human being and that all Articles beyond Article 1 must be interpreted as either 
furthering the overall purpose of the Convention or at least as being in conformity with that aim. 
669
 UDBHR, note 4, Articles 2 and 3 as well as Articles 10 to 12, 28. 
110 
 
 
 
1 that the “human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the human family, as 
well as the recognition of their inherent dignity” and in Article 2 that “everyone has the right to 
respect for their dignity…”. Besides its very general meaning as the norm to which virtually all 
provisions in the area of bioethics must relate670 human dignity also serves more specific functions 
throughout the instruments. It is cited as a limit to stigmatization and discrimination of human 
beings and as an obstacle to genetic reductionism and to genetic discrimination671, as a limit to 
charges of cultural relativists672, against abuse of human subjects in the area of human research 
and experimentation,673 and it is mentioned as a barrier to human cloning674 and to germ line 
intervention.675 While it is difficult to define the concept of human dignity – a topic that will be 
discussed below -, its' obviously important role in the area of bioethics cannot be easily dismissed 
for its lack of clarity and the vagueness of the concept. Moreover, even though the concept, as has 
just been discussed, is more an ethical than a legal principle, it nevertheless is a core principle of 
both, human rights discourses and of the standards in the area of bioethics and as such ties the 
standards to a human rights discourse.  
The standards directly addressed to matters of bioethical interest also refer to and reformulate 
several specific human rights and human rights principles in that they refer to civil and political 
and economic and social rights as well as to overarching human rights principles. In the category of 
civil and political rights one may find within the UDBHR references and reformulations of several 
civil and political rights that have been specified in the UDHR, the ICCPR and the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. These include the right to life676, 
right to liberty and security677, the right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, i.e. the right not to be subjected to scientific or medical 
experimentation678, the right to privacy679, and the right to freedom of expression, opinion and 
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thought.680 The right to life, liberty and security is for example reflected by the UDBHR's Article 2 
c which states that one of the aims of the declaration is to “promote respect for human dignity….by 
ensuring respect for the life of human beings”. It is arguably also generally reflected by such 
provisions as Article 2 of the Oviedo Convention which makes it clear that the “interest and welfare 
of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science”, by Article 16 which 
deals with the protection of persons undergoing research and by the UDBHR's Article 4 which 
specifies that “in applying and advancing scientific knowledge, medical practice and associated 
technologies, direct and indirect benefits to patients, research participants and other affected 
individuals should be maximised and any possible harm …minimised”. Freedom of scientific 
research681 reflects and restates the human right to freedom of expression and thought.  
The UNESCO instruments also refer to a range of established social, economic and cultural rights 
such as Articles 22 and 25 of the UDHR682 which as Schmidt points out  
"emphasise the importance of food, clothing, housing, medical care and social services 
for acceptable standards of living, as well as social security provisions relating to 
unemployment, sickness, disability, old age or other lack of livelihood due to 
circumstances that are beyond people's individual control. The relevance of 
international cooperation is stressed in this regard."683  
Several of the provisions of the UDBHR relate to this and specify in more detail the precise 
meaning and implications of these rights.684 Recitals 19 and 21 and Article 13 of the UDBHR, for 
example, emphasize "the concepts of solidarity and social responsibility and stress the need for 
international cooperation".685 Article 15, entitled 'Sharing of benefits', declares for example that 
“benefits resulting from any scientific research and its applications should be shared with society as 
a whole and within the international community, in particular with developing countries.”686 And 
Article 2 (f) of the UDBHR seeks “to promote equitable access to medical, scientific and 
technological developments as well as the greatest possible flow and the rapid sharing of 
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 UDHR, note 270, Article 19; ICCPR, note 341, Article: 19; Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights, note 344, Articles 9 and 10; reflected in the UDBHR, note 4, for example, in Article 1 (d). 
681
 ICCPR, note 341, Article 19 is usually construed so as to guarantee a right to scientific freedom. This is reflected in 
the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, Article 12 (b); in the UDBHR, note 4, Article 2 (d); and in the 
Oviedo Convention, note 5, Article 15.  
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 UDHR, note 270, also to be found in ICESCR, note 341, Articles 7 and 11. 
683
 Schmidt, "Bioethics, Human Rights and Universalisation: a Troubled Relationship? Observations on UNESCO's 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights", note 650, 254, 257. See in particular Article 14 of the UDBHR, 
note 4, on social responsibility and health, which holds that 1. The promotion of health and social development for their 
people is a central purpose of governments that all sectors of society share and that 2. Taking into account that the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without 
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition []. 
684
 Schmidt, "Bioethics, Human Rights and Universalisation: a Troubled Relationship? Observations on UNESCO's 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights", note 650, 267. 
685
 Ibid. in particular with respect to “the special needs of developing countries, indigenous communities and vulnerable 
populations”. On the subject of solidarity and cooperation see also Explanatory Memorandum, note 8, para 74, at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001390/139024e.pdf (last visited 27.04.2012). 
686
 The UDBHR, note 4, also states that externally sponsored research projects should be reviewed both in the 
sponsoring country and the country where research takes place, and appeals to states to take measures to combat 
bioterrorism and illicit traffic in organs, tissues, samples, and genetic resources and materials. UDBHR, note 4, Articles 
19 a and 21. 
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knowledge concerning those developments and the sharing of benefits, with particular attention to 
the needs of developing countries”. The Oviedo Convention does not so much stress international 
cooperation. It does, however, also echo several social and economic rights enshrined for example 
in Articles 11 to 14 of the European Social Charter which stress the right to enjoy the highest 
possible standard of health attainable, the right to social security, the right to social and medical 
assistance and the right to benefit from social welfare services. Article 3 on equitable access to 
health care for example dictates that “parties, taking into account health needs and available 
resources, shall take appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, 
equitable access to health care of appropriate quality.” Thus, social and economic rights as much as 
civil and political human rights often form the background and soil from which the provisions in 
the presently examined standards emerged. 
Finally all standards operate on the basis of certain general human rights principles. These 
principles include most prominently the principles of non-discrimination687, equality and respect 
for the autonomy of the human being.688 In the UDBHR, for example, the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination clearly features in Article 2 f which states the aims of the Declaration as “to 
promote equitable access to medical, scientific and technological developments…” The principle of 
autonomy again can be found in Article 3 declaring that the interest and welfare of the individual 
should have priority over the sole interest of science or society and Article 5 which mandates 
respect for autonomous decisions of individuals as well as in the provisions on informed consent in 
Article 6 and 7.689 The principle that the basic conditions to lead an autonomous life have to be met 
is reflected in the instruments' recognition of socio economic rights, discussed above.  
The majority of the provisions of the standards in the area of bioethics are thus at the very least 
inspired by established human rights norms or principles. They usually, however, also go beyond 
the established human rights norms in that they "are not mere rehearsals of these norms, nor are 
they reducible to them."690 Instead they further develop and specify human rights norms and 
principles by adapting them to the context of bioethics. As such they are not new human rights but 
either a more detailed restatement or an advancement or adaptation of existing human rights and 
human rights principles. 
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 In the UDHR, note 270, this principle is for example reflected in Articles 1 and 2 but also in such provisions as 
Article 7. In the ICCPR, note 341, see for example Articles 4, 20, 22, 24.  
688
 In the UDHR, note 270, this principle is named in Articles 7 and 23. In the ICCPR, note 341, this principle is, for 
example, reflected in Articles 7 to 9, holding respectively that no one may be submitted to torture, or slavery and that 
everyone has the right to liberty of the person. 
689
 In the Oviedo Convention, note 5, the principle of non-discrimination is for example reflected in Articles 1 and 11. 
The principle of autonomy in all articles on informed consent, for example, Articles 16 - 17. 
690
 Schmidt, "Bioethics, Human Rights and Universalisation: a Troubled Relationship? Observations on UNESCO's 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights", note 650, 257. 
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2. Aims and Bioethical Principles in the Standards Directly Addressed to 
Matters of Bioethical Interest 
2.1. Aims of the Standards 
All standards directly addressed to matters of bioethical interest endorse a number of aims. A first 
aim that features in all standards directly addressed to issues of bioethical relevance is to promote 
respect for human dignity and to protect human rights in the area of relevance to the standards. 
Consistency with other international human rights standards is thereby to be ensured. The Oviedo 
Convention formulates this objective in its Article 1 which states that “Parties to this Convention 
shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without 
discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard 
to the application of biology and medicine.” Each party is thereby asked to take in its internal law 
the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of the Convention.691 The UDBHR again in 
Article 1 (c) states that it aims “to promote respect for human dignity and protect human rights, by 
ensuring respect for the life of human beings, and fundamental freedoms, consistent with 
international human rights law”.692  This aim generally reasserts the human rights character of all 
standards and makes it clear that the primary function and aim of all standards in the area is to 
protect human rights and human dignity, however, with a special focus on those issues and 
concerns that arise in the area of bioethics.  
One further objective stated in most standards is “to provide a universal framework of principles 
and procedures to guide States in the formulation of their legislation, policies or other instruments 
in the field of bioethics.”693 The UDBHR is even more ambitious, aiming not only to provide such a 
framework for states but also, where appropriate, to “individuals, groups, communities, 
institutions and corporations, public and private.”694 While the Oviedo Convention does not 
specify this aim in its provisions the Council of Europe gateway to bioethics and biomedicine states 
that “the Convention….provides a framework for the protection of human rights and human dignity 
by establishing fundamental principles applicable to daily medicine as well as to new technologies 
in the fields of biology and medicine.” 695 Implicitly it therefore also aims to provide guidance to 
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 Oviedo Convention, note 5. Similarly, Article 2 dealing with the primacy of the human being states that "the 
interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science." 
692
 Likewise in the other standards: Article 2 (a) of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, holding 
that "everyone has a right to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic characteristics." And 
in the Declaration on Human Genetic Data, note 4, Article 1 a, refers to the aims and scope of the declaration as "to 
ensure the respect of human dignity and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the collection, 
processing, use and storage of human genetic data…" and that (b) "any collection, processing, use and storage of human 
genetic data, human proteomic data and biological samples shall be consistent with the international law of human 
rights." 
693
 UDBHR, note 4, Article 2 a. 
694
 Ibid. 
695
 See Bioethics Gateway of the Council of Europe, at: http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic/default_en.asp (last 
visited 27.04.2012). 
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signatories of the Convention and to serve as an overall framework for dealing with issues.696 This 
aim mirrors states' concern for a coherent and human rights based approach to matters of 
bioethical interest. The standards are meant to provide such a uniform and human rights based 
framework approach that provides some minimum agreement between states in the sense of that 
human rights have to be protected when issues of bioethical relevance are addressed. 
Next, all standards in one way or another aim to foster multidisciplinary and pluralistic dialogue 
among all stakeholders. The Oviedo Convention in Chapter X entitled 'Public debate' stipulates that 
“parties to this Convention shall see to it that the fundamental questions raised by the 
developments of biology and medicine are the subject of appropriate public discussion in the light, 
in particular, of relevant medical, social, economic, ethical and legal implications, and that their 
possible application is made the subject of appropriate consultation.” The UDBHR in Article 2 e 
states that it is one aim of the Declaration “to foster multidisciplinary and pluralistic dialogue 
about bioethical issues between all stakeholders and within society as a whole”.697 The 2003 
Declaration in Article 24 entitled “ethics education, training and information” holds that “in order 
to promote the principles set out in this Declaration, States should endeavour to foster all forms of 
ethics education and training at all levels as well as to encourage information and knowledge 
dissemination programmes about human genetic data. These measures should aim at specific 
audiences, in particular researchers and members of ethics committees, or be addressed to the 
public at large.” This aim pays recognition to the fact that many issues of bioethical relevance 
concern many fundamental questions that have a bearing on the broader public and should be 
discussed at all levels of society. The public should not loose sight of the sometimes highly 
technical debate involved in scientific research and technical application involved in issues of 
bioethical relevance while the technical or research oriented side in the debate should not loose 
sight of what the broader public opines with respect to these issues and these issues' ethical 
implications.698 That seems to also be the consideration with regard to another aim of the 
standards, that of the establishing of national or international ethics Committees. The Oviedo 
Convention does not specifically address the need for states to set up ethics committees and 
instead specifies in Article 32 the responsibilities of the CDBI. It should however be noted that 
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 Likewise the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, does specify in Article 1 b the same with regard 
to actions in the area of "collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic data, human proteomic data and 
biological samples"; and the Declaration on Human Genetic Data, note 4, in Article 1 (a) states that "the aims of this 
Declaration are: … to set out the principles which should guide States in the formulation of their legislation and their 
policies on these issues [in the collection, processing, use and storage of human genetic data, human proteomic data and 
of the biological samples from which they are derived]; and to form the basis for guidelines of good practices in these 
areas for the institutions and individuals concerned." 
697
 Likewise the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, holds under 'F' referring to the promotion of the 
principles set out in the Declaration that "states should take appropriate measures to promote the principles set out in the 
Declaration, through education and relevant means, inter alia through the conduct of research and training in 
interdisciplinary fields and through the promotion of education in bioethics, at all levels, in particular for those 
responsible for science policies.  
698
 Andorno, "First Steps in the Development of an International Biolaw", note 625, 128.  
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most member states of the Council have ethics committees in place699 and that it has given rise to 
the European Conference of National Ethics Committees (COMETH) which has it as its aim to help 
countries wishing to set up national ethics committees in doing so.700 The UDBHR in Article 19 
entitled 'Ethics committees' states that “independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics 
committees should be established, promoted and supported at the appropriate level.”701 In 
addition to fostering exchange at all levels of society and between the science community and the 
broader public, here the rationale is also to have a body of independent experts or advisors that can 
help governments in formulating legislation.702 Moreover, the need to establish independent 
multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics committees also results from the increasing complexities in 
bioethical research and research applications.703 By establishing such institutions it is hoped that 
they can help establish national rules in the area of bioethics, that they are helpful in detecting and 
representing various public sentiments about issues of bioethical relevance, that they help arriving 
at common regulations in these areas and that they help to establish a process of how to deal with 
questions in the area of bioethics generally.704 Moreover, these bodies also create a forum for 
international exchange, which might help to liken approaches on a global level.705 
Fourthly, standards, in the words of the UDBHR, provide that states should “promote equitable 
access to medical, scientific and technological developments as well as the greatest possible flow 
and the rapid sharing of knowledge concerning those developments and the sharing of benefits, 
with particular attention to the needs of developing countries.”706 The Oviedo Convention focuses 
on this requirement to health care in stipulating in Article 3 - dealing with equitable access to 
health care - that “parties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take 
appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable access to health 
care of appropriate quality.”707 This aim or principle reflects considerations of justice, also 
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 WHO, National Bioethics Committees in the European Region, at: 
http://www.who.int/ethics/committees/euro/en/index.html (last visited 27.04.2012). On Ethics Committees in a variety 
of countries see also Vöneky, Recht, Moral und Ethik. Grundlagen und Grenzen Demokratischer Legitimation für 
Ethikgremien, note 15, Chapter 6.   
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 Conference of National Ethics Committees, Article 2 b appendix to Resolution COMETH 11, 4th meeting, 1998, at: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic/cometh/default_en.asp (last visited 27.04.2012). 
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 See also the Declaration on Human Genetic Data, note 4, Article 24 and Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome, note 4, Article 16. 
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 On democratic legitimacy of such Committees see Vöneky, Recht, Moral und Ethik. Grundlagen und Grenzen 
Demokratischer Legitimation für Ethikgremien, note 15, in particular Chapter 9. 
703
 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, Article 16; Declaration on Human Genetic Data, note 4, 
Article 6 (b); UDBHR, note 4, Article 19; Oviedo Convention, note 5, Article 16 (iii). 
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 See for example para 2 of the Gesetz zur Einrichtung des Deutschen Ethikrats (Ethikratgesetz - EthRG), 16 July 
2007 (BGBl. I S. 1385), and Terms of Reference of the Irish Council for Bioethics, at: 
http://www.bioethics.ie/uploads/docs/AbouttheCouncil.pdf (last visited 27.04.2012). 
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 See Vöneky, Recht, Moral und Ethik. Grundlagen und Grenzen Demokratischer Legitimation für Ethikgremien, note 
15, on functions and on how ethics committees work, chapters 5-6. 
706
 UDBHR, note 4, Article 2 f. 
707
 The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, states the principle of equitable access to medical 
development in Article 12 in that (a) "benefits from advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human 
genome, shall be made available to all, with due regard for the dignity and human rights of each individual." The 
Declaration on Human Genetic Data, note 4, implicitly upholds this principle in Article 19 entitled– sharing of benefits- 
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enshrined in the UN, i.e. of a fair distribution of goods within and across societies. Governments 
are under the responsibility to create such conditions.708 They therefore have to ensure minimal 
standards of health care and in case of scarce goods, fair mechanisms to allocate these scare 
resources.709 
All standards moreover in some way or another aim at enhancing regional or international 
cooperation. The Oviedo Convention though it does not explicitly stipulate that in its operative 
clauses in recital 13 “stresses the need for international co-operation so that all humanity may 
enjoy the benefits of biology and medicine”. The UDBHR holds that dialogue should be enhanced 
within and across societies and nations. That is to be achieved through transfer or exchange of 
relevant knowledge within and between nations.710 International cooperation and development is 
one fundamental aim of the UN and as such it is only consistent that it also receives recognition in 
the standards.711 The need for justice in transnational research as a principle in the instruments 
reflects the trend that also biomedical research is becoming increasingly globalised and hence that 
the results of such research should also benefit and contribute to the well-being of the whole world. 
The danger is that if benefits are only reserved for developed countries then that is likely to even 
further widen the gap between them and the developing countries. In theory therefore, “solidarity 
among human beings and international cooperation towards that end are to be encouraged”.712  
Finally, the UDBHR states in Article 1 (g) that it aims “to safeguard and promote the interests of 
the present and future generations.” The theme is repeated in Article 1 (h) in which the declaration 
holds that it aims “to underline the importance of biodiversity and its conservation as a common 
concern of humankind.” The Declaration on the Human Genome repeats this theme in Article 1 
which holds that "the human genome underlies the fundamental unity of all members of the 
human family… In a symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity." 713 The Oviedo Convention in 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
it says that "….benefits resulting from the use of human genetic data, human proteomic data or biological samples 
collected for medical and scientific research should be shared with the society as a whole and the international 
community. In giving effect to this principle, benefits may take any of the following forms….(ii) access to medical 
care".  
708
 UN Charter, note 208, Chapter IX.  
709
 It is plausible to understand the requirements that this principle entails for governments as one that – like the 
correlated human right to health as enshrined Article 12 ICESCR, note 341, has to be fulfilled progressively, according 
to limits and possibilities of each government. See ICESCR Article 2.1 and CESCR General Comment 14, "The right to 
the highest attainable standard of health (Article 12)", E/C.12/2000/4, 2000. The principles of equitable access to health 
care, in particular access to appropriate medical care and essential medicines can be found in the Universal Declaration 
on the Human Genome, note 4, Article 12; UDBHR, note 4, Articles 10,14; Oviedo Convention, note 5, Article 3. 
710
 See also Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, Articles 17 to 19; Declaration on Human Genetic 
Data, note 4, Articles 18 to 19; UDBHR, note 4, Articles 13, 14, 16.  
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 UN Charter, note 208, Chapter IX. 
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 UDBHR, note 4, Article 13. Article 24 of the UDBHR again stresses that "States should foster international 
dissemination of scientific information and encourage the free flow and sharing of scientific and technological 
knowledge". 
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 See also Declaration on Human Genetic Data, note 4, which expresses concern for the interest of future generations 
in recognizing in Recital 6 "that human genetic data have a special status on account of their sensitive nature since they 
can be predictive of genetic predispositions concerning individuals and that the power of predictability can be stronger 
than assessed at the time of deriving the data; they may have a significant impact on the family, including offspring, 
extending over generations, and in some instances on the whole group; they may contain information the significance of 
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Recital 12 affirms “that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present 
and future generations.” This is probably the most vaguely and ambitiously worded aim stated in 
the standards. It also breaks with the traditional human rights language of individual rights in that 
it takes a future generation as beneficent. As an aim or principle it owes its existence to recent 
growing awareness of the destructive powers at the hands of the present generations and a growing 
sense of responsibility towards future generations.714 The notion pertains not only to the 
environment but also to the identity of humankind itself, which, according to some, could be 
damaged by practices like reproductive cloning or germline intervention. Arguments, such as those 
advanced by the philosopher Habermas for example suggest that we do not have the right to pre-
determine the characteristics of future generations, as they should be free to develop their 
potentialities without being biologically conditioned by current particular conceptions of good and 
bad.715 The standards aim to address such concerns and to ensure that they are being dealt with 
within a human rights framework 
 
2.2. Principles enshrined in the Standards 
Certain principles are endorsed across all or at least most standards. These principles are at the very 
least ethical principles in that they seek to provide justifications for moral behaviour or provide 
criteria according to which acts are morally justifiable yet in that they cannot by themselves be 
invoked in a court as a legal principle that gives rise to a legal right. It is arguable, however, that 
some of the principles discussed below, also constitute legal principles.
716
 As was seen above 
general legal principles in international law can most prominently be derived from the existence of 
a rule in several municipal laws of states or from general principles of international law.
717
 In 
particular, if most states can be shown to have enshrined the bioethical principles in their national 
legislation or if it can be shown that these principles are in fact legal principles under international 
law that could be taken to show that these principles are also legal principles.
718
 As will be argued 
below this might be the case when it comes to such principles as the principle of freedom of 
scientific research, that in one form or another, has found legal recognition in international legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
which is not necessarily known at the time of the collection of biological samples; and they may have cultural 
significance for persons or groups". It also repeats this theme in Article 4 which reads that (a) "human genetic data have 
a special status because: … (ii) they may have a significant impact on the family, including offspring, extending over 
generations, and in some instances on the whole group to which the person concerned belongs." 
 
714
 See for example Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, Article 1; UDBHR, note 4, Articles 16 and 
17; Oviedo Convention, note 5, Preamble.  
715
 Andorno, "Biomedicine and International Human Rights Law: In Search of a Global Consensus", note 386.  
716
 The major difference between legal and ethical principles being that a legal principle is a source of law itself while 
an ethical principle can inform that source but is not a source itself. For in-depth discussion of the concept of principles 
and rights see below in Chapter III, 3. 
717
 See Chapter IV, section 3.3.   
718
 See generally Lauterpacht, note 622. Malanczuk, note 204, 49 et seq. 
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text and in many municipal laws around the world.
719
 However, for the most part the bioethical 
principles enshrined in the standards cannot be said to be reflected enough in either international or 
municipal law for them to have gained legal status. That does not mean that these principles are 
irrelevant to legal analysis, as will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
720
 In fact, ethical 
principles always to some extent inform legal principles and legal decision making and vice 
versa.
721
 Nor does it mean that ethical principles cannot be transformed into legal principles, for 
example, if they become part of customary international law or receive wide recognition in binding 
international or municipal laws. Yet for the present context, unless stated otherwise the below listed 
principles are considered to be more ethical than legal principles.  
The important role assigned to the ethical concept of human dignity in international legal 
standards in the area of bioethics, not only as a general principle to which all other principles and 
norms have to relate but as a barrier to many types of conduct specified in the standards, has 
already been mentioned in the previous sections and will be discussed further below.722 
A second principle is that of the “primacy of the human being over the sole interest of science and 
society” which is usually given a prominent position in the standards as it is a direct corollary to the 
principle to safeguard human dignity. The UDBHR in Article 3 (2) entitled Human Dignity and 
Human Rights, for example, holds that “the interests and welfare of the individual should have 
priority over the sole interest of science or society.”723 Similarly, the Oviedo Convention holds in 
Article 2 that “the interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of 
society or science.” This principle echoes the Kantian injunction that individuals should not be 
instrumentalised, in this case, for the sole benefit of science or society.724 It is also a provision that 
specifically is directed against certain utilitarian perspectives that could justify the 
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 See for example Article 5 Abs. 3 [1] of the Grundgesetzes (GG), note 541; Article 44 of the Spanish Constitution of 
31 October 1978. In the United Kingdom it is protected by that the United Kingdom incorporated the European 
Convention on Human Rights, note 222, and the guarantee of freedom of expression it contains in Article 10, into its 
domestic law under the Human Rights Act in 1998.  Freedom of speech is protected by Article 40.6.1 of the Irish 
constitution, etc. See generally D. McGoldrick/T. Donnel, "Hate Speech Laws: Consistency with National and 
International Human Rights Law", 18 Legal Studies, 1998, 458 et seq. See also European Court of Human Rights, 
Jersiled v. Denmark, Series A, No. A928, 1994, and Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993, 1993; Human 
Rights Committee, Views of the Committee, UN Doc. A/52/40, 1999, Vol. II, at 84 et seq.  
720
 On Principles see Chapter VI, 2.2.1. 
721 Vöneky, Recht, Moral und Ethik. Grundlagen und Grenzen Demokratischer Legitimation für 
Ethikgremien, note 15, Chapter 3 II et seq., citing para 6 Abs. 4 Nr. 2 Stammzellgesetz - StZG, note 19, as one 
example of a legal standard that explicitly incorporates ethical considerations. See also Vöneky, Recht, Moral 
und Ethik. Grundlagen und Grenzen Demokratischer Legitimation für Ethikgremien, note 15, chapter 3 III 
with regard to a discussion of the mutual interdependence of ethical, moral and legal norms in Germany. 
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 See Chapter VI, 2.2.2. and Chapter VII, 2. 
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 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome, note 4, Article 10; UDBHR, note 4. Article 3(2); Oviedo Convention, 
note 5, Article 2. See also Helsinki Declaration, note 207, Article 5 providing that …" in medical research on human 
subjects, considerations related to the well-being of the human subject should take precedence over the interests of 
science and society".  
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 Immanuel Kant's concept of human dignity, is to some extent elaborated in: I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik 
der Sitten, 1785, 4:431; cf. 4:432. See discussion below in Chapter VI, 2.2.2.  
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instrumentatlization of the few or individual for the sake or benefit of the many.725 That this is, 
however, not an absolute proposition is suggested by this principle's wording which states that 
human beings take primacy merely over the sole interest of science and society. Thus, while the 
human being in principle is accorded primacy over the sole interest of science or society, the 
general interest of society or science may prevail under certain circumstances.  
A third principle prominently featuring in the legal instruments is that of respect for the autonomy 
of patients and research subjects and its direct corollary, the requirement of informed consent for 
any intervention in the area of biomedical research or treatment.726 Patients and research subjects 
insofar as they are competent adults must be treated as autonomous agents and therefore must be 
accorded the right to make decisions about medical interventions carried out on themselves, 
without any kind of coercion or deception. Obviously, for this principle to work it is a prerequisite 
that sufficient and understandable information is provided. This principle has been transformed 
into one of the most fundamental and most clearly specified provisions enshrined in the legal 
instruments in the area of bioethics, making it one of the core and most widely accepted principles 
of ethical and legal debates in the field, to be discussed in detail below.727 This principle is 
correlated with a further one, the principle that everyone should have the right to know his or her 
diagnosis or health information728 and it is reflected in many other provisions of the standards, 
including the principle to protect those unable to consent.729 This principle responds to more 
traditional models of the doctor-patient-relationship, which were rather paternalistic in that the 
physician often exerted absolute discretion about treatment options and with regards to whether 
and what about to inform the patient.730 Over the last decades these assumptions were then 
replaced with models that stressed the autonomy and self-responsibility of competent patients so 
that patients could be involved in the decisions concerning their treatment.731 Since it is only 
through adequate information that they are in a position to give informed consent or participate 
informedly in the decision on their treatment options they also need to have the right to know, i.e. 
they need to be granted access to their health information, including diagnosis and genetic data.  
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Fourth, and in the same spirit, the standards endorse a principle of special protection for those 
unable to consent as research subjects. This principle applies to those who lack the capacity to 
consent, which usually includes children and people with mental disabilities.732 These groups of 
persons are considered particularly vulnerable as they depend on the decisions others take for 
them. It is therefore necessary to specify the conditions under which an intervention may be 
carried out on these people in order to ensure their protection.733 Besides minors, mentally 
incapacitated and the deceased also other groups of people can at times be considered particularly 
vulnerable and hence in need of special protection. People with certain physical disabilities, 
pregnant women or economically disadvantaged people may be socially disadvantaged to an extent 
that they deserve special protection. Extra protection and safeguards have therefore to be added to 
prevent harmful abuse, particularly in the area of biomedical research. Because of the potential 
harm for persons unable to consent this principle has been subject to wide discussions during the 
elaboration of the standards. 
A further principle endorsed in most instruments is that biomedical activities should not harm 
patients and research subjects and, if possible, improve their health condition.734 This principle, 
also often stated in medical ethics as primum non nocere, and today often referred to as the dual 
concept of beneficence and non-maleficence, has long been a widely respected injunction of 
medical ethics. It can for example already be found in the Hippocratic Oath,735 commonly dated to 
around 400 BC. As such, and because of its rather vague and principled approach that avoids 
absolute and hierarchical specifications of this principle it has remained little contested and 
generally intact.736  
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The next principle that needs mentioning is that of freedom of scientific research.737 Freedom of 
scientific research is “one of the highest expressions of human capacities and the principle pays 
recognition to the fact that this freedom is one of the main guarantors of human health and welfare 
as it can propel progress and development.”738 The correlated right has already been enshrined in 
one of the most basic civil and political right, the human right to freedom of thought, speech and 
expression.739 Because it is also enshrined in international treaty law such as the ICCPR and 
European Convention on Human Rights and in many municipal laws as well as it has been 
frequently been referred to in courts this principle can be said to constitute a legal principle.740  
A further principle enshrined across the instruments in the area of bioethics is the protection of 
confidentiality of medical data.741 The duty of confidentiality is essential to foster trust in the 
doctor-patient relationship and as such again an old injunction of medical ethics that can already 
be found in the Hippocratic Oath.742 With the advent of modern means of communications, 
electronic data collection and storage special safeguards for the preservation of the confidentiality 
of data have come in order. Such measures might include encoding of data, limited access to the 
data, use of passwords, etc. Moreover, through modern means of data collection and processing the 
range of possible use of this data has been much increased. It therefore seems that there is a need 
to clearly identify what kind of research should be undertaken and what data needs collecting for 
that.743  
The next principle worth mentioning as it is endorsed in all instruments is that of non-
discrimination and non-stigmatization.744 This includes a prohibition of stigmatization on the basis 
of health status, particularly as regards genetic status but also when it comes to the allocation of 
scarce resources and access to health care. This issue has recently received considerable attention 
with fear of genetic discrimination, that is of the abuse of genetic information to discriminate 
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against people in health insurance, employment or other field, being on the rise.745 The principle 
clearly roots in the broader human rights principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined 
in the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR.746 
Non-commercialisation of the human body and its parts reflects two notions.747 For one, it follows 
from “an ethical and legal axiom according to which human organs and tissue should be regarded 
as gifts and not as mere commodities.”748 Secondly, the principle has been in place to prevent the 
exploitation of economically disadvantaged people who might readily part with one of their organs 
for remuneration. Since it must be doubted that such an act could ever be based on a truly 
informed and autonomous decision abusive practices could easily be established. Such abusive 
practices in turn could amount to an objectification of a human person. As such prohibition of the 
sale of human body party is grounded in the conviction that even if informed consent has been 
obtained such acts “would diminish human dignity and our sense of solidarity.”749  
Finally, a clear and rather unequivocal prohibition of reproductive human cloning for reproductive 
reasons is endorsed both, in the Oviedo Convention and in the Additional Protocol on human 
cloning and in the Declaration on the Human Genome.750 However, it is noteworthy that this 
principle has not been further endorsed through the General Assembly in the form of a Convention, 
as discussed above. The fact that states could not agree on a complete ban on human reproductive 
cloning suggests that they may in fact want to leave the door ajar to such experiments even though 
the majority of states seem to consider cloning, at least if undertaken for reproductive purposes, to 
constitute a repulsive practice.  
 
3. The Relationship between Human Rights and Bioethical Principles 
All bioethical principles discussed above have been incorporated and hence become principles 
enshrined in international human rights instruments. The acquaintance of this new form also 
somewhat changes or transforms certain aspects of the character of these principles. First of all 
they are no longer addressed primarily to doctors and physicians but to states and their agencies, 
and only exceptionally to the broader public. States thereby, to varying degrees at least, owe it to 
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other states to ensure within their area the application of these principles.751 Secondly, the 
principles at the very least have entered the realm of political discussions and negotiations on 
international legal and/or policy standards.  
This transformation seems also to have been in the mind of the IBC that elaborated the UDBHR. 
The explanatory memorandum for the fifth draft of the UDBHR comments on the relationship 
between bioethics and human rights as follows:  
“...A most important achievement of the draft declaration is that it anchors the principles 
that it espouses firmly in the rules governing human dignity, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Bioethics has hitherto developed substantially along two broad 
streams. One of these, present since the ancient times, derives from reflections on medical 
practice and on the conduct of medical professionals. The other, conceptualized in more 
recent times, has drawn upon the developing international human rights law. One of the 
important achievements of the declaration is that it seeks to unit these two streams. It 
clearly aims to establish the conformity of bioethics with international human rights 
law.”752 
The description shows that “a picture of bioethics that did not include human rights would be an 
incomplete one”753 today. The first stream, described as being centred around the activity of 
“reflection” on medical practices and hence constituting medical ethics, meets a second stream, 
that of bioethics, which has “drawn upon the developing international human rights law”.754 It 
seems thereby that the IBC considers one stream to approach matters from an ethical, and the 
other from a more legal perspective.755 Based on this proposition Harald Schmidt, reflecting on the 
relationship between bioethical principles and human rights convincingly summarises their 
relationship as follows: 
“… it is plausible to view the general relationship between bioethics and human rights as a 
complementary one. On this view, academic bioethics - in the various disciplines that 
contribute to this field, which is in itself an inter-disciplinary one - legitimately addresses 
many of the same questions as the human rights branch, whether in the context of 
academic research, jurisprudence, politics, the setting out of human rights policy standards 
or grass roots activism. I take this overlap to be unproblematic as long as one is clear about 
the scope and limitations of the respective approaches. Accordingly, while both streams 
have a clear and robust theoretical element, with distinct methodologies and normative 
frameworks to draw on, the human rights stream is closer to the sphere of politics and 
jurisprudence, and thus to the actual implementation of normative provisions, whether at a 
national or global level. The role of bioethics is primarily to provide input into the process 
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of establishing legal norms generated at the human rights level, and to give constructive 
criticism on the appropriateness of norms once they have been established.”756  
Norms and principles enshrined in the instruments in the area of bioethics therefore are human 
rights norms and principles to the extent that they root in and built on human rights doctrine and 
thought and or to the extent that they reformulate and adapt these provisions. Human rights 
thought and principles provide the framework in the sense that the human rights framework 
determines the interpretation of the single provisions, i.e. how they are to be operationalized, how 
they relate to other norms of international law and what effect they have.757 The part of “bioethics” 
and the bioethical body of thought must be understood as the part that fills this framework with 
specific content.758 Bioethical principles thereby fill in the gaps in case established human rights 
norms and principles do not cover a specific factual situation of bioethical relevance. The 
relationship is thus indeed a complementary one, albeit it seems that human rights are dominating 
in that they provide the framework and hence set certain limits for bioethical principles to be filled 
and operationalised within this framework. For example, a bioethical principle that would 
completely undermine the principle of freedom of expression or one that would suggest that the 
sole interest of society should trump individual interests would be incompatible with human rights 
framework and hence would be inconceivable in a standard. In the literature it has, however, been 
noted that bioethical principles sometimes deviate from a classical human rights approach to 
matters at hand as the former approach less aims at the protection of fundamental freedoms than it 
is about the endorsement of ethical principles that can, under certain circumstances seek to curb 
the fundamental freedoms encapsulated in human rights.759 For example the Deutsche Ethikrat in 
its commentaries did not so much press for the value of scientific freedom then for an ethically 
balanced approach to such questions as whether or not the import of embryonic stem cells should 
be allowed and whether or not the cloning of human beings for therapeutic purposes should be 
allowed.760 An ethical discourse, that arrives at its conclusions on the basis of 'good but not purely 
legal reasons' and that, in a pluralistic society, necessarily takes a mediating role, is thereby 
juxtaposed to a human rights discourse that is fundamentally about the protection of freedoms and 
can thereby come to very different conclusions about how a certain topic should be regulated. This 
certainly holds true for discourses at the national level and it might be arguable that certain ethical 
principles, such as the principle that the cloning of human beings for therapeutic purposes is 
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against the human dignity of human beings, at the international level can be construed as 
somewhat limiting fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom to expression.761 It should, 
however, also be noted that human rights, while the protection of fundamental freedoms has 
always been a core raison d'etre for their existence, they, because they had to be a common ground 
for all nations and cultures also always had to be eclectic and flexible enough to accommodate 
different views on how far the protection of fundamental freedoms should be stretched and in how 
far other considerations should be given priority.762 With the exception of the Additional Protocol 
on Human Cloning, discussed above in chapter 3, no international standard in the area of bioethics 
endorses an unequivocal prohibition of human cloning for therapeutic or reproductive purposes, 
thus leaving it to national interpretations to decide whether to give priority to a right of freedom of 
expression or to an ethical principle that prohibits the cloning of human beings for therapeutic or 
reproductive purposes.763 At the international level it therefore seems justified to speak of a 
complementary discourse in which bioethical principles flesh out and fill in gaps in human rights 
standards without too starkly undermining the fundamental freedoms set out within the 
standards.764   
 
4. Conclusion 
In essence all standards that are directly addressed to issues of bioethical relevance are human 
rights standards at their core. That is, they refer to human rights in their title, refer to human rights 
standards throughout their texts and endorse and are based on human rights principles. They are 
bioethical to the extent that their objectives are directed towards and that their content deals with 
questions of bioethical interest and to the extent they endorse bioethical principles within the 
human rights framework. As could be seen above most of the principles discussed above are rather 
long grown ethical principles that have developed from the general medical ethics or bioethical 
body of thought. The general bioethical principles enshrined in the instruments continue to exist 
and to inform legal norms and principles in the area of bioethics. Most bioethical principles, in 
theory at least, constitute absolute statements. In practice, however, these principles are often 
rather flexible and relative principles. 
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The bioethical principles are thereby “anchored” in human rights. At the same time, are they not 
mere rehearsals of abstract human rights norms. Rather, they infuse human rights with past and 
contemporary controversies in bioethics, thereby illustrating again the above-asserted 
complementarities of human rights and bioethics.  
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Part III: 
The Analysis of the Implications of Discussing issues of Bioethical 
relevance in this Epistemological Approach to Bioethics 
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Chapter VI Roots, Narrative and Episteme of Human Rights Standards  
Having established in the previous chapters that the standards in the area of bioethics are at their 
core human rights standards and having further established that in this thesis these standards are 
considered legal and hence can give rise to a legal discourse of some sort this chapter aims to 
provide a better understanding of the properties of this legal discourse. That is, this chapter 
inquires into the character and nature of the episteme or structure giving concepts of the human 
rights discourse that takes place in the area of bioethics. To that purpose this chapter first discusses 
the context from which and into which human rights emerged, i.e. it discusses some of the socio-
historical background to and the philosophical roots of human rights. Analysing the history and 
roots of the standards is helpful in explaining why their episteme was formed in the way it has. It 
also to some extent is helpful in explaining how the structure giving concepts or grid-points that 
together form these standards' episteme are charged, i.e. what their context is, what they mean and 
how they must be read or interpreted, a discussion that is undertaken in the second part of this 
chapter.  
 
1. Philosophical Roots of Human Rights 
There are divergent views as to the philosophical roots and origins of human rights. In particular, 
scholars differ widely on the question of whether or not these roots are universal, i.e. on whether 
they can be found in all philosophical, religious or cultural traditions around the world.  
One prominent view thereby is to argue that most of the concerns dealt with in the UDHR and 
other human rights instruments had long been recognised within varying conceptions of human 
dignity which again are an integral part of all of the world's major religious and cultural 
traditions.765 On this view states' practice of human rights in the pre-UN era was not only limited 
to Western States. Rather, it is argued that “all societies cross-culturally and historically manifest 
conceptions of human rights.”766 To contend that “the concept of human rights is basically a 
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Western concept is to ignore the practices of other great ancient civilisations of the world.”767 
Closely related is often an understanding of human rights as arising from universal basic human 
needs768 or entitlements to fulfil a person's capabilities.769 Human rights in this perspective are the 
answer to being human, they logically stem from humans' humanness and correlated human needs 
and as such can be found everywhere at all times.770  
Another group of scholars makes strong linkages between the actual coming into existence of 
human rights, i.e. between the moral consensus achieved in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the atrocities of the 2nd World War.771 According to this view it is the “shared outrage” 
in the face of these atrocities and “the need to reaffirm each and everyone's individual rights after 
their violation during the war”772 that explains why the Declaration has found such widespread 
support from so many delegations from so many different backgrounds.773  
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Other scholars again dismiss the idea of universal roots, arguing that this idea confuses 'ontological 
and functional equivalents of human rights', which are inherently present in every culture, with the 
specific concept of human rights, which is unique to the Western774 liberal775 tradition.776 These 
scholars moreover argue that while human dignity, as the major concept underlying and driving 
human rights philosophy, is an age old concept that can be found in all cultures at all times, the 
specific notion of human dignity as used in a human rights context stems principally from liberal, 
enlightenment traditions of thought.777 Thus, while Buddhism, Islam and Confucianism, for 
example, may very well provide viable perspectives on human dignity, these specific conceptions of 
human dignity differ from other perspectives used, including from that underlying human rights. 
Since the conceptualisation of human dignity differs also the “particular social practice that aims to 
realize a distinctive substantive conception of human dignity”778 differs. Human rights, 
constituting one specific such social practice, consequently differ from other social practices. 
Donnelly, therefore concludes that  
“most non-Western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human 
rights but the very concept. As a matter of historical fact, the concept of human rights is 
an artefact of modern Western civilisation.”779 
In much the same way detects Onua Yasuaki for example several compelling 'substantive and 
psychological factors'780 that give rise to theories of human rights' universal origin. On the whole, 
however, he equally dismisses this notion since “those mechanisms that protected the interest of 
the people … may be characterised as the ontological or functional equivalents of human rights but 
not as human rights per se.”781  
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This thesis, as will be further explained in the next sections, upholds that concepts of human 
dignity as well as ontological and functional equivalents of human rights can be found in all 
cultures at all times. Nevertheless, it also recognises that human rights as rights were not born into 
a vacuum but that some of the specific characteristics of human rights as enshrined in international 
human rights standards in many ways inhere in a certain tradition of thought and in a certain 
nomos782, to be explained over the next section. The claim made here is not that human rights are 
not or cannot become universal or that the idea of human rights and human dignity is a specific 
'Western' concept. Yet it is upheld that human rights as enshrined in many international standards, 
with their specific understanding of human dignity, use of legal concepts and language, emphasis 
on the individual and his or her autonomy as well as intricate relationship with the state can be 
indebted and often have been influenced by certain liberal, and enlightened traditions of thought 
which again to some extent defines the content, meaning, scope, fundamental notions and 
application of today's human rights. Understanding the roots and nomos of human rights will then 
be helpful to better understand the meaning and scope of the presently examined human rights 
discourse. Hence it is worthwhile to elaborate on the traditions that gave rise to human rights and 
to thereby bring human rights and human rights' episteme into context.  
 
1.1. The Idea of Liberalism 
Liberalism is conventionally said to root in the experience of the Wars of Religion that swept 
Europe during the 16th and 17th century and to have emerged "in response to the growth of the 
modern nation-states, which centralize governmental functions and claim sole authority to 
exercise coercive power within their boundaries."783 Today liberalism comes in many differing 
philosophical variations and institutional manifestations.784 Yet its foundation still is that of 
tolerance – albeit in differing conceptualisations - and that of two other bases captured by 
Locke's famous claim that men are born in a state of perfect freedom and a state of equality. 
Locke maintained that in order  
“to properly understand political power and trace its origins, we must consider the state 
that all people are in naturally. That is a state of perfect freedom of acting and disposing of 
their own possessions and persons as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature. 
People in this state do not have to ask permission to act or depend on the will of others to 
arrange matters on their behalf. The natural state is also one of equality in which all power 
and jurisdiction is reciprocal and no one has more than another. It is evident that all 
human beings – as creatures belonging to the same species and rank and born 
indiscriminately with all the same natural advantages and faculties – are equal amongst 
themselves. They have no relationship of subordination or subjection unless God (the lord 
                                                          
782
 On the term nomos see Cover, "Nomos and Narrative", note 38, 95 set seq.  
783
 Entry on liberalism in: Audi, note 9, 502 et seq. 
784 See for example, R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, 1974; W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and 
Culture, 1989.  
132 
 
 
 
and master of them all) had clearly set one person above another and conferred on him an 
undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.”785 
Much like in Locke's reasoning liberal theories generally build on the tenet that all human beings 
are fundamentally equal as much as they are individuals and free and that they are entitled to equal 
individual liberty. In one way or another these theories' aim is to promote social outcomes that are, 
as far as possible, the result of free individual choices – as long as the choice of one person does 
respect the equal freedom and rights of others. The ideal of freedom and equality, to the largest 
possible extent, has to be preserved even after the formation of the state. The state is thus only 
legitimate to the extent that the individual voluntarily trades his or her liberty away in exchange for 
the state's guarantee of a good social order. The state may only exercise coercion in order to ensure 
the maintenance of basic liberal ideas.786 Yet a state's coercive order must not build on the 
superiority of one substantive conception of the good life for human beings. Rather, people are 
generally free to choose what values to pursue in their lives provided that they pursue them within 
the limits of an equal liberty that respects equal limits on individual entitlements.787 Liberalism 
thus does generally not seek to resolve conflicts emanating from different values, but to provide a 
'neutral' framework within which everyone can live up to his values. A liberal modern government, 
as Dworkin summarises, for example,  
“must treat those whom it governs with concern, that is, as human beings who are capable 
of suffering and frustration, and with respect, that is, as human beings who are capable of 
forming and acting on intelligent conceptions of how their lives should be lived. 
Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with equal concern 
and respect. It must not distribute goods or opportunities un-equally on the ground that 
some citizens are entitled to more because they are worthy of more concern. It must not 
constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen's conception of the good life . . . is nobler or 
superior to another's.788 
Liberalism, then, "generally consists in the structuring of individual interactions in society on the 
basis of a set of rights or entitlements that require human beings to respect each other's liberty and 
equality to the greatest extent possible".789 These rights or entitlements do not have to be 
expressed as natural or human rights.790 However human rights, at least in their current form, 
have been born from and into liberal traditions and, at least their origins cannot be separated from 
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the liberal project of ensuring respect of individual's liberty, equality and autonomy by means of 
rights, usually within the context of a nation state. Human rights and thereby the standards in the 
area of bioethics, standing in the tradition of liberal thought, are built on and emphasise liberal 
values, which, as will be shown further below, again impacts the way issues of bioethical relevance 
are approached and dealt with.   
 
1.2. Enlightenment 
A second strand that clearly left its imprint on contemporary human rights doctrine might best be 
referred to by the broad term 'enlightenment'.791 That movement and its equivalents in other 
European languages, denotes an intellectual movement which is characterised by certain doctrines 
or ideas which to some extent are similar to that of liberalism. Of course, as is the case with 
'liberalism' and any other grand philosophical idea, it must be noted at the outset that  
“no single idea, belief or practice unites all of the writers associated with Enlightenment 
thought; no one meaning informed even the banners under which dispute was sustained; 
no one definition embraces the ways in which the most self-consciously used terms were 
employed – terms such as 'science', 'republic', 'scepticism', 'Christian', 'atheist'. This does 
not render such labels useless, because they function as maps, simultaneously reflecting 
and requiring interpretation. No one map, and no single label, can represent everything 
that could be represented; each must be drawn up on a certain scale, and all can be 
misread. An analogy with maps was popular among writers of the time who were keen to 
signal the challenges of interpreting unfamiliar contexts” 792 
Bearing these inevitable limitations in mind this thesis will in the following attempt to sketch out 
some of the propositions that are commonly associated with enlightenment thought. For one, the 
scientific and intellectual achievements of the 16th, 17th and 18th century, including for example the 
expansion of the print culture, discoveries and inventions in a variety of disciplines such as 
astronomy, chemistry, mathematics and biology as well as the general popularization of science for 
example by means of a promotion of the value of scientific education, encouraged a belief in a 
scientifically discernible natural order and paved the way for growing confidence in human reason. 
Reason hence came to be regarded as man's central capacity as it enabled men to think and to 
discern information.793  
Since all men (and on some accounts women) at all times were understood as having the same 
capacity to exercise reason they, secondly, were also considered to be fundamentally equal. It 
follows that they should hence be granted equality before the law and equal freedom of expression 
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and thought. Tolerance had to be extended to other creeds and ways of life and local prejudice and 
customs, which owed their existence not to the exercise of reason but to authority were to be 
devalued.794 Overall, non-rational aspects of human nature were to be played down. Education, for 
example, according to many enlightenment thinkers should impart knowledge rather than mould 
feelings or develop character.795 Much of enlightenment philosophy is therefore characterised by 
its atheistic or agnostic, anti-theological and anticlerical character, by its rejection of authority and 
advocating for intellectual and moral autonomy and self-reliance.796 
Thirdly, acting rationally was understood to imply acting correctly or good. Therefore, men, by 
nature, was seen to be rational and good797 and both, an individual and humanity as a whole, were 
understood as being able to progress to perfection by means of using their capacity to reason.798 
Many parts of Immanuel Kant's philosophy, including his concepts of autonomy and human 
dignity illustrate this strand of thought. For example, autonomy, according to Kant, is the duty of 
each man to live according to rules that he himself sees fit for himself and everyone else799, i.e. 
autonomy is the self-imposition of rationally identified laws. Laws that are rationally identified are 
necessarily good or correct laws. That is so because all good and correct moral requirements or 
rules are based on standards of rationality (categorical imperatives), i.e. because all good and 
correct moral requirements or rules can be identified by a rational mind and only rules that have 
been identified in that way are then, according to Kant, justified and those that must be self-
imposed. Immorality involves a violation of these standards of rationality and is thereby 
irrational.800 Because acting rationally is acting morally and thereby is acting correctly or good 
humans have the ability (and the duty) to arrive at morally good decisions and thereby to progress 
to good ends.801  
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Men's status as free rational agents who are the source of the authority of the moral laws that bind 
themselves is also the source of Kant's concept of humans' dignity. The freedom of the individual to 
exercise his or her own innate capacity for rational thought, for thinking for him or herself, is, for 
Kant, every human beings' vocation, and it is also a key to enlightenment.802 The human dignity of 
each human being is best promoted by their progressive development into autonomous rational 
human beings capable of “forgoing the tutelage incurred by unexamined dogma or authority” for 
such development is the proper destination of human nature.803 Dignity then stems from human 
beings' ability to reason and to thereby form moral decisions, i.e. to constitute ends.804 As human 
beings are capable to form such moral decisions, i.e. because they can distinguish between right 
and wrong at all and thereby constitute ends, they have dignity.805 It follows for Kant that human 
beings in themselves or in others must never be treated as a means only but always as an end in 
themselves. Dignity demands that they are not to be instrumentalised for whatever reason.806 In 
his Metaphysik Kant further elaborates this concept of dignity and the respect that is owed to 
human's dignity 
“Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow human beings and is 
in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot 
be used merely as a means by any human being . . . but must always be used at the same 
time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which he raises 
himself above all other beings in the world that are not human beings and yet can be used, 
and so over all things. But just as he cannot give himself away for any price (this would 
conflict with his duty of self-esteem), so neither can he act contrary to the equally necessary 
self-esteem of others, as human beings, that is, he is under obligation to acknowledge, in a 
practical way, the dignity of humanity in every other human being. Hence there rests on 
him a duty regarding the respect that must be shown to every other human being. 807 
Kant's concept of human dignity, in particular the idea that human beings are priceless and that 
they may not be instrumentalised, is frequently invoked in discussions of bioethical interest and it 
seems that many prevailing contemporary views concerning patient “autonomy”, informed consent 
and with regard to what ought or what ought not to be done in the name of patients' human dignity 
are informed by Kant's philosophy.808 Since his ideas are so intricately linked with the 
enlightenment project itself it seems then also that contemporary debates in the area of bioethics 
are indebted to enlightenment thought.  
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To summarise, enlightenment philosophers were generally united in their optimism or belief in the 
powers of reason to yield knowledge about the natural, including the human, world and by their 
commitment to reason as the main basis and source of authority and dignity, as well as to equality 
and respect for every individual's freedom to exercise reason and autonomy to follow what reason 
demands to do. A good human society, accordingly, is to be based on the fundamental values of 
personal liberty, equality, and freedom of thought and expression.809 As will be seen throughout 
this and the following chapter, human rights, standing in that tradition of enlightenment thought, 
emphasise many of the values and endorse many of the ideas connected with the enlightenment 
tradition of thought, including the values of equality and autonomy. As such also the standards in 
the area of bioethics endorse certain values, which again have a bearing on how issues of bioethical 
relevance are perceived of and dealt with. 
 
1.3. Socio-Historical Developments and the Emergence of the Modern Nation State 
Occurring parallel to and in conjunction with the above mentioned developments and equally 
influential on the development of a liberal, enlightenment world view and the idea of human rights 
were the development of the modern European state as well as several socio-historical changes in 
European (Western) society.810 Particularly the above mentioned experiences of religious strife in 
Europe, the technological and scientific revolutionary developments as well as changes, generally 
referred to as those of 'modernization', including the formation of the nation state, migration, 
urbanization and industrialisation deserve mentioning.811 The religious strife, in particular the 30 
years of war in Europe between 1618 and 1648 brought a level of destruction that to some extent 
led to the dissolution of religion as the foundation of society. It also made it clear that tolerance of 
different creeds and beliefs was paramount to any peaceful society.812 Technical and scientific 
developments in addition fostered a belief in man's capacity to reason and to progress.813 By 
questioning established authority in their respective fields both these developments also helped 
bring along the emergence of a new vision of the individual's relationship to god, society, and the 
state. That is, the individual was seen as capable to reasoning and thereby to question established 
religious or otherwise inspired modes of explanation, which in turn allowed him or her to 
reconfigure his or her relationship with the entities that embodied these authorities.814 
Modernisations also furthered this trend by for example replacing the all-encompassing moral 
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whole of traditional society by a much more segmented social order.815 A strong workforce that was 
capable of claiming rights and entitlements emerged.816 More complex divisions of labour resulted 
in changes in class structure, particularly the rise of a working class.817 The individual was 
suddenly not merely separable from the community and his or her traditional social roles or class, 
but specially valued precisely as a distinctive, discrete individual. No longer could persons thus be 
reduced to their roles, to parts of the community. Rather, they were now separate individuals, 
possessing special worth and dignity precisely as individuals.818  
In this environment or because of this environment the modern state emerged, originally as a 
guarantor of an individual's rights against all-encompassing rights of kings, emperors and religious 
authority and as guarantor of a territorially confined order, in which resources and benefits were to 
be spread more evenly than the 'favouritism' of aristocratic elites. Soon, however, also the state 
threatened the individual citizen as it grew in power and as new elites emerged.819 To forestall 
encroachments “freemen” began to demand that they indeed be free. Such demands eventually also 
took the form of arguments for universal natural rights, to be discussed below, as well as it 
reinforced a belief in the ideal of the equality of all men. In the new socially mobile society in which 
entrance to and exit from the bourgeois class was less predictable, a new set of privileges could not 
readily be reserved for a new elite defined by birth or some similar characteristic. Rather, “in order 
that some (the bourgeoisie) might be able to exercise these new rights, they had to be guaranteed 
for all.”820 Thus, natural (or human) rights came to be articulated primarily as claims of any 
individual against the state. 
In practice, of course, all these structural changes remain incompletely realized even today, are 
ongoing or have been restricted to a small segment of the population or society.821 Nevertheless, as 
will be seen below human rights, emerging from this background, clearly have a special reference 
to the state, individualism and individual autonomy, for states' equal concern and respect for its 
population, which other traditions of thought might lack or emphasis less strongly.   
 
1.4. Natural Rights  
Against the backdrop of the liberal and enlightenment ideas and their socio-historical background, 
various scholars such as Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and Locke developed theories of natural 
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rights.822 Natural rights theorists generally hold that there are universally applicable general rules 
or principles of conduct for human beings which have overriding moral authority. They command 
human beings and states to respect the rights arising from these rules in all their practices and 
associations. These rights or principles are claimed to derive from such sources as God, a state of 
nature or from some essential human quality or capability that necessitate the existence of such 
rights.823 Locke, one of the most prominent natural law theorists, for example, argued that certain 
rights self-evidently pertain to the individual.824 That is, these rights were derived from reason and 
hence from a source that was held to be rationally self-evident. Prehistoric humans in their above 
mentioned original “state of nature,” i.e. before humans began forming complex societies enjoyed 
certain “natural rights” which humans could discover through reason.825 Natural rights, maybe 
most prominently, obligated that “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or 
possessions.”826 Because of their self-evident and 'natural' character these rights then laid the 
rationale of certain inalienable 'human rights' that are attached to and derive from human being's 
innate qualities and capabilities.827 
Hugo Grotius, widely credited with being one of the founding fathers of international law, similarly 
set forth a theory of natural laws and laws of nations. His treatise is about how the law of nature 
should affect the law of nations, how international law must serve as the foundation for universal 
human freedom.828 To Grotius "human law, like God's law, must be just. As God's creatures 
humans are endowed with the capacity of reason and blessed with the opportunity of sharing the 
gift of life."829 Natural law is “the dictate of right reason” necessary to human's rational and social 
nature.830 The system of rights and duties that flows necessarily from our essential nature as 
rational creatures living together in society is a just one.831 Natural rights must both be respected 
and realized “irrespective of the inclinations of individual nation-states” as “the dictate of right 
reason” applies at all times to everyone, everywhere.832  
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Natural rights theories therefore generally come with certain characteristics. For one, they usually 
hold that natural rights are discernible by reason. Because of their foundation in reason or some 
human essential qualities or generally in 'humanness', natural rights are seen to be universally 
valid and independent from time and social or historical culture. They moreover generally ground 
in the idea of human beings' special status or worth, which the natural rights are to protect. Next, 
because natural rights ground in humanness and humans' special features and status, they must be 
accessible by every human being equally and they have the purpose of preserving, to varying 
degrees, human beings' humanness and capacities.833 Good and natural is often associated with the 
nature of human beings, a concept to which God or another authority outside of the human being is 
often only of secondary importance.834 Another important feature is that an individual's rights, 
such as the protection of life and private property, are usually understood to constitute an essential 
aspect of individual autonomy against the state.835 Since only the exercise of these rights can 
protect the individual against arbitrary incursion by the powerful state and because the aim is to 
prevent the state from interfering with a human being's capacity to exercise autonomy and to 
reason,  
“the list of [natural] rights comprised rather what have been termed negative freedoms, 
than positive liberty, that is, the freedoms that protect the individual from any outside 
invasion rather than the freedom of the individual or group to achieve its purposes or 
ideals”836  
Finally, natural rights are usually individual rights that each individual may invoke and even 
enforce against the state and society. They presuppose an autonomous individual who can and is 
willing to form autonomous decisions. Most of these characteristics of natural rights, as will be 
seen below, are well reflected in modern human rights thought and doctrine. 
 
2. Human Rights Law Today 
2.1. The Nomos of Modern Human Rights Law 
Of course, human rights by the time of their coming into existence were no longer tied to liberal, 
enlightenment traditions or natural law theories in their classical senses. Nor is today's human 
rights agenda or body of thought solely informed by liberal and enlightenment traditions of 
thought nor have human rights and their concepts ever been uncontested even in these liberal and 
enlightenment traditions of thought.837 Instead, human rights, by the time of their coming into 
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existence and ever since, were informed and are constantly further developed and extended 
through a variety of influences which can hardly be tied to a single monolithic body of thought. 
However, the influence of the liberal and enlightenment perspective has been a factor in the 
constitution and development of human rights, a factor that is still evident in several ways. 
Koskenniemi expresses this idea of the legacy of historical roots in the following way:  
“I have not met an international lawyer who would have said: “Look, here is my liberal 
theory of politics. The international law which I teach is based on that theory.”... And yet, I 
know of no modern international lawyer who would not have accepted some central tenet 
in it. Obviously this is not a matter of conscious political choice...[]...the case appears that if 
one tries to engage in the sort of debate about international legality which international 
lawyers undertake, then one is bound to accept an international legal liberalism. Self-
determination, independence, consent and most notably the idea of a Rule of law, are all 
liberal themes. These themes create distinctively liberal problems: How to guarantee that 
states are not coerced by law imposed from above? How to maintain the objectivity of law? 
How to delimit off a “private” realm of sovereignty over domestic jurisdiction while 
allowing international action to enforce collective preferences or human rights? How to 
guarantee state “freedom” while providing the conditions for international “order”? These 
are all distinctly liberal problems…”838  
According to this view modern human rights law reflects liberal and enlightenment traditions and 
has inherited many of their strands of thought and the conceptual riddles associated with it. What, 
according to Koskenniemi, makes it sometimes difficult to understand these traditions as 
materially controlling is that they usually claim to merely constitute a neutral framework within 
which substantive political choices can be made as opposed to a grand theory themselves.839 Yet, 
the liberal enlightenment worldview certainly has an impact on how and whether at all human 
rights emerged and on the way they are framed. It does so by providing the soil, and the 
philosophical and intellectual ferment and background from and into which human rights 
developed and often continue to do so. That is, these traditions form the nomos or normative 
universe of human rights in that they are part and parcel of the narratives, epics and stories that 
found and inform human rights, often also in their contemporary forms. Robert Cover, reflecting 
on the normative universe of human rights and their implication for general human rights 
jurisprudence, provides an example for how the founding story or epic, as part of human rights' 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
more nonsense, -- and the nonsense, as usual, dangerous nonsense. The words can scarcely be said to have a 
meaning…" and E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1790, which is highly critical of the philosophical 
foundations that brought about the Revolution, casting for example doubt on the "use of discussing a man's abstract 
right to food or medicine… The question is upon the method of procuring and administering them."  
838
 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, note 245, 5. Of course this is not to be understood as a factual account of 
human rights but as a means to show that human rights are indebted to certain ideas. Arguing along similar lines see 
also Weston, note 827, 262; Alston/Steiner, note 214, 472 et seq.; Freeman, note 237, 136; J. Gray (ed.), "Max 
Horkeimer: The Way They See and Hear Is Inseparable from the Social Life Process", in: J. Gray, Enlightenment's 
Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, 1999, 200 arguing that ours are "Ours are enlightenment 
cultures not by positive conviction but by default." 
839
 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, note 245, 5-6. One such way in which liberal thought for example controls 
without seeming to control is through the often discussed divide between a public and private sphere in law. The 
division of law in a public sphere, in which law is enacted and behaviour controlled by the state and a private sphere 
which is left to the private person to exercise his or her autonomy rests on a distinction between private and public 
spheres which is owed to liberal distinction between a public sphere in which the state has a role and a private sphere in 
which it has not. C. Chinkin, "A Critique of the Public/Private Dimension", 10 European Journal of International Law, 
1999, 387 et seq.  
141 
 
 
 
nomos840, first of all, is heavily indebted to liberal and enlightenment tradition of thought and, 
secondly, lives on and impacts contemporary human rights thought.841 According to him the myth 
that founds and underlies human rights is one of 
“...social contract. The myth postulates free and independent if highly vulnerable beings 
who voluntarily trade a portion of their autonomy for a measure of collective security. The 
myth makes the collective arrangement the product of individual choice and thus 
secondary to the individual... “Rights” is the fundamental category because it is the 
normative category that most nearly approximates that which is the source of the 
legitimacy of everything else. Rights are traded for collective security. But some rights are 
retained, and ...[]... are inalienable.” 842   
Oversimplified, the story that founds and then informs human rights, according to Cover, 
presupposes a state of nature in which there exist individuals who are free and dispose over 
unlimited rights.843 In this setting the individual is the first and fundamental unit, and rights locate 
him as an individual separate and apart from every other individual, society and the state.844 Only 
through each individual's choice and free consent to trade some of his or her rights away, i.e. 
through a social contract, can there be a legitimate limitation of the rights of the individual. Yet, 
even then some of these original rights, so called human rights, are retained by the individual. 
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These rights then are meant to guarantee a good order or society. In the human rights epic, it is 
mostly left to the state, as the product or end result of the social contract, to be the guarantor of 
these rights and to thereby establish a good moral order.845 The narrative of human rights thus 
constructs a particular vision of the human being as a free and autonomous human being who is 
capable and willing to form his or her decisions individually and who voluntarily trades some of his 
freedoms away in exchange for being part of society. It also postulates a particular ideal of a good 
society or good order and the means by which to achieve this good order – i.e. one that is based on 
each and everyone's enjoyment of and access to human rights within a state that acts to guarantee 
each and everyone's enjoyment of and access to human rights.   
Cover contrasts this myth and the way it constructs the individual, the state and a good order with 
the myth that defines the Jewish jurisprudence of 'mitzvah',846 which, according to him, is a 
fundamentally different one though it is functionally equivalent to human rights.847 In contrast to 
the contract based theory that founds human rights the myth that founds the Jewish concept of 
'mitzvah' is essentially one of heteronomy and not autonomy. It is the 'myth of Sinai' which gives 
meaning to the word 'mitzvah' which is  
“a collective -  indeed, a corporate – experience. The experience at Sinai is not chosen. The 
events give forth the words which are commandments... All law was given at Sinai and 
therefore all law is related back to the ultimate heteronomous event in which we were 
chosen...”848 
In the myth that founds the concept and jurisprudence of mitzvah the autonomy and individuality 
of each and everyone consequently is of lesser importance than in a human rights context. The 
individual's consent to whether or not a jurisprudence of mitzvah is to be established is in fact 
irrelevant as it is God who chooses the collective people of the Jews no matter an individual's 
consent.849 Also the means and concepts used to establish a good order significantly differ from 
that based on the establishment of the “rule” of human rights. There are no rights that an 
individual retains and that he or she is at liberty to invoke against a state. Thinking of the Jewish 
concept of mitzvah in terms of rights is generally amiss as there is no choice as to whether or not an 
individual accepts a jurisprudence of mitzvah. Moreover, the state is largely irrelevant to the 
concept of mitzvah as responsibilities are owed to God and not to the state. The founding stories or 
myths underlying human rights and mitzvah and their implications for the respective core concepts 
of human rights and mitzvah thus contrast in several important ways. They, for example, rather 
markedly differ with regard to the status of the individual, as concerns questions of free choice or 
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autonomy of the human being, on the question of the means by which a good or legitimate order is 
to be realized and the relevance and role of the individual and state in securing this order. To some 
extent then the founding story of social contract reflects many of the abovementioned liberal and 
enlightenment tenets and core principles, including that of autonomy, individual rights and the 
state as the protector of these rights.  
In summary, liberal, enlightenment and natural law traditions of thought thus had and have a 
significant impact on the ideas and ideals that inform human rights, on the range of concepts that 
are relevant in the field, on the content of human rights concepts and the methodology used by 
human rights to resolve the issues it tackles. That is, human rights self evidently pertain to each 
individual. They are viewed as (morally) prior to and above society and the state. They emphasise a 
person's autonomy, equality, individuality and dignity and are linked to human beings' innate 
capacity to reason i.e. to human beings humanness. They are rights, not duties and, at least when 
first conceived of within the UDHR, they were mainly negative rights, i.e. rights that restrict rather 
than incite the state to act.850 The state has a duty to protect them, it is the guarantor of a good 
order.  
In terms of epistemological concepts (grid points) that constitute a human rights discourse it may 
then be fair to say that any such discourse is based on the following structure giving concepts. First, 
it is based on the idea and concept of individual rights or legal entitlements that self-evidently 
pertain to each and everyone equally. Secondly, it is based on the idea and concept of that each 
everyone has human dignity simply qua being human and that this dignity must be or is best to be 
protected through the aforementioned individual rights. Third, any such discourse is about the idea 
and concept of a nation state as main guarantor and threat to human rights. Fourth, it is somehow 
linked to the idea and concept of universality as all human rights, if they have to have to be valid 
for everyone i.e. if they can be identified by the rational mind and inhere in the human being, must 
apply to everyone equally and must be the same for everyone everywhere. Finally any such 
discourse is about the idea and concept of autonomy which, as the natural birth right of each and 
every person, has to be protected in a human rights discourse. The following section will explain 
the idea and concept of each of these structure giving points as relevant to a human rights 
discourse. 
 
2.2. Episteme of the Standards in the Area of Bioethics 
So far it has been established why and how the just identified epistemological concepts came to be 
important to human rights discourses. This section then focuses on how these epistemological 
concepts are charged in a modern human rights discourse, i.e. how they are conventionally 
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understood or interpreted in a modern human rights discourse. It will thereby be seen that while 
these concepts are still to some extent wedded to and informed by the traditions that gave birth to 
them they have obviously also been extended and developed since. The following sections therefore 
discuss the nature, meaning and scope of each of these concepts as far as is relevant to a 
contemporary human rights discourse. 
    
 
2.2.1. Human Rights as Rights or Principles 
One characteristic and structure giving concept to any human rights discourse and to the discourse 
that takes place in the area of bioethics is that the standards are couched in a language of rights. 
With regard to the standards directly addressed to matters of bioethical interest it must, however, 
first be discussed to what extent these provisions are at all rights and/or to what extent they are 
principles and what the concept of a right entails. 
In definitional terms, a right, according to the Oxford dictionary of law, is (1) a title to or an interest 
in any property (2) any other interest or privilege recognised and protected by law (3) freedom to 
exercise any power conferred by law. Rights can thus denote several meanings. They can be a claim 
to something (e.g. to property), a liberty to do something (e.g. to move or to seek employment), or a 
power to do something (e.g. to destroy property or to make certain decisions).851 Principles, are 
hardly defined in legal dictionaries, at least not without the affix of “general principles of 
international law”.852 If used in legal texts principles are often taken to be general moral ideals or 
ideas, sometimes legally codified, that help make decisions in that they can help form and direct a 
decision. They are “a reason that argues in one direction but does not necessitate a particular 
decision … all that is meant when we say that a particular principle is a principle of our law, is that 
the principle is one which officials must take into account if it is relevant as a consideration 
inclining in one direction or another.”853 
From this short reflection on the nature of principles and rights it can be inferred that one 
distinction between rights and principles then is that human rights have right holders – a person or 
agency having a particular right who has the freedom to invoke that right. Principles in contrast 
have no holder as such who could invoke a principle in courts. They form the background to 
decisions but are not attached to one specific person or entity.854 Next, human rights, at least to the 
extent that they form part of the non-derogable core of human rights as enshrined in such 
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international legal standards as the ICCPR or to the extent that they form part of non-derogable 
international customary law must offer the same standard of protection for all those being under 
the jurisdiction of a state that has signed up to the standard.855 Principles in contrast can apply 
differently to different entities for example, when a principle in equity seeks to balance differences 
in bargaining power. To have a human right to x (e.g. the right to have my autonomy respected or 
the right to not to be abused as research subject in dangerous experiments) moreover asserts that 
the state has a duty not to prevent the right-holder from x (i.e. to respect his or her autonomy and 
not to abuse him or her as a research subject in dangerous experiments).856 That is, the addressee 
of human rights, including of those in the area of bioethics, are mostly states and it is states that 
have clear duties that correlate the right.857 Principles, in contrast, can be addressed to states but 
can also be general considerations such as principles of equity which are not necessarily addressed 
to one entity or can obligate various entities. In any event, principles do not necessarily correlate a 
clear duty on the part of the state or any other stakeholder but can be of a more general nature, 
such as that pacta sunt servanda.858 Next, to have a human right to x implies a person is entitled to 
x. It is owed to the bearer of the right. If x is threatened or denied a human right-holder is 
“authorized to make special claims that ordinarily trump utility, social policy, and other moral or 
political grounds for action”.859 That is, human rights can – to some extent at least- be enforced, no 
matter if there are good reasons for why they should not be enforced. Principles in contrast are 
more often statements that suggest that it is desirable, good or right in a moral or legal sense that 
someone enjoys what the principle entails. While it might be right or good in a moral or legal sense 
that these principles are observed, they usually cannot, standing by themselves be enforced. 
Endorsing this principle is not owed to anyone, it does not trump other considerations. In the 
words of Dworkin, principles are to be distinguished from rules (rights) “in the character of the 
discretion they give860, for while rules are applicable in a all or nothing fashion, principles allow for 
discretion.861  Moreover, according to Dworkin, principles can conflict with each other, whereas if 
rules conflict with each other, a superior rule has to be established determining which rules is to be 
given priority.862 Finally, rights only apply to certain injuries whereas principles can be much 
broader in scope. In the case of human rights that means that besides the requirement for a human 
right to be violated by a state or state agent human rights only cover certain areas of misconduct. 
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Principles in contrast can be much broader than rights and can hence in theory be applied to a 
wider variety of circumstances.  
In short, the term 'rights' usually refers to a legally enforceable set of expectations as to how others, 
most obviously the state, should behave towards rights bearers. These expectations may take the 
form of limitations on, and/or requirements of, the behaviour of others. Rights bearers have to be 
entities legally considered to possess 'personality' – that is, legally deemed to be autonomous moral 
agents – and therefore capable of taking decisions and accepting responsibilities, as in the case of 
adult persons, trade unions, corporations, or states. 863 Principles in contrast are much broader, 
have no clear addressee or holder and cannot be enforced in court. Their content is broader defined 
and they can be breached without giving rise to any obligation to set someone right.  
In practice however, these distinctions between rights and principles cannot be easily maintained 
and they are often blurred, particularly when used in a human rights context.864 That is so because 
the term rights, particularly when used in a human rights context is “chameleon-like”865 in the 
sense of that it can describe a variety of legal relationships. In the provisions enshrined in the Bill 
of Human Rights and most of the more recent human rights standards rights can for example be 
formulated as positive rights such as “everyone's right to for example life and liberty or 
security”866, formulated negatively such as “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”867 or neither be framed as a positive nor as a 
negative right at all. Article 10 of the ICESCR, for example, reads that “States Parties to the present 
Covenant recognize that: 1. The widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the 
family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, particularly for its 
establishment and while it is responsible for the care and education of dependent children. 
Marriage must be entered into with the free consent of the intending spouses.”868 Similarly vague 
formulations can be found in more recent human rights standards, such as the UN Declaration on 
Social Progress and Development which uses formulations, such as “social progress and 
development require the full utilization of human resources, including, in particular: ( a ) The 
encouragement of creative initiative under conditions of enlightened public opinion….”869 or as the 
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/Aids which in para 42 holds that states “encourage and 
support local and national organizations to expand and strengthen regional partnerships, 
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coalitions and networks.”870 In all these instances rights can imply different meanings and 
commitments. Some, for example, are intended as immediately enforceable binding commitments, 
others merely as specifying a possible future. Particularly many of the social, cultural and economic 
rights can be used and often have been interpreted in the latter sense of specifying a future 
possibility yet are still being referred to as rights.871 If used in this sense there, however, hardly 
seems a difference to the concept of principle which is also usually taken so as not to create an 
immediately enforceable binding commitment. On the other hand some of the principles endorsed 
in the presently examined standards, for example, those referring to informed consent could be 
seen as to give rise to justiciable, and immediately binding commitments or at least as being as 
close to doing so as a right to health that is to be progressively realised.872 Next, sometimes a 
human right has a clear rights-bearer such as the autonomous individual who has a right to life and 
liberty. However, some human rights are more difficult to assign to an autonomous individual or 
specific rights holder. With regard to the right to self-determination or many rights in the area of 
environmental law, for example, as Waldron points out, there has been a movement to recognize 
and to enforce group claims to self-determination or to for example a sustainable environment as a 
basic human right.873 Groups, however, are not easily defined so that at least in relation to those 
rights there is not a clear right holder. Moreover it is not quite clear how a group's right to 
sustainable environment distinguishes from a principle formulating a group's claim to sustainable 
environment. In both cases it is not clear who may invoke that right or principle and how it may or 
must be operationalised in a judicial systems or how it may be enforced. In the same way is it 
difficult to assign a clear rights bearer to a right to transnational cooperation or benefit sharing in 
the area of bioethics. It is for example, not clear how an individual could invoke this right and in 
what form and to what extent it is owed to him or her. Moreover, even though human rights in 
principle are addressed to the state while principles are not necessarily solely addressed to the state 
it is sometimes difficult to see how some human rights can be meaningful without a variety of 
stakeholders, including but not limited to the state, observing them.874 For example the right of 
future generations to sustainable development requires everyone to act upon this right.875 Next, 
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human rights also, in many ways, much like in the case of principles, are value driven or based on 
broad moral and ethical principles. While other considerations certainly played into the 
establishment of international human rights standards at some level these standards were and are 
inspired by a desire to promote certain broad moral values and ideals, namely that human beings 
are endowed with certain inalienable rights which are to be protected at the international level by 
an international standard.876 That, however, is exactly a quality that was previously assigned to 
principles only. Finally, both rights and principles can conflict with other rights or principles. The 
right to health can as much conflict with a right to religious freedom without one of these rights 
necessarily having to be abrogated as the principle that freedom of religion should be observed can 
conflict with the principle that everyone's health should be insured.  
Assessing the provisions of the standards in the area of bioethics against what has just been laid 
out in terms of rights and principles it should first be noted that only few of the provisions in these 
standards are formulated as 'positive' rights of individuals. In fact, merely the Oviedo Convention 
formulates positive rights by using, for example, in Article 10 such formulations as (1) “everyone 
has the right to respect for private life in relation to information about his or her health” and that 
(2) “everyone is entitled to know any information collected about his or her health.” Negative rights 
arguably are created by a range of provisions in the Oviedo Convention as well as through 
UDBHR's Article 6 on consent which reads that “any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic 
medical intervention is only to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent of the 
person concerned, based on adequate information” or through the International Declaration on 
Human Genetic Data which in its Article 13 states that “no one should be denied access to his or 
her own genetic data or proteomic data unless such data are irretrievably unlinked to that person 
as the identifiable source or unless domestic law limits such access in the interest of public health, 
public order or national security.” Most of the Oviedo Convention's Articles can be taken to 
formulate rights negatively.877 The majority of the provisions of the UNESCO standards, however, 
do not seem to create any specific rights, negatively or positively formulated, at all.878  
It may, however, be fair to correlate the positive and negative rights formulated in the standards 
directly addressed to matters of bioethical interest with those formulated in the ICCPR and 
ICESCR and therefore to assume that these provisions are meant to create some sort of rights. At 
least in the case of the Oviedo Convention, which creates binding obligations on states, this seems 
mostly justified. That view is also supported by that Article 26 of the Oviedo Convention holds that 
“no restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of the rights and protective provisions contained in 
this Convention” and by that article 1 states that “Parties to this Convention shall protect the 
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dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect 
for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of 
biology and medicine.” It thus seems that with regard to the Oviedo Convention there is an 
understanding that it creates some individual rights. The same cannot, however, be assumed with 
regard to the provisions of the UNESCO standards or the UN Cloning Declaration. Here it seems 
that the standards did not so much aim to create individual rights than to lay down guiding 
principles that might give rise to rights now or in the future. For the perspective that standards lay 
down individual rights speaks that these standards refer to themselves as human rights standards, 
that they are referred to as such by OHCHR879, and that they endorse, extend and strengthen, as 
discussed above, existing human rights by reformulating, adapting and construing existing human 
rights to apply to a new context, that of bioethics. As such they at least anchor their provisions in a 
rights based philosophy. Moreover, with regard to some of the principles enshrined in the 
standards, such as those on autonomy and consent, it is hard to see who should be the beneficent if 
not the individual who is entitled to have his or her autonomy respected. This at least seems to 
show that there is some recognition that the provisions in the standards could at some point be 
transformed into or already may be giving rise to individual rights. Moreover, other Human Rights 
Conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women or those non-binding standards mentioned above, use similarly worded provisions.880 
Most importantly, however, it is the aim of all the standards directly addressed to the area of 
bioethics to protect human rights and human dignity in the respective specific areas covered.  
On the other hand, for the perspective that these provisions are principles speaks their rather 
vague formulation and the fact that they themselves refer to the provisions they specify as 
“principles”. In this thesis it will therefore be assumed that the UNESCO standards in the area of 
bioethics do not create rights per se but are, with the limited exceptions mentioned above, meant to 
lay down principles that may be the stepping stone to rights or can give rise to rights but are not 
rights themselves.  
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis differences between principles and rights will be 
assumed to be of little relevance overall. That is, to the purpose of this thesis principles and rights 
that are inscribed in the standards seem conceptually close enough and their implications similar 
enough that both these concepts' implications will then be discussed under the same headings in 
the next chapter. That is, in the following chapter this thesis will only where absolutely necessary 
draw a distinction between implications following from a use of rights and those following from a 
use of principles and otherwise deal with implications of both under the same headings. 
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2.2.2. Human Dignity and Human Rights 
The second grid point that is of fundamental importance to and constitutive of a human rights 
discourse, including the one in the area of bioethics, is the centrality of the concept of human 
dignity. Human dignity is a cornerstone and one raison d'etre for human rights. In the area of 
bioethics, human dignity was identified as the ethical principle to which virtually all provisions in 
the area of bioethics must relate as well as it occupied more specific functions throughout the 
instruments in the area of bioethics, such as a barrier to human cloning881 and to germ line 
intervention.882  
However, while, as discussed above, the principle is well enshrined as a mostly ethical principle in 
international law883 and even though the notion of human dignity is at the heart of the several 
major international human rights instruments, it is as Andorno notes "never explicitly defined by 
them, other than making it clear that dignity is “inherent… to all members of the human family”884 
i.e. that it is inseparable from the human condition."885 Moreover, it is usually understood that all 
human beings are “free and equal in dignity;”886 that “human rights derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person”887 and that recognition of the inherent dignity “of all members of the 
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”888 The source of 
dignity thus seems to be every human beings' 'humanness' and respect for that dignity can lead to a 
well ordered, free and just society. Yet human rights standards generally do not specify what 
humanness is or how it comes about, i.e. whether it stems from human's ability to reason or from a 
divine or transcendental source, whether it just is and who exactly qualifies as a member of the 
'human family'. It is worth noting in addition that from the wording of human rights standards it is 
not quite clear whether the concept of human dignity is an absolute one. That is, if used in a human 
rights context, human dignity is sometimes specifically targeted as a concept or quality that needs 
to be protected and sometimes as a quality or concept the respect of which is worth supporting. For 
example, article 22 of the UDHR states that “everyone, as a member of society, has the right to 
social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation 
and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and 
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cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality." Here the 
achievement of certain rights is indispensable for the enjoyment of dignity, i.e. it seems that dignity 
is dependent on the achievement and observance of these rights. Similarly, Article 11 of the 
UDBHR holds that "no individual or group should be discriminated against or stigmatized on any 
grounds, in violation of human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms". On the other 
hand, other articles stress the importance of ensuring respect for human dignity. Article 10 
UDBHR holds for example that the fundamental equality of all human beings in dignity and rights 
is to be respected so that they are treated justly and equitably.889 Thus, the notion of dignity is used 
in at least two senses or at two levels in human rights provisions, as something that deserves or has 
to be protected in itself and as something the respect for which is to be furthered and protected by 
standards. 
While human dignity is an important concept in many religions, as well as in moral and political 
philosophy and can therefore have many different meanings and connotations in a human rights 
context human dignity is usually tied to three claims which together form the “basic minimum 
content” of the concept of human dignity.890 For one, the concept contains an ontological claim 
about the intrinsic worth of the human person. That is, it is claimed that every human being 
possesses an intrinsic worth, merely by being human and that human beings, by virtue of their 
fundamental equality not in terms of actual achievement but capacity and potential possess dignity 
equally.891 That dignity, moreover, cannot be lost or discharged, enhanced or diminished, taken 
away or bestowed upon someone else as a function of achievement, class, gender, religious 
affiliation etc. It is worth noting that the ontological claim is frequently related back to Kant's 
concept of human dignity, discussed above. Based on that understanding human dignity, when 
used in a human rights context is usually portrayed as a secular concept that stems from human 
beings' innate capability to exert reason, and humans' duty and ability to act morally and to 
constitute ends. However, that is not an authoritative interpretation of the foundation of human 
dignity and the notion of human dignity can and is claimed by for example various religious groups 
and movements. Nevertheless, while the ontological claim does not clearly state how or why it is 
that human dignity exists it still shows that this conceptualisation of human dignity differs from 
other possible conceptualisations of the concept that tie dignity to for example social status, 
achievement or gender, give it a communitarian notion in the sense that dignity is something that 
only a member of a certain community, such as a certain cast or group, obtains, or that construe it 
so that it admits of degree, etc.  
The second claim that human dignity comes with when used in a human rights context is that it 
contains a relational claim about how others should treat human beings in view of their inherent 
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value.892 That is, the intrinsic worth of every human being is to be "recognized and respected by 
others, and some forms of treatment by others are inconsistent with, or required by, respect for 
this intrinsic worth."893 Since all human beings are the bearer of human dignity equally they for 
example must be treated equally and without discrimination of any kind.894 Again this 
conceptualisation can differ from other traditions which require differential treatment depending 
on for example gender, class, status, association with certain groups, etc.  
Finally, the third element of human dignity in a human rights context is supplied by the human 
rights framework itself and concerns the relationship between the state and the individual.895 The 
idea is that the state exists for the good of persons and not vice-versa and that the state has to 
ensure that each human being can access and enjoy his or her human rights, conducive to his or 
her human dignity.896 Again this claim sets the concept of human dignity as used in a human rights 
context apart from the way it is construed in other contexts. As mentioned above, the state has 
little role to play in relation to the concept of human dignity as advanced for example through a 
jurisprudence of mitzvah.  
To summarise, human dignity when used in a human rights context thus carries a somewhat 
specific meaning, which is probably best described by that it comes with an ontological and 
relational claim and a special understanding of the state and its role in relationship to the 
individual.897 Yet, even while it seems that these three basic cores of human dignity when used in a 
human rights context are generally accepted among scholars, politicians and the wider public, the 
concept is still far from being clear. That is, scholars still differ in terms of "their understanding of 
what the intrinsic worth of the individual human being consists in (ontological claim) and who it 
applies to or what its foundation is, in their understanding of what forms of treatment are 
inconsistent with the inherent worth of the human being (relational claim), and in their 
understanding of what the detailed implications of accepting the ontological and relational claims 
are for the role of the state vis-à-vis the individual, beyond the core idea that the individual does 
not exist for the state."898 In other words, there nevertheless "appears to be no consensus, 
politically, [legally] or philosophically, on how any of the three claims that make up the core of the 
concept are best understood nor is there any final agreement regarding the foundation of 
dignity."899  
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2.2.3. The Sovereign States 
A further grid point essential to any human rights discourse is, as has been mentioned at various 
points before, human rights' connection with state authority. Human rights usually only exist in 
relation to a state or supranational entities such as the European Union and only to a very limited 
extent in relation to private actors. In the words of Thomas Pogge “to engage human rights, 
conduct must be in some sense official.”900 This dictum is somewhat changing with the 
introduction of soft law, such as the UDBHR that addresses itself also to non-state actors.901 
However, it should be noted that the UDBHR merely seeks to give guidance to non state actors, it 
does not bind them nor is it in fact properly addressed to non-state actors in the sense that it called 
specifically on them in the preamble or title. It is also difficult to see how the vague reference to 
"guidance" as stated in Article 2 of the UDBHR could be construed to give rise to any obligations. 
The term guidance in fact implies that it is up to the individual non-state actor to follow up or not 
on that guidance. Therefore, as long as it is unclear to what extent non-state actors are addressed, 
obliged and how obligations on non-state actors are to be operationalised this thesis will assume 
that standards in the area of bioethics are still mainly addressed to states and obligate, if at all, only 
states.    
The connection with the state is reflected in the standards in the area of bioethics in several ways. 
For one, they are primarily addressed to states, bind states and require or allow states to act in 
certain ways. The Oviedo Convention starts off by making it clear that it is “the member States of 
the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community which are signatories here to 
[i.e. to the Convention]”. Only states can sign and ratify the Convention and it can only entry into 
force between states.902 Moreover, only states can at the time of signature specify the territory or 
territories to which the Convention shall apply903, make reservations904, denounce the 
Convention905 and only states are to be notified by the Secretary General of the Council of Europe 
of any further state that has signed906, ratified, accepted, approved or acceded to907 the 
Convention, of the date of entry into force of the Convention908, of any amendment or Protocol 
adopted and of the date on which such an amendment or Protocol enters into force909, of any 
declaration910, reservation or withdrawal of reservation made by any signatory911 or of any other 
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act, notification or communication relating to this Convention.912 Also the UDBHR, as was just 
discussed, is primarily addressed to states.913  
Standards in the area of bioethics and everywhere else also nearly only create obligations for states. 
Article 1 of the Oviedo Convention for example holds that “parties [that is states] to this 
Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, 
without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with 
regard to the application of biology and medicine.” Similarly, chapter VIII of the Oviedo 
Convention makes it clear that it is states that shall provide appropriate judicial protection to 
prevent or to put a stop to an unlawful infringement of the rights and principles set forth in the 
Convention914, compensate for undue damage,915 provide for sanctions916, that may restrict the 
exercise of the rights enshrined in the Convention917, grant a wider measure of protection with 
regard to the application of biology and medicine than is stipulated in the Convention918 and that 
should ensure that the fundamental questions raised by the developments of biology and medicine 
are the subject of appropriate public discussion.919 In the same way does UDBHR's Article 22, 
defining the role of states, for example, hold that, it is (1) “[s]tates [that] should take all appropriate 
measures, whether of a legislative, administrative or other character, to give effect to the principles 
set out in this Declaration in accordance with international human rights law.” Only “[s]tates 
should encourage the establishment of independent, multidisciplinary and pluralist ethics 
committees…”920, it is “[s]tates [that] should foster international dissemination of scientific 
information and encourage the free flow and sharing of scientific and technological knowledge921 
and “[s]tates [that] should promote cultural and scientific cooperation and enter into bilateral and 
multilateral agreements enabling developing countries to build up their capacity to participate in 
generating and sharing scientific knowledge.”922 In effect, only states therefore have legitimate 
roles in the negotiations leading up to the conclusion of standards at the international level, and 
only they have a role in their implementation or any further dealings with it.923  
It was briefly discussed above how the emergence of the modern nation state intersected with the 
development of human rights. Yet, some further reflection regarding the concept, meaning, scope 
and use of the term “state” is clearly warranted in order to understand this concept's implications 
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for the presently examined discourse. Most significantly maybe states when referred to in 
international human rights standards and international law generally are considered to be 
sovereign states, i.e. the “supreme authority within a territory” and the sole legitimate actor on the 
world stage.924 Sovereignty thereby, though never quite clearly defined, constitutes one 
fundamental cornerstone of international law. The concept is enshrined within the United Nations 
Charter925, particularly in Article 2.1, which states that the United Nations is “based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”, in Article 2.4, which states that “members 
shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any State” and in Article 2.7, which prevents the UN from 
intervening in the domestic affairs of states. The UN General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States926 
further elaborates a list of 'elements' that comprise sovereign equality, amongst which are included 
the notions that all 'States are juridically equal', that the 'territorial integrity and political 
independence [of all states] are inviolable', and that a state has a right to determine its own 
'political, social, economic and cultural systems'.927 In addition 'no state or group of states has the 
right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs 
of any other state.'928 Sovereign states thus at least pro forma are equal in terms of status and 
rights, and they have no higher authority above them. That is, there exists no sovereign state that 
could enforce international law provisions on other states or demand obedience from them.929 
Of course, the here portrayed ideal notion of an egalitarian community of equally sovereign states 
with equal powers has never been an adequate representation of reality nor, was it ever meant to be 
one. Existing hierarchies between states were clearly reflected in international law at all times of its 
existence. Some “states” were or are, for example, a priory excluded from the community by not 
being recognised at all or only to some extent as a sovereign state.930 Some were or are classified as 
“rogue” states and thereby stripped of some of their sovereign privileges, such as territorial 
sovereignty.931 Also, the set up of certain UN organs or agencies such as the UN Security Council 
pays tribute to hierarchies among states, for example by granting certain states permanent veto 
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rights or more voting powers than others.932 Moreover, the principle of sovereignty itself has never 
been an absolute one in that it has been continuously challenged from various sides. Over the 
years, human rights law, for example, often has helped to carve out inroads into the principle of 
sovereignty.933 That is so because in contrast to international law generally, which mostly aims at 
regulating the relations between and the distribution of power among states human rights reach 
broad areas of everyday life within states that are vital to the internal distribution of political 
power. The promotion of human rights concern, including with regard to such questions as how 
states organise their prisons, how and which criminal law provisions apply under what 
circumstances, whether citizens have access to judicial remedies, housing, health etc., have then 
played into question the legitimate scope for states to use their sovereign privileges and to make 
important decisions on the character of their domestic law free from interference by other 
states.934 The observance of human rights to some extent at least also seems to play a role in the 
very conception of statehood as there has been some indication that states nowadays require some 
guarantee of respect for human rights before bestowing recognition by other states.935 Other 
potential venues for a clash between human rights and the principle of sovereignty lie in the right 
to self-determination which contests the principle of state sovereignty by threatening the territorial 
integrity of sovereign states.936 In any event, as international human rights aspirations grow, and 
as human rights law becomes ever more critical of and hence more distanced from and powerful in 
relation to states' behaviour, the potential for conflict between the human rights movement and the 
principle of sovereignty have certainly grown.937 On the other hand it may not be forgotten that 
human rights still are addressed mostly to states and that states in turn are the only guarantor of 
human rights. The tensions between human rights and the concept of sovereignty as well as the 
implications of obliging sovereign states to protect human rights, as far as reflected and relevant to 
the bioethical debate, will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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2.2.4. Universality in the Context of the Standards 
One further important concept in human rights discourses is human rights' implicitly and 
sometimes explicitly voiced aspiration to universal validity. That is, human rights exist at several 
intersecting levels. For one, they have a legal dimension. Human rights are constituted by being 
enshrined in national constitutions as well as in international declarations, covenants, and treaties. 
At this level, human rights standards are not universally applicable or valid. With the exception of 
norms of jus cogens they formally and legally only bind those states that have signed up to them 
and only to the extent that a state actually accepts the standard as a binding standard, i.e. to the 
extent that it has not qualified its commitment by entering explanations or clarifications with 
regard to its interpretation of provisions, or, if admissible, derogates from the provisions.938 While 
it has been argued that human rights standards are nevertheless de facto universally valid as 
"almost all states have signed at least one of the "six major human rights treaties"939, it has also 
been submitted that a significant number of states have not adhered to many of these treaties and 
are therefore neither bound by the respective treaty obligations nor entitled to invoke those 
obligations against parties of the treaty. A claim to universal validity thus cannot be based on the 
contention that most states have signed one or several human rights standards. It can also not 
easily be based on another contention, namely that human rights, in particular the UDHR, had 
become part of international customary law which consequently binds all states even if they had 
not formally consented to it.940 That is so because apart from certain norms enshrined in 
international standards, such as the right to life, the right to be free from slavery and torture and 
the prohibition of discrimination and genocide which all arguably have become customary 
international law and/or part of jus cogens, it seems that neither governments nor courts have 
accepted for example the whole UDHR as an instrument with obligatory force. That is also not 
changed by the fact that governments sometimes refer to the UDHR in condemning certain acts 
and thereby "rhetorically rely on the UDHR as a touchstone of legality and/or frequently laud the 
UDHR's principles as standards to be achieved by all.941 Hence, while a limited number of specific 
human rights can be said to form part of international customary law and hence could be said to be 
universally obligatory on all states that statement certainly does not hold true for the whole body of 
human rights.942  
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It has also sometimes been suggested that the UN Charter contained a legal obligation to promote 
universal respect for and observance of human rights.943 Proponents of this idea usually cite the 
Preamble of the UN Charter which states the spirit of the Charter as, inter alia, reaffirming "... faith 
in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of 
men and women and of nations large and small ..." and article 1 (3) of the Charter which holds that 
human rights are “for all without distinction”.944 They further content that the Charter legally 
commits the United Nations and all Member States in Article 55 (3) to promote “universal respect 
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms” and in Article 56 pledges 
Member States to take actions to achieve certain ends of the Charter, including human rights. They 
also cite Arts 62 and 68 that mandate that the Economic and Social Council takes steps towards 
promoting human rights.945 However, as the just stated provisions are very general and abstract in 
nature, as they lack a specific definition of the concept of human rights they have have been argued 
to fail to "impose any positive legal obligation to observe or promote the universal validity of 
human rights on Members States."946 Yet even if the obligatory force of in particular Arts 55 and 56 
of the UN Charter is dismissed, these Articles and the Preamble of the Charter still powerfully 
connect human rights with ideas and ideals of universal applicability of human rights.  
This connection, even if legally irrelevant is even more pronounced in the context of international 
human rights standards themselves. In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights an aspiration to 
universal applicability, for example, is literally written into the title of the Declaration. The text of 
the UDHR further recognizes that all human beings are “free and equal in dignity”947, and that 
recognition of the inherent dignity “of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice, and peace in the world.”948 The UDHR is moreover proclaimed as a “common 
standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” and hence at some level clearly aims to set 
standards applicable to all peoples and nations.949 The ICCPR again, for example, proclaims in its 
first two recitals that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of 
all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world" and 
recognises "that these [human] rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person"950, 
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statements that cannot meaningfully be construed without linking the ICCPR to a notion of 
universal rights of all members of the human family. Finally, the Vienna Declaration and numerous 
other declarations by states have confirmed that “the universal nature” of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is “beyond question”.951 
It can thus be submitted that while human rights standards are not legally universally applicable, 
they at least invoke ideals of universal applicability in their titles and provisions, are often written 
in a universalist spirit and are often intertwined with a philosophical, ethical or political claim to 
universal validity. That is for one so because human rights standards cannot be completely 
separated from the traditions, philosophical underpinnings and the nomos that gave rise to them 
and because these traditions and roots, as discussed above, often inscribe into human rights some 
form of universal applicability.952 This is also so because legal human rights cannot be completely 
separated from their existence in a political dimension, where their proclaimed universality is 
sometimes used to bolster political claims about the correct or legitimate behaviour of states.953 
Particularly soft law instruments that, as discussed above, can be more aspirationally worded than 
hard law instruments and that, exactly because they remain legally non-binding and non-
enforceable, are sometimes very much akin to political statements seem to lend themselves more 
easily to such a use and perception.954 That this does not always remain political rhetoric but that 
soft law instruments can have or can mature into some legal commitment was discussed above. To 
the extent that international legal standards in the area of bioethics reflect and incorporate ethical 
or political aspirations to universal validity that might at some point develop into legal 
commitments and to the extent that these aspirations trigger debates as to the justification, 
meaning, scope and validity of these aspirations, these debates are then also relevant to the present 
context.  
In fact, in the standards in the area of bioethics references to the term universal abound. Two of the 
standards dealing directly with questions of bioethical interest, the Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome and Human Rights and the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
declare their universal aspirations in their respective title. The explanatory memorandum to the 
UDBHR also makes it clear that the Declaration is about developing "universally applicable ethical 
guidelines within a context of cultural pluralism inherent in bioethics. This involves the 
identification and promotion of universally shared values…"955 Similarly, the same document 
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explains that the IBC was given the task to submit a report on “the technical and legal studies 
undertaken regarding the possibility of elaborating universal norms on bioethics” and the Director-
General was invited to continue preparatory work on a declaration on universal norms on 
bioethics."956 With regard to the use of the term universal in the title of the Declaration the report 
then remarks at 10 that  
"During the consultations with intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental 
organisations, National Bioethics Committees as well as the written consultations with the 
Member States, it has been pointed out frequently that the adjective 'universal' before the 
term 'declaration' would be more appropriate. The word 'universal' refers not merely to 
the general applicability of the norms but also emphasizes the global recognition of 
bioethical principles. Every culture, even those most critical of technological advances, 
must develop a response - be it supportive or controlling – to the emergence of new 
technologies, including biotechnology..."957 
The norms enshrined in the UDBHR are thus meant to be generally applicable. By analogy it may 
be assumed that similar considerations have preceded the inclusion of the word universal in the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Human Genome. Further references to the term 
universal can moreover be found in various provisions of the standards in the area of bioethics. The 
UDBHR for example in Recital 3 recognizes that ethical issues raised by the rapid advances in 
science and their technological applications should be examined with due respect to the dignity of 
the human person and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms; in Recital 4 it resolves that it is "necessary and timely for the international community to 
state universal principles that will provide a foundation for humanity's response to the ever-
increasing dilemmas and controversies that science and technology present for humankind and for 
the environment"958. It also uses the term universal in Article 2, specifying the aims of the 
declaration as among others (a) to provide a universal framework of principles and procedures. 
Moreover, all standards in the area of bioethics, even if they do not indicate so in their title or 
directly use the term universal in their provisions speak in somewhat universalist tones when they 
claim the same rights for 'everyone', for example that 'everyone' has the right to respect for private 
life in relation to information about his or her health959 or that "everyone has a right to respect for 
their dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic characteristics."960 Also, an argument 
can be made that by using the concept of human dignity as a guiding principle, which itself is 
generally construed as adhering equally and intrinsically to all members of the human family and 
which as such invokes notions of universal applicability the standards too, to some extent, must be 
connected with aspirations to universal validity. Moreover, some of the statements enshrined in the 
standards simply do not seem to make much sense if they do not at some level imply that they are 
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linked with everyone's intrinsic dignity and that they inhere in every human being, that human 
rights therefore should be for all people at all times, in short, that human rights at some level are 
meant to be universal.  
Finally, it must be acknowledged that states deliberately chose to incorporate into the text of 
standards references to the concept of universality, for example, when choosing the title of the 
UDBHR. If that is assumed it can also be assumed that the term has some meaning and that, as 
was stated in the explanatory memorandum, the expectation was to set out universal or generally 
applicable norms. In the following chapter it will be clarified and assessed what is actually meant 
and entailed by when declarations refer to the concept of universality, and what implications of 
doing so are for bioethical debate. 
 
2.2.5. Autonomy  
Respect for human beings' autonomy is one further central tenet and constituting concept of 
human rights doctrine. As stated by Karl Klare, "the dominant understanding of the human rights 
project is to erect barriers between the individual and the state, so as to protect human autonomy 
and self-determination from being violated or crushed by governmental power.”961  
Autonomy indeed features prominently in several provisions of all standards in the area of 
bioethics. In the UDBHR it is explicitly mentioned in Article 5 - Autonomy and individual 
responsibility – which holds that “the autonomy of persons to make decisions, while taking 
responsibility for those decisions and respecting the autonomy of others, is to be respected. For 
persons who are not capable of exercising autonomy, special measures are to be taken to protect 
their rights and interests.” In all other standards dealing directly with bioethics the principle of 
autonomy also receives a prominent place mostly through the clauses dealing with informed 
consent, discussed above as well as through those dealing with privacy and confidentiality. The 
international declaration on the Human Genome for example specifies in Article 14 that “(a) States 
should endeavour to protect the privacy of individuals and the confidentiality of human genetic 
data linked to an identifiable person, family or, where appropriate, group, in accordance with 
domestic law consistent with the international law of human rights. Valuing each individual's 
autonomy also means that (b) Human genetic data, human proteomic data and biological samples 
linked to an identifiable person should not be disclosed or made accessible to third parties, in 
particular, employers, insurance companies, educational institutions and the family.”  
The principle of respect for autonomy and its common expression as or in the process of obtaining 
informed consent deserves some further elaboration. In the literature on bioethics autonomy is 
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commonly construed to mean that patients have a right to make decisions about their medical care 
without their health care providers trying to influence the decision.962 That is, the latter should 
sufficiently educate patients, use his or her training, knowledge and experience to provide patients 
with facts about the diagnosis and about the prognoses without treatment and with alternative 
treatment but may not make decisions for patients. 963 In other words, to act autonomously in the 
area of bioethics and health care means that one has to have the liberty, possibility and the capacity 
to act and make moral choices independently and in accordance with the individual's beliefs, 
maxims and principles and without controlling influences that would mitigate against a free and 
voluntary act. 964 Respect involves not only refraining from interfering with others' choices, but 
sometimes entails providing them with the necessary conditions and opportunities for exercising 
autonomy - in that sense autonomy is often equated with informed consent. A patient's autonomy 
is only limited where the principle of autonomy can or does result in harm to others. The 
explanatory memorandum on the previous draft of the UDBHR echoes these considerations:  
Respect for personal autonomy is strongly linked to and, according to certain 
interpretations, derives from the notion of human dignity. It is directly derived from 
binding international human rights law. Individuals cannot be instrumentalised and 
treated merely as means to a scientific end; they should be granted the authority to make 
autonomous decisions in all aspects of their lives where their decisions do no harm to 
others. Respect for autonomy involves not just a respectful attitude but also respectful 
action. However, autonomy, in this interpretation, is not simply an invested right. It also 
has the dimension of responsibility towards others. Article 9 [of the UDBHR] reflects the 
right of each person to make individual decisions, whilst at the same time respecting the 
autonomy of others. Some experts wanted to reinforce the emphasis on responsibility by 
including in Article 9 reference to the duty to take such responsibility. However that 
formulation seemed to be too forceful and might indicate a possible erroneous 
interpretation of autonomy which is not a synonym of 'freedom' or 'liberty'. Autonomy 
refers to the concept of acting in accordance with voluntarily accepted principles but it does 
not liberate the individual from taking responsibility for his or her actions. 965 
In the area of human rights the absolute need to preserve and protect human beings' autonomy is 
usually taken to be one fundamental cornerstone of human rights philosophy and theory.966 Yet, 
while there are many differences in human rights scholars' understanding of what and how 
autonomy is exactly constituted, how it exactly relates to persons, moral obligations and 
responsibilities and what social policies or laws it justifies or necessitates, most of these scholars, 
nevertheless, also seem to agree on three accounts. For one, autonomy and the need to protect it, 
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generally is rooted in human beings' unique capacity to reason, “their capacity to decide upon, to 
revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good.”967  
A second shared characteristic of how the concept of autonomy is used in a human rights context, 
is that it is in one way or another about 'self-government' and freedom from manipulative 
influence.968 It aims, to varying degrees to give a person some control over his or her “physical 
integrity, liberty, expression, religious and moral beliefs, private and family life, property, personal 
data and more.”969 Individual autonomy thus implies the capacity to exercise one's capacity to 
reason and to live according to motives that are taken to be one's own i.e. not the product of 
manipulative or distorting external forces.970 It is the “capacity to be selfdetermining, to be in 
control of one's own life.”971 As such accounts of autonomy contrast with those of “heteronomous” 
theories that for example credit the state, society, a deity or institutions, with the capacity to 
determine an individual's desires and choices and to obstruct his or her ability to follow through 
with these choices and desires.972  
Thirdly, autonomy in the context of human rights is usually relational, in that autonomy is located 
in the relationship between the state and its citizen. It moulds this relationship by making conduct 
of the state impermissible or incompatible with the autonomy of the person. In particular, the state 
has to ensure that an individual is freedom from paternalistic interference by the state. For 
example “the prohibition of certain religions on the ground that they are religiously wrong or 
misguided or an insult to God would be a violation of autonomy.”973  
Yet, while in one way or another many human rights scholars agree on these three properties of the 
concept of autonomy in a human rights context they nevertheless to this date argue about what 
autonomy exactly implies and which conduct it necessitates. It will be seen below how and to what 
extent framing issues of bioethical relevance by reference to the concept of autonomy has 
implications for the bioethical debate. 
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3. Conclusion 
In summary, the liberal, enlightenment and natural law traditions of thought have a significant 
impact on the ideas and ideals that constitute and inform human rights, on the structure giving 
concepts that are relevant in the field and on their content. These traditions, thus, to a large extent, 
provide the context and background into which human rights and in their extension the standards 
in the area of bioethics were born and against which they are set to work. Without knowing and 
understanding this fabric or nomos many concepts used in human rights jurisprudence remain 
fragmented and/or unclear. As such these traditions form an integral part of human rights 
jurisprudence.  
The way this plays out is that standards in the area of bioethics as human rights standards are 
rights or principle based standards, that they endorse human rights values, including that of 
human dignity and individual's autonomy that they include notions of universal validity, that they 
operate within the confinement of state sovereignty, and that they firmly endorse the value of the 
individual's autonomy. Implications of framing bioethical debates in this discourse will be 
discussed in the next section. 
 
  
Chapter VII Impact on the Area of Bioethics  
This chapter discusses implications of leading bioethical debates in a human rights discourse. In 
particular it discusses how leading bioethical debates through the prism of the five epistemological 
grid points identified and characterised in the previous chapters impacts bioethical debates. For 
each of these grid-points it shows how the structuring of bioethical debates along or within these 
grid points has several implications for the way these debates are constructed and conceived of as 
well as for how possible solutions to questions raised in that context are answered or resolved.  
 
1. Human Rights in the Area of Bioethics as Rights or Principles 
It was explained above how human rights, standing in the liberal, enlightenment and natural rights 
tradition, became rights and legal principles and how these concepts are charged. In this section 
some of the implications of employing a jurisprudence of rights or principles as an approach to 
matters of bioethical relevance will be explored. 
 
1.1. Focusing and Developing the Debate through Rights and Principles  
Referring to bioethically relevant issues through a framework of human rights, in their 
specifications as rights or principles, first of all can and has helped broadening and sharpening the 
focus of fledgling and then evolving bioethical debates. It can and has, secondly, also provided tools 
through which problems or dilemmas of bioethical relevance can and have been successfully 
resolved. That is, using a language of human rights or principles can help prioritise certain 
concerns and show ways of how such concerns can be meaningfully addressed.974  
In terms of shaping and focusing the debate Daniel Sperling, for example, notes how rights 
discourses have been used to conceptualise and deal with traditional concerns in the doctor patient 
relationship. Tort cases, for example, promoted the idea of the integrity of the human body, 
implying that no individual should be touched, let alone treated without prior consent.975 Any 
unapproved appropriating of the body was regarded as battery and breach of duty of care.976 
Gradually these cases established and developed the right of and requirement of consent which not 
only protected patients from unwanted touching but also empowered them by furnishing them 
                                                          
974
 See generally Glendon, note 21, 1- 13, summarising some of the advantages of employing a rights based approach to 
social questions. 
975
 D. Sperling, "A Rights-Based Relationship and its Troubling Implications", in: M. Freeman (ed.), Law and 
Bioethics, 2008, 52, 56. See also for example R. Fox, The Sociology of Bioethics, 1989, 224, arguing that as movements 
that were inspired by legal or normative notions of equality and freedom "from its outset the value and belief questions 
with which it [bioethics] had been preoccupied have run parallel to those with which the society had been grappling 
more broadly."  
976
 Ibid. 
166 
 
 
 
with the right to autonomy and self-determination.977 Similarly, the law and its discourse expanded 
the right to and requirement of consent to include the obligation to provide patients with sufficient 
knowledge about treatment, risks, and alternatives so that the giving of consent was not only to be 
free but also informed.978 Case law and advance directive also established the right to refuse 
treatment including life sustaining treatment and more generally to participate actively in medical 
decisions.979 Overall, resorting to a language of rights thus has been particularly helpful to further 
develop those cases in the area of bioethics that involve professional misconduct or mistreatment 
of vulnerable persons or of groups, such as people of certain ethnicity or class.  
In the same vein can and have rights discourses also been successfully used as a way of broadening 
out the traditional focus of bioethics on the doctor-patient relationship to include, for example, 
wider social discriminatory practices and newly arising challenges posed by new technologies or 
economic degradation. The civil rights and feminist movements of the 1950s through to the 1970s, 
for example, during which individuals and civil rights organizations challenged discriminatory 
practices such as the discrimination of black Americans and which campaigned for, inter alia, 
achieving equal rights of women in areas such as reproductive rights, domestic violence, maternity 
leave, equal pay, sexual harassment, and sexual violence, did much to stimulate and direct early 
debates in the area of bioethics.980 Tina Stevens for example notes that 
“…just when courts were defining an expanded right to privacy the bioethicists were 
emphasizing the principle of autonomy, … Just when movements on behalf of a variety of 
minorities were advancing their claims the bioethicists were defending another group that 
appeared powerless – patients. All these advocates were siding with the individual against 
constituted authority; in their powerlessness patients seemed at one with women, inmates, 
homosexuals, tenants in public housing, welfare recipients, and students, who were all 
attempting to limit the discretionary authority of professionals.”981 
In addition to providing a framework for these debates a language of human rights can also do 
much to empower those in “need of a voice.”982 That is, (human) rights are not "some abstract, 
inchoate good but defined, particular claims listed in international instruments."983 A holder of a 
right may choose to press claims against a trespasser or to not to pursue the matter. To have a right 
to something means that this right can at some level be asserted and even be enforced - even if a 
majority within any given society does not comply or agree with the principles that are established 
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by that right or with the content of that right itself.984 That these empowering qualities of rights are 
well known and well understood is also evidenced by that many political movements at the 
international level want to see their main concerns categorized as matters of human rights, 
arguably also because this allows them to publicize, promote, and legitimate their concerns in a 
manner that is accepted, respected, and well understood by other actors.985 As Mr Hang Chhaya 
notes "aggrieved groups around the world thus have routinely portrayed themselves as victims of 
human rights abuses. Physically and mentally disabled people, indigenous peoples, AIDS patients, 
and many others have attempted to protect and promote their interests by advancing new human 
rights before the United Nations and other international bodies."986 The power and success of 
rights thereby is not only due to international currency and a sense of empowerment on behalf of 
those who invoke them but also due to their high visibility and practicality. Rights can be invoked 
in courts and can deal with very real life situations on a practical as opposed to a theoretical level. 
This quality makes them also particularly relevant to the fostering of a broader public debate on 
issues which in turn often enhances rights' popularity and thereby their acceptance by people and 
states as a legitimate framework for dealing with issues of bioethical relevance.987 Menikoff in that 
respect, for example, observes that if one was to ask “the average [American] person to tell you 
something about bioethics…likely as not, the response will include a reference to Karen Ann 
Quinlan, Nancy Cruzan or Baby M”988, i.e. to cases that involved a language of rights. These rights' 
application thus can provide a face to bioethics as well as offer a well-probed and hands on 
methodology on how to resolve bioethical problems that enjoys wide acceptance. 
Overall human rights thus can do much to conceptualise and to further develop bioethical debates 
in certain areas, particularly where professional misconduct or mistreatment of vulnerable persons 
is concerned or where discrimination or unfair treatment of certain groups of people are involved. 
Their empowering qualities also make them an attractive means particularly for disadvantaged 
groups to voice their concerns. Their wide visibility and widely acknowledged status as a 
framework within which sometimes difficult and contested queries can be addressed moreover 
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render rights highly relevant to issues of bioethical interest where some form of practical and 
highly visible solution is required.989  
 
1.2. Rigidity and Simplicity of Rights  
Yet, while a rights discourse thus can certainly help broadening, shaping and advancing bioethical 
debates in particular areas it can also limit such debates in several ways. One problem commonly 
associated with a rights discourse is that it often is seen to have a rigid, absolutist and simplistic 
character which is held to make rights inapt to adequately deal with some of the complex problems 
involved in bioethics.990  
The argument is that rights neither admit of compromise nor allow room for competing 
considerations and that they offer 'simple formulas' that cannot realistically resolve the complex 
and intricate problems at stake. Cass Sunstain illustrates this point by pointing out that rights 
 “rooted in nineteenth-century ideas of absolute sovereignty over property, ... are said to be 
ill-adapted to what we usually need, that is, a careful discussion of trade-offs and 
competing concerns. If rights are ... “trumps,” they are for that very reason harmful to the 
difficult process of accommodating different goals and considerations in resolving such 
thorny problems as abortion, the environment, and plant closings.”991 
Rights, for example, hardly allow the state or other respective addressees of a right to form 
decisions about when to endorse that right. The process of  
“a person claiming a right- for example, a handicapped person claiming that all buildings 
should be accessible to people who use wheelchairs - may not …[]… allow a process of 
balancing in which we  judge, for example, whether accessibility for wheelchairs really 
makes sense in light of the relevant costs and benefits.”992 
In the context of the area of bioethics this means that conceiving of bioethically relevant issues, 
such as standards of patient care, genetic research or sustainable development under a 
framework of rights might be problematic as the correlated rights can be somewhat too rigid, 
narrow, or simplistic to offer realistic solutions to the underlying complex problems.993 For 
example, a right to informed consent that is taken to be the basis for the decision of whether or 
not a medical treatment is applied leaves out a host of considerations, including emotions, such 
as fear or shame on the part of the person seeking treatment and/or his or her family, questions 
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of religious belief, family arrangements, financial aspects, social networks etc,994 that the 
distinct focus of the right to informed consent simply cannot grasp.  
Moreover, because rights, such as the right to the best available treatment, apply to all human 
beings in the same 'rigid' way, rights can sometimes not make a distinction when for example 
allocating scarce resources between a person with dependents, a person with a self-induced 
ailment, such as liver failure due to consistent alcohol abuse, or a 99 or 20 years old. Of course, 
non-discrimination among human beings is one of the big achievements of human rights – yet the 
question of whether there may be cases in which a differentiated treatment is in order can only be 
asked with some difficulty under a (human) rights framework.  
Another side-effect is that the rights specified in the area of bioethics can be somewhat simplistic 
catch-it all statements.995 While acknowledging that the problems taken up under the rubric of a 
right to health for example are real and serious, including such a broad array of issues as 
inequalities in life expectancy, access to clean water, access to medicines and so on, the notion that 
all of these different problems can be coherently framed under a single overarching right to health 
seems somewhat misplaced.996 Many of these concerns involve rather complex interplays of a 
variety of factors. For example, access to medicine depends on inter alia such a wide range of 
factors as logistics, research and development capacity, innovation capacity, governments' 
budgeting and spending in the area of health care, national health plans and policies, gender 
conceptions, infrastructure, health education etc. To address all of these concerns under the 
heading of for example the Oviedo Convention's Article 3 on “equitable access to health care” thus 
seems somewhat simplistic.  
Finally, international human rights law, like any discipline, is also a system that to some extent will 
need to keep its coherence.997 Hence the law might not as readily and flexibly accept innovative 
approaches to regulating the area of bioethics even if doing so flies in the face of “better” justice or 
better reason, because it might has to endorse a certain rule or value, such as autonomy, for want 
of coherence.998 In these instances law must give up some of its sensitivity, precision and possibly 
the ideal of justice.999  
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1.3. The Indeterminacy of Rights of and Principles 
Another point of note is that rights and principles, taking the form of general propositions, are - to 
some extent - indeterminate.1000 One obvious example is Article 16 of the UDBHR1001 which deals 
with the protection of future generations and which reads “the impact of life sciences on future 
generations, including on their genetic constitution, should be given due regard.” Just standing by 
itself this proposition is certainly too indeterminate and broad to adequately deal with the vast area 
of potential issues involved in a possible right, duty or responsibility of humankind towards future 
generations. Stated like it is, the clause, for example, neither specifies who exactly is the right-
bearer in this context nor what action is required to honour this right, what action would violate 
that right or who the addressee of this right is.  
Yet also more recognised and more regularly invoked human rights, such as the right to equitable 
access to health care1002 or the right to privacy1003, need to be concretised in order to have 
meaning. Standing by itself, the right to equitable access to health care says, for example, nothing 
about whether different types of health care insurances within a country are acceptable or 
prohibited, whether health care infrastructure across a country may differ, for example, between 
rural and urban areas and on whether or not regionally diversified types of trainings for doctors are 
permissible. Similarly, the right to freedom of scientific research1004, without supplemental work, 
remains unspecific. It, for example, does not clarify which and whether at all limits to the exercise 
of that right exist, whether commercial trade with ethically contested goods that are necessary for 
that research, such as e.g. embryonic stem cells is allowed, permissible or even mandatory and 
whether the state is obligated to support all or only selectively chosen research projects and if so on 
which basis such decisions have to be made.1005 Rights thus have to be specified in order to have 
concrete meaning. As will be discussed in more detail below these specifications, however, depend 
on premises not contained within the announcement of the right itself and thus regularly include 
political, ethical, and religious considerations.1006 That is problematic to the extent that rights 
thereby run the risk of being hijacked by political or other power struggles which could lower their 
acceptance in a society and hence their capacity to regulate conflict.1007  
 
                                                          
1000
 Sunstein, note 990, 735. See also, O. Holmes (ed.), "Codes and the Arrangement of the Law", in: O. Holmes, 
Formative Essays, 1984, 77 et seq.  
1001
 UDBHR, note 4. 
1002
 Oviedo Convention, note 5, Article 3. 
1003
 For example ICCPR, note 341, Article 17.  
1004
 See discussion above in Chapter V, 2.2. 
1005
 Ibid. 
1006
 See below under 1.4. 
1007 Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, note 245, 7, albeit referring to international law as a whole and 
not only to rights, for example notes that the system of international law has a structural bias, wherein it 
favours some outcomes or distributive choices over others, especially showing a bias against the South or the 
Third World.  
171 
 
 
 
1.4. Conflicting Rights and Principles  
A further corollary of using a (human) rights' discourse can be that rights conflict with other rights 
of the same category. That is, formally there is no hierarchy between different human rights and 
hence no objective or rather no incontestable, clear-cut way of judging whether one or the other 
right supersedes in case of conflict.  
For example, as Michael Selgelid points out "the promotion of one person's autonomy can conflict 
with the autonomy or well being of others"1008 – and it can also often conflict with the principle of 
equality.1009 Articles 51010 and 61011 of the UDBHR both appeal to the importance of individual 
autonomy. Both of these principles, however, can conflict with Article 4 of the UDBHR which holds 
that: in applying and advancing scientific knowledge and medical practice, direct and indirect 
benefits to patients, research participants and other affected individuals should be maximized and 
any possible harm to such individuals should be minimized.1012 Applying these provisions to the 
question of whether or not it is permissible to use genetic technologies to 'enhance' the quality of 
life, for example by eliminating a gene which makes it likely that a person will develop a certain 
form of cancer or by enhancing perceived attractiveness of a person through the elimination or 
correction of certain genes, conflicting interpretations can ensue.1013 Article 5 apparently, on the 
one hand, grants freedom to those who would use genetic technologies to enhance their quality of 
life. The practice of genetic enhancement by the rich, however, so Selgelid could be interpreted to 
conflict with Article 4 as it could harm others who would be "competitively disadvantaged because 
they cannot afford enhancement oriented technologies"1014. The advancement of enhancement 
orientated genetic technologies could moreover "conflict with Article 4 if the profitability of 
developing them draws industry resources away from more fruitful technological directions, such 
as antibiotic and vaccine development."1015  
Many more such potentially conflicting examples can be construed. Yet in no case do the standards 
help resolving this general problem of how to deal with conflicting rights. That is, none of the 
standards in the area of bioethics provides an answer as to how the rights enshrined in them 
should be ranked or what should be done in case they conflict with each other. The problem is of 
course, that there can be “more than one justifiable ordering or understanding of them [rights]” 
and the ranking of decisions depends upon such contingencies as the specific information and 
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circumstances involved in each case.1016 In the absence of clear guidance from the standards on 
how to resolve conflict such decisions will then likely be made based on premises that again will be 
found outside of the wording of the standards' provisions and hence might replicate structural 
inequalities underlying the rights.1017 Another potential result is that standards are conceived of as 
incoherent. Ashcroft rather harshly notes 
“If principles are, on the face of it, in contradistinction, how far should we construe them as 
mutually consistent? Or do we take the interpretative work here as a question of balancing 
principles which are taken to be in tension rather than in logical contradiction? Or do we 
instead convict the statements in the text as in actual contradistinction, and a sign of poor 
drafting? Bioethicists are inclined I think to the last approach whereas human rights 
advocates, especially those with legal training would prefer the more charitable 
construction approaches.” 1018 
No matter how this question is resolved it shows that principles and rights are far from providing 
clear guidance as to how rights or principles are to be construed or how they are to be resolved in 
case they conflict, which can limit their utility. 
 
1.5. Structural Inequalities Underlying Rights and Principles 
Another concern about using a framework of human rights thus, as already alluded to in the 
previous sections, is then that rights are often unable to take account of structural inequalities 
underlying a right. This is problematic to the extent that these inequalities can substantially impact 
the exercise of the right itself.1019  
That is, even though the UDBHR, for example, "asserts the 'fundamental equality of all human 
beings in dignity and rights' and insists that 'the highest attainable standard of health is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, 
economic or social condition', it does not explicitly recognize structural inequities of power and 
wealth"1020 that may thwart the equal dignity and rights to many. Mary Rawlinson, for example, 
notes that  
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“a person who cannot vote or drive in her own country or who is condemned by her village 
council to be raped in order to settle a dispute among men or whose children die of 
dysentery in the twenty-first century is not 'fundamentally equal'. Nor are the many women 
around the world whose lives are disrupted when multinational companies and technically 
oriented development projects irresponsibly impose changes that deprive their local 
economies of traditional markets and other resources required to meet subsistence needs 
and sustain their culture. Without recognition of structural (as opposed to merely 
accidental) inequity, UNESCO's invocation of rights [in the UDBHR] is so abstract as to be 
incompatible with its avowed intention.”1021  
Thus a right to equal access to health care might be implicitly invalidated by societal structures 
which favour medical treatment of boys over girls or which allocate more and better nutritional 
resources to boys over girls. The face-value neutrality of a language of rights then sometimes 
merely disguises systemic or structural inequalities in any given society which the right does 
nothing to address as the right remains silent on the question of the impact of structural 
inequalities on the health of populations, as well as on the question of the necessity of social 
transformations and redistributions of power in addressing the underlying structural 
inequalities.1022  
It should also be noted that structural inequalities not only thwart rights that exist but are reflected 
in even more basic terms. That is, they play a role with regard to such questions as which issues are 
considered pressing issues at all within any society or at the international level and which hence 
are formulated as rights or principles at all, who the addressee of a human right is and how or 
whether they are to be enforced in case of a breach. For example, whether or not rights of 
indigenous groups with respect to natural resources are considered legitimate concerns for the 
international community of states to deal with is as much a question of power as is the question of 
whether or not domestic abuse of women is considered a violation of a human right as is the 
question of how much technology transfer in the area of bioethics should take place between 
developed and developing nations. Similarly, a country can have exceptionally high income 
inequality, inadequate provision for higher education, no medical infrastructure, lack public health 
emergency plans or refuse to provide training for physicians and yet no human right is breached. 
The question of whether or not these instances are considered a violation of a human right at all is 
a question of power which is not addressed by the right itself. 
 
1.6. The Lack of Telos of Rights  
One further problem sometimes associated with rights is that they are – to some extent at least- 
indifferent to the ends they procure. In other words “the rights system is indifferent to ends and in 
its indifference can claim systemic coherence without making any strong claims about the fullness 
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or vanity of the ends it permits.”1023 That is, as long as each individual can exercise his or her right 
a system based on rights has no self-evident telos, overall moral aim or control of or interest in the 
ends it produces. Applied to the area of bioethics that means that standards merely seek to ensure 
that human beings have access to rights, such as the right to give informed consent or to highest 
attainable health care standards. Yet apart from setting conditions under which the ideal of highest 
attainable health care may or may not be invoked by individuals, i.e. apart from providing 
individuals or the right holder with the however distant opportunity to invoke a right, rights do 
nothing to actually endorse the aim, i.e. to endorse the aim of the highest attainable health care 
standard itself. Doctors in that sense might feel less responsible for their patients' overall 
wellbeing, as his or her responsibility formally does not extent beyond ensuring that his or her 
patient makes a free and informed decision.  
This is related to a similar concern more specifically expressed by Alasdair McIntyre and which is 
that rights simply lack the words or conceptual clarity to do what they are meant to do. In 
McIntyre's word 
“traditional European society inherited from the Greeks and from Christianity a moral 
vocabulary in which to judge an action good was to judge it to be the action of a good man, 
and to judge a man good was to judge him as manifesting dispositions (virtues) which 
enabled him to play a certain kind of role in a certain kind of social life … But the breakup 
of the traditional forms of social life which was produced by the rise of individualism, 
begotten partly by Protestantism and capitalism, made the reality of social life so different 
from the norms implied in the traditional vocabulary that all the links between duty and 
happiness were gradually broken. The consequence was a redefinition of moral terms. 
Happiness is no longer defined in terms of satisfactions which are understood in the light of 
the criteria governing a form of social life; it is defined in terms of individual psychology. 
Since such a psychology does not yet exist, it has to be invented. Hence the whole apparatus 
of appetites, passions, inclinations, principles [such as rights], which is found in every 
eighteenth century moral philosopher.
1024 
The lack of telos of rights in this understanding is a consequence of the moral structures that 
emerged from the Enlightenment. Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment moral philosophers 
'failed' because they, among others, abandoned the Aristotelian concept of teleology, which in one 
way or another relied on the idea that human life had a proper natural purpose, and that human 
beings could not reach this natural purpose without practicing their virtues.1025 Enlightenment, 
however, by rejecting teleology also in ethics and morality, and by focusing purely on reason 
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rendered ethics a 'body of empty knowledge devoid of its central content and context.'1026 Basing 
their moral and ethical understanding on this incomplete framework, Enlightenment and post-
Enlightenment thinkers, according to McIntyre lack a framework within which they can assess 
what a good act is. Instead McIntyre argues an ethics of virtue can provide meaning to human acts 
and deeds as it always comes with a teleological understanding of how humans should act.1027  
This overall critique is of some relevance in the present context. For example, treating someone 
with a placebo, if done with the honest intention to help, might be less deplorable, while it might be 
more so if the aim is simply to cut costs. Similarly, someone disclosing patient information to a 
third person, if undertaken with the honest intent to bring about some better form of treatment, for 
example, will seem less deplorable than if the same act is undertaken for financial gain, such as 
disclosure of information to a health insurance company. In these cases, being a good person is not 
necessarily about following or enforcing formal rules, a consideration that human rights cannot 
take into account. Instead, human rights, because they need to be to some extent at least coherent 
and their application predictable must be mostly blind to such considerations. Moreover, given the 
complexity of cases that are and can be dealt with by reference to rights and the infinite personal 
circumstances involved in cases of bioethical interest there is indeed an argument to be made in 
favour of an approach that deals with each of these cases on a case-by-case basis and individual 
level. What is right in one circumstance or for one person does not necessarily have to be right for 
another person and it does not even have to be right for the same person at all times and places.  
 
1.7. The Fostering of Negative Human Traits through Rights 
A further related problem sometimes associated with rights is that they are said to foster highly 
undesirable characteristics in humans, including lack of responsibility, selfishness and indifference 
to others.  
It is held that “a culture of rights encourages a form of selfishness and an unwillingness to 
compromise that are incompatible with citizenship.” 1028 The argument is that rights “posit selfish, 
isolated individuals who assert what is theirs, rather than participating in communal life.” 1029 
Where rights are laid down, so the argument, people no longer refer to their own sense of 
responsibility to people in need.1030 A preoccupation with legal remedies – as William Sage puts it 
– moreover “is likely to lead to compliance with the law – nothing less, but certainly nothing 
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more.”1031 Similarly, Arras concludes that “as medical ethics collapsed into law and rights …[this] 
drove another nail into the coffin of medical ethics, and self-responsibility of the medical 
profession.”1032  
This position has several famous proponents. Jeremy Bentham for example regarded the idea that 
rights could be the starting point for political morality as “pernicious nonsense.”1033 Similarly Marx 
claimed that none of the “so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man,…an individual 
withdrawn behind his private interests and whims and separated from the community.”1034 More 
recently the critique has been continued by such authors as Kirsten Sellars who claims that 
“idealist championing human rights have done more to benefit themselves than their supposed 
beneficiaries”1035 and Mary Ann Glendon who, while not so much criticising the concept of rights 
per se, still argues that the way a right is often interpreted results in that is abused by 
individualistic and selfish humans.1036 
It indeed seems that a language of individual rights might be less well-equipped to describe certain 
experiences, for example, what is involved in cases that concern groups or communities. A 
language of individual rights, for example, seems somewhat misplaced or inapt when dealing with 
a right, duty or responsibility to engage in sustainable development of present humankind towards 
future generations. It is not immediately obvious why the concern of sustainable development 
should at all be addressed under an individual right to sustainable development.1037 Similarly a 
right to informed consent might be unduly individualistic in cases where the individual decision 
actually affects a range of people such as family members or friends.1038 Yet whether it in fact 
promotes selfish behaviour in people may be doubted. For one, human beings and human activity 
never take place in complete isolation from its surroundings and hence it may be doubted whether 
a person really disregards family or community wishes only because he or she has a right to do so. 
To the contrary it seems that even if law exists in certain fields, people often reject the due process 
rights offered to them by law when it e.g. comes to resolving personal matters in close 
relationships.1039 Also the contraposition, i.e. the idea that more community oriented societies 
necessarily result and foster less selfish behaviour cannot be sustained. Quite apart from the 
question of how to measure the degree of selfishness in any given society it is not clear whether 
more altruistic societies exist because they do not endorse a jurisprudence of rights. Moreover, to 
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say that rights instigate selfish behaviour seems somewhat simplistic. Rights, among many other 
functions, often constitute functional answers to a felt need to regulate human behaviour, they are 
not necessarily the source of this behaviour.  
 
1.8. Excessive Use of Rights and Legal Talk 
Much has been written about the excessiveness of rights and how everything is “rights talk” 
nowadays. The critique thereby seems to be that an overuse of rights might dilute their success and 
power and/or renders them meaningless.  
Indeed, as briefly mentioned above, the language of rights is very present in international legal 
texts as well as in political movement and debate. Human rights, no matter the frequency of their 
violation, remain the 'currency' of international relations and many international legal negotiations 
and, for the reasons discussed in the first sub-section of this section, one of the favourite choices of 
groups or individuals to advance their concerns at the international level. Yet because human 
rights are so frequently invoked, linking bioethics with human rights can carry some negative 
implications as well. First of all, it could be that rights' “proliferation” renders human rights a 
victim of their own success.1040 Too many human rights might dilute the invocation of a human 
right in single instances. It might also be that the 'brand' human rights becomes less powerful the 
wider it is spread and the more concerns are framed as human rights issues.1041 The continuing 
pressure to expand the list of human rights to include new areas, including that of bioethics, also 
might weaken efforts to protect traditional human rights concerns in the area such as the rather 
long established human right to life or health.1042 Here it is argued that human rights should focus 
on their core business of defending certain basic civil liberties of human beings. 
Besides uncertainty as to the effectiveness of human rights if overused one further possible result 
of the inflationary use of rights is the devaluation of human rights caused by producing too much 
“bad human rights currency”.1043 That is, if human rights, despite them being enshrined in 
international human rights standards, are consistently abused by governments or if they are 
implemented according to widely disparaging standards across states they might lose credibility 
and as such force of argument.1044  
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1.9. Conclusion 
Using a framework of rights thus comes with several implications, including that human rights 
provide for a long established, well recognised and highly successful language within which ethical 
problems can and have successfully been addressed. Yet despite rights' many successes rights can 
also be problematic to the extent that rights can be rigid, simplistic and indeterminate and thereby 
prone to overlook structural inequalities. Their general lack of telos might inhibit their relevancy 
for the area of bioethics and their overuse might limit their effectiveness to achieve the very aims it 
wanted to reach.  
 
 
2. Human Dignity  
The second grid point identified above in thinking about bioethics within a human rights 
framework was that of human dignity. That is, the standards in the area of bioethics are tied to and 
are based on the philosophical concept and ideal of human dignity.  
 
2.1. Fostering of Consensus and Justification of the Human Rights Project 
It should first of all be noted that the use of the concept of human dignity as a central concept in 
the standards examined in this thesis and hence in the presently examined discourse, because of its 
high level of generality, has been one of the major reasons for or at least has been a most important 
factor in achieving a successful outcome in the negotiations leading to the instruments in the area 
of bioethics.1045 As it was necessary to persuade states of vastly different ideological point of view 
that the declarations and the Convention in the area are consistent with their conceptions of a good 
order or with their conception of what it takes to lead a dignified life in the area of bioethics a vague 
conceptualisation of human dignity was and is much more likely to secure support from all states 
than a narrow definition1046. That is so because in the end everyone can agree that human dignity 
is central, even if not why or how.1047 Human dignity in that sense, in the same way as human 
rights per se provides for one language in which problems in the area of bioethics can be discussed 
and addressed while it at the same time allows states to infuse the concept with a meaning that is in 
accordance with their respective national sense of morality. For example, states came to vastly 
differing conclusions with regard to the question of whether or not it is compatible with respect for 
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human dignity to engage in stem cell research, or whether to allow for research to be carried out on 
persons unable to consent.1048 
The concept of human dignity also provides a robust justification for the human rights project. If 
human dignity is important everywhere and human rights are the means by which human dignity 
is to be safeguarded then human dignity can provide the concept that can rally enough support 
from states to actually agree on substantive provisions and to provide support to human rights at 
any time and place.1049  
The concept of human dignity thus has an important mediating and reconciliatory function that is 
sometimes essential to reaching agreement among states in the area of bioethics.  
 
2.2. The Definition of Dignity 
Yet framing issues of bioethical interest by reference to the concept of human dignity also comes 
with certain drawbacks. As was discussed above, the term human dignity as used in a human rights 
context is not devoid of meaning. Yet outside of confined cases1050 there is little guidance with 
regard to the meaning and scope of the term dignity. That is, the minimum definition of human 
dignity provided in the previous chapter, by no means forecloses further debate as to the exact 
meaning or scope of the concept. Even if the three claims specified above are accepted by scholars, 
scholars still differ in terms of their understanding of what the intrinsic worth of the individual 
human being consists in and who it applies to (ontological claim), "in their understanding of what 
forms of treatment are inconsistent with the inherent worth of the human being (relational claim), 
and in their understanding of what the implications of accepting the ontological and relational 
claims are for the role of the state vis-à-vis the individual, beyond the core idea that the individual 
does not exist for the state."1051 In other words, there exists no consensus, politically or 
philosophically, on how any of the three claims that make up the core of the concept are best 
understood. 1052 In the words of Marmot  
“many find the idea of putting dignity at the centre of global health convincing and 
appealing. “But what is dignity? How would we know if we were doing it? Is dignity, like 
beauty, in the eyes of the beholder, or is it a property of the individual? Can you have 
dignity, for example, regardless of how authority treats you? If we cannot define dignity 
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precisely, we will have trouble measuring it. If we cannot measure it, how will we know if 
we are achieving it?” 1053 
The following sub-sections elaborate some of the difficulties that stem from the lack of a clear 
definition of the concept of human dignity. 
 
2.2.1. Uncertainties as Regards the Bearer of Human Dignity 
One difficulty with the concept of human dignity as used in a human rights context is that it is 
rather difficult to make out who exactly is or, rather, who is not the bearer of that dignity.1054 That 
is so because particularly in the context of bioethics it has been rather difficult to determine who 
does and who does not qualify as a human being. For example, standards in the area of bioethics do 
not define whether an embryo at any stage in its existence, a foetus of three or one of nine months, 
a deceased, a brain dead person or all or none of these qualify as a 'human being' and whether they 
are or are not hence the bearer of human dignity.1055 Since only a human beings' dignity is, 
however, protected according to international legal standards, the lack of definition also means 
uncertainty as regards the very subjects of this protection. 
Also long established international human rights standards do little to remove confusion regarding 
the question of who qualifies as human. That is so because many of the standards use different 
terms to refer to 'human beings' i.e. to bearers of human dignity. While the UDHR, for example, 
holds in Article 1 that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights “, the ICCPR 
in its Recital 2 refers to the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family” and the ICESCR in Recital 3 recognises the rights 
specified in the Covenant derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. The UDBHR again 
in Article 2 (c) aims “to promote respect for human dignity and protect human rights, by ensuring 
respect for the life of human beings. It uses the term 'dignity' eight more times, six times of which 
in connection with the term human, yet as Schmidt points out "dignity is also related twice to 
“persons”, once to “the life of human beings” and once to ”all human beings”.1056 In addition, there 
is one reference to the dignity of “individuals.”1057 The Oviedo Convention in turn in its title makes 
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it clear that it is about the protection of human rights and dignity of the human being.1058 It also 
mentions dignity in relation to the term individual.1059 Generally it must be noted that no 
international human rights standard so far has provided an authoritative definition of what 
constitutes a human being1060 in the same way as no biological or philosophical strand or 
dictionary so far has provided an authoritative definition of what it means to be human. To the 
contrary the question of what is and what is not a human being, what its characteristics and 
properties are have been endlessly debated among biologists and philosophers.1061 
Commenting on the somewhat confusing use of terminology across human rights standards Harald 
Schmidt then notes that 
“at one end of the spectrum, there are “all human beings” (or “the life of human beings”): 
although these terms may have metaphysical–vitalistic undercurrents, they are primarily 
biological concepts that can be understood to refer to humans in all stages of development, 
from the newly merged DNA that can be found in a fertilised egg, to infants, to children, to 
physically and mentally healthy women and men, to those with disabilities, to older people, 
as well as to patients in a state of brain death, and, in principle, even to corpses of recently 
deceased persons. All of these are forms of human life, or human beings at different stages 
of capacity or development. Then there is the reference to “human person”, which is 
primarily a legal or philosophical term, often used to refer to human beings with specific 
capacities, or qualities—these terms can be coextensive with biological definitions but they 
may also relate to a more narrow range of instantiations of humans. And there is the 
somewhat vaguer, albeit quantitatively most frequent, concept of human dignity: the 
adjectival construction suggests that dignity relates to humanity, although it is not clear 
whether this is humanity in the biological sense, or in the philosophical or legal sense.”1062  
Also the explanatory memorandum to a previous draft of the UDBHR eschews the question of who 
or what exactly is the bearer of human dignity. In para 21 it states that  
“Bioethics applies to human beings and their relationship with the biosphere. While the 
notion of 'person' is defined in domestic law, human beings frequently appear in 
international documents and more recently in legal instruments related to bioethics. The 
two notions are often regarded as synonymous….1063 
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Yet the report does, however, not go on to elaborate on who or what kind of life forms are included 
in the term 'human beings.'1064 While definitional quandary about who does and who does not 
constitute a human being and who hence is and who is not a bearer of human dignity might be less 
relevant and hence in lesser need of specification when it comes to deciding whether the torturing 
of any man or women is in accordance with his or her dignity, it is crucial in the area of bioethics, 
where the question of the dignity of the human being often arises exactly with regard to those 
'marginal' beings or life forms that are either not yet born, deceased, not purely human, such as 
hybrid stem cells, or might have lost some of the biological or philosophical attributes sometimes 
connected with humanness, such as the ability to reason, think and express wishes or act. For all 
these beings the question of who or what comes under the protection of human dignity have very 
real implications. A definition which, for example, excludes embryos from having human dignity 
might allow for a framework in which IVF and stem cell research are perfectly permissible. In 
reverse a definition which grants embryos equal dignity as born human persons will have to place 
some or complete restrictions on embryonic stem cell research. Similar implications arise in the 
cases of for example human cloning, genetic research or organ transplantation of deceased people, 
etc. Moreover, history has shown time and again that such terms as 'human being' can come to be 
interpreted in ways that from today's vantage point might seem inconceivable, such as the 
exclusion of witches, sorcerers or slaves from the category of human being or as the definition of 
certain races or ethnic groups as less or not yet fully evolved human beings.1065 Yet to think of this 
as a distant and irreversible part of humankind's past history is certainly naïve too.1066 Hence, 
while remaining silent on the question of an exact definition of who is the bearer of human dignity 
provides for the much needed leeway for states to construe their national regulations according to 
their internal values and ideals, doing so also comes at the price of considerable uncertainty as to 
what it is that is protected and at the risk of that human dignity might be construed in a way that 
that is harmful to some human beings or life forms. 
 
2.2.2. Actions in Conformity with Human Dignity 
One further problem with an overtly vague definition of the concept of dignity is that it can be 
endlessly debated what treatment is and what is not in accordance with the dignity of the human 
being.  
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To obtain some sense of the uses of dignity in recent debates in the area of bioethics Ashcroft, for 
example, point to all of the following examples that have been argued to be contrary to human 
dignity: "organ sales from living “donors”, seeking patent rights over human genes, making 
animal–human chimeras, obliging someone to live in abject poverty, pornography, torture, sex 
selection by pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, death in irremediable physical or psychological 
suffering, abandonment to senility in a nursing home and prolonged proceedings of court 
cases."1067 Even conflicting meanings can be inferred from the term dignity as Mohammed 
Bedjaoui points out:  
… 'human dignity'. It is an expression which seems simple: one immediately apprehends its 
prospective import, if not its exact meaning. But, paradoxically, it is also an expression full 
of fragility, for in the name of the same argument of 'human dignity' some refute the 
legitimacy of euthanasia, whilst others claim it as the ultimate right of those who wish to 
'die in dignity'!1068 
The breadth of actions that can be justified by reference to human dignity and the fact that 
sometimes even conflicting meanings can be derived from it then undermines the concept in 
several ways.1069 It for example unduly broadens the concept of human dignity beyond meaningful 
limits. If all the above stated claims are to be discussed under the broad theme of human dignity, if 
all can claim to be in accordance with human dignity, then it seems that the term human dignity is 
too unspecific as to be of much meaning at all. In the same way as pro and anti assisted suicide 
arguments can and are framed under the heading of human dignity so can be the selection of 
embryos during IVF treatment which do or do not carry certain genetic disorders may be construed 
as being in accordance or against a life worth of dignity. Because of these uncertainties regarding 
the scope and meaning of human dignity the concept in fact can become an empty formula, used to 
patch over and disguise states' actual disagreement on substantive issues at hand. This has 
arguably been the case with regard to the UN cloning declaration, discussed above, which sets a 
limit to human cloning by prohibiting “all forms of human cloning inasmuch as they are 
incompatible with human dignity and the protection of human life” as well as it prohibits any 
genetic engineering techniques “that may be contrary to human dignity.”1070 However, stated like 
this, these provisions leave it first of all unclear whether the cloning of a human being for 
reproductive purposes or for therapeutic purposes or both or neither violates human dignity. It 
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also leaves it unclear whether it is actually the human dignity of the potential clone or of the person 
that has been cloned or of both or none that is in question.1071 Taken together, despite its 
'immediate appeal', any reference to the concept of human dignity in bioethical debates then does 
provide little actual guidance with regard to the question of what is and what is not in conformity 
with a protection of human dignity.  
 
2.2.3. The State and Dignity 
It is furthermore not clear what role the state has as regards human dignity. As one major 
addressee of human rights standards, including those in the area of bioethics, it falls mostly on 
states to safeguard human dignity.1072 Yet, non-state actors have the capacity and have often 
been engaged in actions that, if performed by a state official, would very likely have qualified as 
torture.1073 It is not immediately self-evident why the state should be considered a major threat 
to human dignity if non state actors not only have the capacity but have also been shown to use 
this capacity to engage in activity that arguably fulfils most of the definitional requirements of 
torture.  
Secondly, even if human dignity only gains meaning in relation to the state it is still far from 
being clear what a state has to or can do to enable a human being to live a dignified live. Apart 
from the fact that the exact meaning of the statement “the individual does not exist for the sake 
of the state” is far from being clear, the antithesis, i.e. the claim that the state exists for the sake 
of the individual human being is also rather vague and difficult to be engendered with meaning. 
In German constitution, as seen above, human dignity is generally seen as an absolute limit to 
state action and treated as a legal principle.”1074 Yet it is also clear that “what human dignity 
requires may depend on the context.”1075 Moreover, the special status that the concept of 
human dignity has been given in the German Constitution is unparalled in the world and 
certainly has not been replicated in international law.1076 Nevertheless, this suggests that at 
least at some national levels and at the level of the European Union there are certain minimum 
standards of political treatment that a state must observe in order to preserve human dignity. 
The use of coercion, physical or psychological for example is usually cited to be "as striking an 
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affront to the dignity of the person as physical abuse or mental torture"1077. Yet different 
definitions exist regarding the question of what exactly qualifies as torture or physical or 
psychological coercion.1078 States, for example, differ widely with regard to the question of 
whether human beings who are unable to consent may be subjected to biomedical research.1079 
Human dignity therefore might set an absolute limit to state action but that limit must not be 
the same in every state and it is not clear what this limit really is. It is even less clear what it is - 
beyond the absolute limit-setting function – that the protection of human dignity requires a 
state to do. For many scholars respect for the dignity and worth of all persons, and for their 
individual choices, leads for example, broadly speaking, to a strong emphasis on the will and 
consent of the single patient.1080 They take it to mean that states have to ensure that 
paternalistic behaviour of doctors is outlawed as it is incompatible with the due respect for the 
dignity of the person and that they have to ensure that doctors may not use coercion to impose 
decisions and attitudes on those subject to their treatment or to extend their authority into 
areas of human life that are essentially personal and familial.1081 Yet again, that is not an 
authoritative statement on how states have to behave in order to be in accordance with the 
human rights standards and in fact actual state practice shows that there is no international 
agreement regarding the exact scope and meaning or level of protections that flow from any of 
the provisions in the standards. 
The absence so far of uniform national approaches to many questions of bioethical interest, 
including for example with regard to such questions as research on those incapable of consenting, 
and that states can claim their opposing national regulations with regard to these questions to be in 
accordance with the concept of human dignity as inscribed into standards in the area of bioethics 
suggests that there is no clearly defined role or requirement for the state re the protection of 
human dignity in the area of bioethics. As long as the standards lack a clear cut definition of the 
term human being they, however, ultimately remain open to an infinite variety of possible 
interpretations of the term and hence more likely than not, not to regulate anything at all.  
 
2.3. The Utility of Human Dignity 
Given the confusions and ambiguities that surround contemporary uses of the term human dignity 
some scholars have come to question the utility or overall value of the concept of human dignity in 
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bioethical debates or suggested to altogether replace the concept with other 'slogans'.1082 Richard 
Ashcroft summarises several different positions on the concept of human dignity as relevant to the 
bioethical debate in the following quote:  
Currently, scholars divide into four distinct groups as regards dignity. One group regards 
all “dignity-talk” as incoherent and at best unhelpful, at worst misleading. I venture to 
suggest that this group is the mainstream of current English speaking bioethics. Another 
group finds dignity talk illuminating in some respects, but strictly reducible to autonomy as 
extended to cover some marginal cases...[]... The third group considers dignity to be a 
concept in a family of concepts about capabilities, functionings, and social interactions. 
This group is …[]… inspired by the writings of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum on 
development and freedom. The final group considers dignity as a metaphysical property 
possessed by all and only human beings, and which serves as a foundation for moral 
philosophy and human rights. This group is perhaps the mainstream in European bioethics 
and much theological writing on bioethical topics...1083 
With regard to these disparaging positions two questions will be of particular relevance in this 
section. For one, to what extent can the concept of human dignity conceptually be distinguished 
from such concepts as autonomy and/or respect and secondly, whether it makes sense or is 
appropriate to use this concept at all. 
Regarding the distinction between human dignity and other concepts, most importantly that of 
respect and autonomy, Ruth Macklin, representing several bioethicists of the first two groups 
mentioned in the quote, for example asserts that “dignity is a useless concept in medical ethics and 
can be eliminated without any loss of content.”1084 In her critique of human dignity as a concept 
used in bioethical debate, she claims that the concept functions as “a mere slogan”1085, “a poor, 
blurred substitute” for what she describes as the principle of medical ethics, respect for persons' 
autonomy.1086 She concludes that “a close inspection of leading examples shows that appeals to 
dignity are either vague restatements of other, more precise, notions or mere slogans that add 
nothing to an understanding of the topic.”1087 This approach finds some support in Sen's and 
Nussbaum's capabilities approach. Although, according to Sen and Nussbaum, dignity might not 
be coextensive with autonomy or capabilities, they suggest that without achieving autonomy or 
capabilities an individual cannot have basic freedoms without which the individual cannot have 
dignity.1088 Dignity and autonomy are thus interrelated to an extent that they can often be used 
interchangeably. Other scholars, particularly of the fourth group mentioned above, counter by that 
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there seems to be something more to the abstract notion of “dignity” that sets it apart from the 
practical notions of autonomy and respect. That is, according to these scholars, the latter notions 
are understood as the consequence of human dignity, not dignity itself.1089 Moreover, if dignity 
indeed was the same as, for example, respect this “would inevitably beg the question and lead to 
circular reasoning: we are obliged to respect persons because… they deserve respect.”1090   
While it indeed seems that respect and dignity can be distinguished by that respect flows from a 
person's dignity or what makes him or her human it seems more difficult to meaningfully 
distinguish between autonomy and dignity in that way. The literature in the area of bioethics 
sometimes seems to use both concepts more or less interchangeably. Often the concept of human 
dignity is thereby portrayed as “a capacity for rational thought and action, the central features 
conveyed in the principle of respect for autonomy”.1091 If for example an analysis of the 
implications of dignity in a bioethical context comes to the conclusion that individuals are to be 
taken seriously, that a state may not engage in abuse of its citizens, that personal liberty, especially 
the liberty to choose and lead one's own life are entailed by the principle of equal respect of each 
individual's dignity, that emphasis on respect for individuals and their choices also implies proper 
regard for their distinct identity, their capacity to make choices, this ultimately, simply seems to 
restate the idea of autonomy of the human being.1092 Moreover, it is in fact not so clear whether 
autonomy or dignity precedes the other and which is the consequence of which and whether there 
is at all a causal relationship between the two. Both concepts are usually derived or are related 
somehow to human beings' special status among all beings, usually allocated to their capacity to 
reason.1093 That is, the capacity to reason and to thereby form moral or good or correct decisions is 
the source of human beings' humanness, and thereby the source of their dignity and their 
autonomy. Autonomy, understood as the exercise of that human capacity in that sense is a more 
definite statement than the idea of dignity which then seems to be the ability to exercise reason. 
Since the source of these concepts is the same and since both concepts aim at preserving or 
protecting this source, the concepts' subsequent relationship and respective roles are also often the 
same or at least blurred. The only difference between both concepts in many accounts then seems 
to be that dignity is understood as an absolute, inviolable principle that cannot be taken away by 
others (i.e. the ability to exercise reason), whereas autonomy (i.e. the exercising and following 
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through with the autonomously formed decisions), can be taken away or threatened by others. The 
debate between those arguing for the utility of the concept of human dignity and those against then 
seems, in many ways, to hinge on exactly this question of whether both or only the concept of 
human dignity is taken to be an absolute principle as both concepts can in fact be used mostly 
interchangeably as long as they are both taken to be absolute and not relative to particular cultures 
or societal understandings. 1094 If, however, only one of these concepts, usually that of dignity is 
understood to be inviolable then in fact, there is a difference between both concepts as only a 
person's dignity is independent of how others relate to and treat a person, whereas, in that 
understanding, a person's autonomy could potentially be taken away by others.  
The just stated distinction, however, does not sit easily with the wording of many of the human 
rights provision of the UDHR and the standards in the area of bioethics in which human dignity 
itself is portrayed as something that needs protection through individual human rights. In these 
examples human dignity is not taken to be absolutely inviolable but, like autonomy, it can be 
threatened or restricted through actions of others. Moreover, if human dignity in the context of 
human rights and in contradistinction to autonomy, was really taken to be absolute it makes little 
sense to even consider actions that can promote respect for or protect human dignity, as doing so 
means to take dignity to the same level as autonomy, i.e. a level on which it can be threatened or 
discharged. And, in reverse, if there are acts that are more or less conducive to or protective of 
human dignity, does the concept of dignity allow for degree? Does someone who lives a life in 
abject poverty live a less dignified life than someone who does not?1095 Ashcroft contemplating the 
possibility of a concept of dignity that admits of degree, for example opines that 
“For example, racist abuse insults the abused person through an implied claim that he or 
she lacks human dignity, but it does not thereby destroy that person's dignity. On the other 
hand, tortures are designed to destroy torture victims' sense of their own dignity, and the 
perception that they are a bearer of dignity in the eyes of the torturer. It is, however, a point 
worth debating whether some torture breaks through actually to destroy the dignity of the 
torture victim. …[]… Shaming punishments can be considered to aim to lessen the dignity 
of those who are punished. Dignity in this sense is not an intrinsic property of the person 
but a synonym for self-respect or social standing.”1096 
Yet, it is clear that human dignity cannot be both, inviolable and non-dischargeable and at the 
same time depend on how a person is treated by others or under which external conditions he or 
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she lives. Nevertheless, the way human dignity is treated, portrayed and advanced in the standards 
in the area of bioethics does exactly that, it suggests that dignity is a relative concept that needs to 
be protected and that can be enhanced through certain actions. In that sense human dignity is 
treated like the concept of autonomy and autonomy and dignity of the person can be found on the 
same level and can or rather are in fact used interchangeably. Moreover, both concepts seem in fact 
to admit of degree if there can be more dignified ways of living one's live or more autonomous 
decision than others. Of course all that does not mean that human dignity or autonomy are not 
nevertheless valid and distinct concepts. Yet it is to say that the way human dignity is used in the 
standards in the area of bioethics and in a human rights discourse generally often makes it 
indistinguishable from the concept of autonomy.1097 
One answer that might cut through and explain some of this confusion around these two terms can 
be found in McIntyre's idea, briefly mentioned above, that certain concepts were meant for another 
context. That is, according to MacIntyre some kinds of talk about, for example, virtue simply make 
no sense today, but that this is not to show that this talk never made sense or can never make sense 
or that they are “false” or “meaningless”.1098 Rather, these concepts had meaning and were right in 
their original context. Taken out of this context they, however, must fail as they are inapt to 
describing or handling the newly assigned context.1099 Applied to the concept of human dignity and 
how it is used in a human rights context it could be argued that human rights and now many 
bioethical debates have taken the concept of human dignity out of its original context and use it in 
a different context, for which it simply is not fit. That is, human dignity and its functionally 
equivalent concepts, such as dharma or li etc. are concepts that seek to state the often deeply but 
not necessarily spiritual or religious notion that all beings are worthy and 'blessed', that they exist 
for a worthwhile reason, that they have a valid purpose in the world, and that human beings' are 
innately good, in the sense that they, by their nature and through the means they were endowed 
with can live a morally good life.1100 If that was the original idea behind the concept of human 
dignity, it, arguably, was never meant to solve technical questions of stem cell research, 
biotechnology or reverse engineering. In fact it was never meant to be further discussed at all as it 
just is.  
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For all these reasons it seems that ethical controversies cannot easily be settled simply by stating 
that this or that solution respects or violates human dignity1101 and there indeed is a risk that 
talking about bioethical relevant issues by reference to the concept of human dignity simply 
“collapses into claim and counterclaim about moral intuitions concerning what dignity is, or what 
has it, or what would affect it.”1102 In these instances bioethical debates might indeed be better off 
using the more clearly defined concept of autonomy, although that too comes with certain 
difficulties, to be discussed below. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that in spite of the 
apparent vagueness of the notion of human dignity and the difficulties that flow from that, the 
central role assigned to it in international standards in the area of bioethics is not the result of a 
merely rhetoric strategy, but usually reflects a real concern about the need to protect the integrity 
and identity and to guarantee respect for humans and humanity and as such has a valid place in 
these discussions.1103  
 
2.5. Conclusion 
The ethical concept of human dignity is the corner stone of human rights doctrine and philosophy. 
It is a fluid concept that so far lacks a terminal definition yet its central role in any debate in the 
area of bioethics has frequently been confirmed and has helped the standards in the area to 
succeed.  
While it is defined in relation to specific conduct, such as for example in relation to torture, 
discrimination, and more specifically in the area of bioethics as a barrier to human cloning and to 
germ line intervention in large parts the concept has remained rather ill-defined. When then used 
outside of these narrowly confined cases human dignity remains a rather vague concept, which 
then comes with several difficulties. The concept, for example, does not authoritately settle who 
exactly the bearer of human dignity is, what actions are conducive to respect for human dignity in 
such areas as human genetic enhancement and what the state has to do in relation to human 
dignity to honour its obligations under international law. It is furthermore not quite clear how the 
concept of dignity can be distinguished from other concepts such as autonomy and, consequently, 
what the concept of human dignity really adds to the debate.  
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3. Sovereignty 
It was shown above how human rights almost only exist in relation to the state. The implications of 
tying human rights so closely to the sovereign nation state will be discussed over the following 
sections.  
 
3.1. The Resilience of the State 
While there may be many critical points of note with regard to the role of the state in a human 
rights framework, to be further explained over the next sub-sections, it first has to be noted that 
several critical factors not only explain but also speak for the resilience of the sovereign nation state 
and its central role in human rights frameworks. For one, so far the sovereign nation state alone 
has been able to provide the structures of authority needed to cope with incessant claims of 
competing societal groups and to provide public justice essential to social order and 
responsibility.1104 In the area of bioethics that means that in the current set up only the state so far 
can – if at all - provide the structure and authority needed to commit differing societal or other 
groups with strong and diverging interests or different views to the same legal standards. The state 
thereby offers a widely accepted platform for negotiations between various groups and, in case no 
consensus can be achieved on relevant matters, 'enforce' one standard for all or broker a 
compromise.1105 In the area of bioethics where issues of relevance usually spark much controversy 
and corresponding fault lines run through all segments of society the state might be the only entity 
that can establish standards, necessary to create protection by and certainty of the law. 
It has also been submitted that “the weak and vulnerable are, on the whole, more likely to obtain 
protection and benefits through their territorial state”1106 than through alternative arrangements 
such as free markets or nongovernmental associations that lack effective authority.1107 That is so 
because only the state so far seems able to counterbalance the processes of, for example, free 
markets and unequal distributions of wealth within societies as well as to ensure that natural 
resources are exploited and processed in fair and egalitarian ways. The territorial nexus attached to 
sovereignty thus has a profound significance as it ensures “an arena in which all in the defined 
territory have access to common institutions and the equal protection of law”1108.  
Finally, despite good reason to question concentrated and absolute sovereign powers in the state, 
the issue of sovereignty and non-intervention often remain the main line of defence against foreign 
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efforts to limit domestic and international choices that third world states - and their citizens - can 
make. In that sense the resilience of the nation state is more than a tribute to governing elites as it 
can help protect nations and societies from undue interference and moral 'chauvinism'.1109  
 
3.2. Minimum Consent 
Yet, developing standards in the area of bioethics within the context of international states' society 
of sovereign states also comes with several potential drawbacks. One is that international 
standards that have been formulated in such an environment usually result in a minimum consent. 
That is, formally all states are equal and no sovereign can force other states to accept and adhere to 
certain standards. As a result human rights standards in the area of bioethics can only come into 
existence if all states involved form a consensus. Such consensus, however, will most likely be 
reached on the lowest common denominator, i.e. delimit the “lower limits on tolerable human 
conduct” rather than stating “great aspirations and exalted ideals.”1110 As such the standards in the 
area of bioethics will often be minimal standards.1111 
The UNESCO process, for example, in shaping the UDBHR gave equal weight to all member states' 
representations - or, as Ashcroft remarks, if not equal at least some weight to all representatives. 
By actively promoting consensus on the Declaration UNESCO thus avoided division between the 
developed and developing countries and was able to forge widespread consensus on the UNESCO 
Declaration.1112 Yet this consensus came at the price of that the Declaration in many ways only 
embodies the minimum consent between states. To the extent that those drafting and adopting the 
declaration represented a range of different views, consensus could only be obtained if the 
declaration made minimalist claims that all could support.1113  
One of the many examples of how the minimum consent is embodied in the standards is Article 18 
para 1 of the Oviedo Convention, which ensures the protection of the embryo in vitro in the 
framework of research and Article 18 para 2, which prohibits the creation of embryos for research 
purposes. Since states could not agree on the level of protections that should be given to all 
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embryos in vitro in the framework of research they were only able to agree on a minimalist consent 
of what must be avoided with regard to the embryo. The formulation of para 1, stating that “where 
the law allows research on embryos in vitro, it shall ensure adequate protection of the embryo” 
leaves it open whether research on embryos in vitro is compatible with human rights at all and 
what kind of protection is to be afforded. The Convention also does not include the more 
contentious topic of research on embryos in vivo as states had vastly different ideas of the good 
with regard to these questions. 
Another example might be Article 8 of the Oviedo Convention which deals with emergency 
situations. It states that “when the appropriate consent cannot be obtained, any medically 
necessary intervention may be carried out immediately for the benefit of the health of individuals”. 
This statement was generally criticised as being so basic and minimalist that it is de facto 
superfluous.1114 While in principle no harm comes from minimalist statements they also certainly 
do not more than that, i.e. than providing minimalist answers to sometimes very complex 
problems. Moreover, these standards will likely feature in future debates in the area and thereby 
set the tone of the debate to some extent. As such setting a minimum standard as basis for future 
discussions in the area might negatively influence the debate if the aim is to set standards that 
provide a considerably higher level of protection than the one agreed to so far.   
 
3.3. Consent by few States  
Alternatively do states simply not sign up to a standard at all that they deem either irrelevant or not 
compatible with their interests, including their moral or ethical point of view. This is arguably the 
case with the Oviedo Convention and it Protocols. While it might be fair to say that the majority of 
European states have signed the Convention (23 have ratified and 11 signed it so far), several 
important and influential states have not signed or ratified the Convention and show no intention 
of doing so. For example Germany, the United Kingdom, Russia, Austria, Belgium and several 
others have not signed or ratified the Convention. Of the non-member states that were invited to 
sign the Convention, including Australia, the USA, Japan, Canada and the international 
organisation invited to do so, the European Union, none have so far signed the Convention or made 
any sign of doing so any time soon. As only those states that have ratified the Convention can sign 
or ratify the Additional Protocols even fewer states have ratified or signed the Additional Protocols. 
18 States have ratified the Additional Protocol on the Prohibition of Human Cloning and 13 signed 
it. The Additional Protocol on Organ Transplantation has been signed by 11 and ratified by 9 
Member States, the Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research has been signed by 16 and ratified 
by 5 states and the Additional Protocol on Genetic testing has so far only been ratified by Slovenia 
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and signed by 4 more countries.1115 While it might be that states like Germany and the United 
Kingdom will sign up to or ratify the Oviedo Convention in the future, nothing in the international 
community of states or under international law could force them to do so. The lack of support of 
such large and economically highly prosperous countries as Germany and the United Kingdom, 
however, can considerably weaken a Convention's impact and it certainly makes it more difficult to 
find common European standards with regard to such questions as organ transplantation, human 
cloning, biomedical research and genetic testing. Yet, here again, international law can do nothing 
to make a state sign or ratify a standard.   
 
3.4. Vagueness 
One alternative to such minimalist claims in the standards that also stems from the structural 
prerequisite of negotiating standards between sovereign states is to make provisions vague enough 
so that they can be interpreted to every state's satisfaction. That is, in order to gloss over 
disagreement among different stakeholders formulations are chosen that are sufficiently vague so 
that each sovereign state can then interpret them consistently with its' view. 1116 
One example in that respect is Article 16 of the UDBHR on the protection of future generations, 
which stipulates that the “impact of life sciences on future generations…should be given due 
regard”. Since it is left unclear what constitutes “due regard” and just how much weight one must 
give to the interests of future generations, what future generations are, and which impacts must be 
considered relevant the formulation is so conveniently vague that most states can safely agree to it 
without actually committing to anything.1117  
Another example is the Cloning Declaration which calls upon all UN member states to “prohibit all 
forms of human cloning inasmuch as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection 
of human life”1118 and to adopt “all measures necessary to protect adequately human life in the 
application of life sciences”1119 and “the measures necessary to prohibit the application of genetic 
engineering techniques that may be contrary to human dignity.”1120 As mentioned above, the 
wording of the Declaration is so ambiguous that it seems to hardly reflect any agreement at all. For 
example, the Declaration does not explicitly and unqualifiedly prohibit human cloning, either for 
reproductive or therapeutic purposes.1121 Consequently, nations which support a comprehensive 
ban on all forms of human cloning have since interpreted the provisions of the Declaration on 
Human Cloning so as to call for an absolute prohibition on all forms of human cloning, including 
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on cloning for therapeutic reasons. In contrast, States in favour of a ban on reproductive cloning 
alone have generally interpreted the Declaration on Human Cloning as prohibiting only those 
cloning processes which they consider contrary to human dignity, i.e. those used for reproductive 
cloning.1122  
To the extent that a declaration is characterized by vagueness it then hardly ever says “anything we 
do not already know”1123 and as such hardly provides guidance where needed.  
 
3.5. Non or only Partial Regulation 
Where standards fail to reach a minimalist consensus and/or do not result in vaguely or 
ambiguously framed provisions, standards then often remain silent altogether on issues in 
question. That is, the standards present their addressees with the uncontested and remain silent 
about the contested.  
Henk Ten Have, referring to the UDBHR, seems to confirm that point when claiming that  
“the Declaration on Bioethics aims to determine those principles in the field of bioethics 
that are universally acceptable, in conformity with human rights as ensured by 
international law. It does not pretend to resolve all the bioethical issues presently raised 
and that evolve every day.  Rather its aim is to constitute a basis of frame of reference for 
states wishing to endow themselves with legislation or policies in the field of bioethics.”1124 
The consistent absence of such contested issues of bioethical interest as abortion, euthanasia or 
embryonic stem cell research from any of the standards in the area of bioethics suggests that no 
consensus, not even a minimalist one, can be reached on them and that therefore they have been 
excluded from the scope of these standards. If in fact there already was an answer somehow 
inferable from the standards, then, as Michel Selgelid remarks “this would already be the obvious 
decision of choice for any decision maker with enough ethical conscience or motivation to be 
looking to UNESCO for guidance.”1125 As such the absence of clear regulations is a sign of that 
standards in the area of bioethics through the structure in which they are conceived only include 
items that all states can agree upon, and ignore others.  
Gaps in the UDBHR therefore generally are the result of the necessary or the unavoidable. As a 
result standards often only provide guidance where none is actually needed and where it is actually 
needed or could be helpful they provide none.  
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3.6. The Need for National Regulations to Supplement International Regulation 
Whenever standards result in either minimalist or vague regulation, national legislation and/or 
courts' or other institutions' dealings with these issues determine how an issue is effectively dealt 
with at the national level. These processes in turn then might result in that the underlying 
international standards' contents are further diluted.1126   
Such dilution can occur when a broad variety of national regulations stretch the meaning of 
international standards in an area beyond any meaningful limit. For example if both, a regulation 
outlawing and one that allows for embryonic stem cell research can be justified by reference to the 
same international legal standard that international standard seems to say little if anything at all 
about how such an issue as embryonic stem cell research should be regulated at the national level 
and the resulting variety of national regulations then render the international provisions in the 
area meaningless.1127 While it might be necessary and even desirable to leave it to national courts 
and legislatures to clarify the exact meaning of international standards and to tune them in to local 
needs and sensitivities such a process, can rip standards off their meaning and thereby further call 
into question their utility.  
 
3.7. Two Forms of Hegemony 
To the extent that an international standard avoids the problem of minimalism, vagueness or lack 
of provisions, and takes a stance, it does so usually by privileging a hegemonic view.1128 Two kinds 
of hegemony must be noted in that respect.  
The first kind occurs where some of those responsible for drafting and adopting the standard in 
question exert greater power or have more influence in drafting or adopting the standard and can 
thus endorse a substantial position with which others disagree.1129 Here, a variety of issues can 
have a bearing on the outcome of negotiations leading up to the conclusion of a treaty. For 
example, some countries dispose over more advanced expert knowledge in a certain field, for 
example in areas of modern biotechnology which require high standards in money intensive 
technical or scientific resources, or can send more or better informed delegates into negotiations 
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which can then participate in several as opposed to one of the usually formed subcommittees and 
thereby considerably shape the work of sub-committees concerned with the drafting of specific 
provisions.1130 Better knowledge of the language in which the negotiation are held, particularly 
when it comes to dealing with highly technical or scientific wordings, are also famously known to 
have considerable influence on the outcome of negotiations.1131 Other factors that can influence 
negotiations might be whether one country 'trades' its agreement in such areas as bioethics for 
privileges in other areas such as trading rights.1132  
The second kind of hegemony occurs when important decisions are shifted from those forums 
which endorse the one country one vote principle to those forums where certain states have greater 
voting powers than others, such as for example the World Bank or IMF, or where matters are dealt 
with in certain ways which grant for example certain, usually more developed countries more 
standing in negotiations, such as WTO.1133 It is at least worth asking why UNESCO should not 
address the delicate and potentially financially intense questions of patents relevant to the area of 
bioethics and why it is not concerned with such issues as trade related to products needed for 
bioethical research. Instead, such issues are dealt with within the TRIPS agreement and thus 
within WTO, where theoretically, all member states' consensus is needed for negotiations to 
advance, yet where the consensus often is first arranged in the 'quad' i.e. among the developed 
countries.1134 That is, many cases potentially of very real bioethical interest are simply not 
addressed by those standards that are most directly concerned with bioethics, i.e. in the UNESCO 
standards or the Oviedo Convention. Instead, important matters related to trade, technology 
transfer etc. are in fact dealt with in those forums where some states can more easily assert their 
standing and hence where a certain, often more subtle and somewhat hidden form of hegemony 
can be practiced.  
 
3.8. The Crimes Committed by Non-State Agencies  
One further corollary of the central role assigned to the state is that some violations, in particular 
those not perpetrated by the state or its officials, cannot be adequately dealt with under a human 
rights framework. Human rights, including those in the area of bioethics, are primarily meant to 
protect individuals against the abuse by powerful states.  
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Yet as Makau Mutua and many others have pointed out “there is nothing intrinsic about human 
beings that requires only their protection from the state and not the asymmetries of power between 
them.”1135 To the contrary private or non-governmental actors, such as biotech firms, academic 
research institutions as well as individuals are active in all major fields subject to bioethical 
debate.1136 Biotech firms for example are involved in many fields relevant to bioethics in that they 
research and develop new therapies and vaccines, they conduct clinical trials to get approval for 
drugs and research and promote genetically modified food, biopesticides and other agricultural 
products.1137 The industry of biotechnology is also a huge economic power, providing employment 
for many million people and administrating billions in research and results.1138 Given all this, 
biotech firms have the capacity to yield both, great benefits as well as great harm to individuals. 
Benefits, when they invent new therapies and drugs that alleviate millions of people from physical 
or mental ailment or when they research special types of crops that might help combat world 
hunger and starvation.1139 Harm can results e.g. in cases of unethical research, such as when 
research is conducted on subjects unable to provide informed consent1140, when hazardous 
material is dumped in developing countries1141 or would they engage in a range of activities that 
might incur criminal liability under several national laws, such as the development of e.g. human 
cloning processes.1142 The potential for abuse thereby is not likely to stop any time soon. Rather 
biotech firms seem to gain importance both quantitatively and qualitatively as the biotechnology 
industry will likely remain a strong economic factor and as biotechnological research will remain 
an important field of interest for a variety of stakeholders, such as all industry related to health 
care or food producers.1143 Similarly, with revolutionary developments in medicine, genetics, and 
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ecology, biotech firms are also likely to expand both, their research within current fields as well as 
the totality of their research fields.1144   
Yet, international law so far neither attaches criminal or civil liability for violations of international 
legal standards that specifically concern bioethics nor does it cover biotech firms other than 
through committing states to ensure standards within their territories.1145 Liability can thus only 
result from violations of general international law, and only if it can be linked to a state, or from 
individual criminal liability as stipulated e.g. in the Rome statute of the International Criminal 
Court. Corporate responsibility, i.e. the idea to make corporations themselves liable for breaches of 
international law so far only exists in theory.1146 While both, civil liability and criminal 
responsibility can theoretically attach at several levels ultimately it seems a better way to hold the 
firms as legal persons accountable separately from their respective state of residence, operation or 
client. 1147 Yet international law, apart from voluntary guidelines can do little to address such 
questions. 1148  
 
3.9. Conclusion 
The mostly state centric model used in the standards in the area of bioethics comes at a significant 
price. In particular, it renders standards likely to be formulated at a minimum level, vaguely 
worded or can lead to that no regulation is found at all. Furthermore, it is by no means only states 
that engage in conduct that could resemble that of human rights abuse, a trend which is unlikely to 
stop. The growing importance of non-state actors as regards their capacity to both, violate and 
protect human rights has led many to advocate for a system in which the state is confined to being 
one among many actors, of which all are equally charged with human rights enforcement.1149  
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4. Universality 
Universality was identified as one further grid point relevant to the presently examined discourse 
as legal standards, while not creating a legal commitment to promote universal respect for human 
rights, frequently invoke ideas and ideals related to the concept of a universal applicability of 
human rights. If these references are taken seriously, i.e. if it is assumed that states have 
incorporated them deliberatedly into the standards and thereby intended for them to have some 
meaning then that begs the question what these references imply and how they relate to other 
values and tenets such as that of cultural diversity.    
 
4.1. The Benefit of Linking Human Rights with Notions of Universality 
It should first of all be noted that, however vaguely done, linking any human rights project, be that 
on the legal, political or philosophical plane with a concept of universality can greatly benefit a 
human rights project. That is so because the claim to universality can, if taken seriously, provide a 
robust justification for human rights to receive unconditional support from everyone involved in 
their formulation, implementation, in their advocacy and from those who are meant to benefit 
from them – in short from everyone. If all human beings are endowed with dignity and human 
rights simply because they are human, and if these rights therefore must be universal, these rights 
will also have to be recognised and promoted as such by all human beings, states, international 
organisations and other actors. In theory at least, a universal human right to something must 
trump all other rights and concerns, a consideration which again adds a powerful edge to human 
rights rhetoric.1150  
In fact, without stressing a connection between human rights and universal validity it is difficult to 
see how human rights can, at the philosophical and political level, withstand charges of cultural 
diversity or defences based on a claim to exercise national sovereign rights. That is, only if rights 
are to some extent transcendentally, trans-historically and trans-culturally valid can they also 
claim to be valid at all times under all circumstances and hence be independent of whether or not a 
particular state deems them relevant. Universality in that sense makes the recognition of human 
rights 'right', 'just' and 'inevitable' and not a choice for states.  
Claims to universality can thus undergird and justify human rights' scope and content. In reverse, a 
viewpoint of ethical relativism1151 can dilute and diminish the force of human rights as it questions 
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their applicability to every human being at all times and under all circumstances.1152 Linking 
standards in the area of bioethics with notions of universality can thus help to further rally support 
for the spreading and implementation of the standards.  
 
4.2. Universality and Cultural Diversity 
One difficulty with assuming that the standards' references to ideals and ideas of universal validity 
is not devoid of meaning is, however, that it is not quite clear what is actually entailed by these 
references. That is, it is not quite clear what universality means if it is attached to a standard or 
referred to in a provision, whether at all or how such references should be honoured, and, 
particularly, in how far they limit or curtail expressions of cultural diversity in relation to questions 
of bioethical relevance.  
Generally speaking, in the philosophical, jurisprudential and political literature on human rights 
two opposing positions with regard to the meaning of the term universality can be made out and 
most scholarly writing on the subject will be found somewhere in between these two positions. One 
is that international human rights are and must be the same everywhere, and that they have 
validity at all times in all cultures and at all places, nations and states. This position, sometimes 
referred to as 'moral universalism', usually is correlated with the belief that there exist rationally 
identifiable trans-cultural and trans-historical moral truths and a truly universal moral community 
comprising all human beings.1153 According to the universalist stance culturally based defences of 
violations of human rights norms must then be dismissed since “the International Community has 
an obligation to protest human rights violations wherever they are perpetrated.”1154 Practices, such 
as discrimination based on gender or age - even if condoned by culture or tradition - fall outside of 
what can be justified on the ground of culture.  
The idea of moral universalism has been and continues to be challenged by advocates of cultural 
relativism who claim that rights and rules, as codification of morality, are culturally contingent and 
depend on context and that thus any imposition of any of these codifications of morality constitutes 
a form of moral imperialism.1155 To the relativist notions of right and wrong and the moral or legal 
rules that encode them necessarily differ throughout the world because the cultures in which they 
root and inhere differ. 'Weak' relativists thereby simply seem to maintain and describe the fact that 
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the world hosts a broad variety of cultures and that views of right and wrong are linked to these 
underlying cultures.1156 'Strong' relativists, on the other hand, argue a point that goes beyond the 
empirical observation of the variety of cultures around the world.1157 They attach great importance 
to the consequence of diversity, which they claim to be the reason for why no transcendent or 
trans-cultural idea of right can be found or agreed upon. Knowledge 
“and truth are culturally contingent, creating a barrier to cross-cultural understanding; and 
that all cultures are equally valid. Combined with the empirical observation of cultural 
diversity worldwide, these two premises lead to the conclusion that human rights norms do 
not transcend cultural location and cannot be readily translated across cultures.”1158   
Consequently no culture and no state would be justified in attempting to force on other cultures or 
states, unless of course those states or cultures freely accept these standards, what must be 
understood to be ideas associated particularly with this culture or state, no matter whether these 
ideas might be universally true at some level. For to claim that they are so always implies an 
argument of false consciousness of others.1159 Moreover, cultural relativists also usually argue that, 
no matter the ulterior motivation of seeking to spread human rights, this has in fact often been 
done in a spirit of abusive imperialism.1160 In this strong form cultural relativism then usually leads 
to a non-interventionist stance as there is a perceived need to preserve the observed cultural 
diversity. Any value judgement, condemnation, or effort to eradicate practices that can be justified 
on the basis of cultural preference will be perceived as a form of a 'cultural imperialism' where 
moral dictates are imposed by other value systems which legitimise their doing so with a reference 
to their own moral superiority.1161    
To date neither universal moralists nor relativists have convinced the respectively opposing side of 
their point of view. In the area of bioethics the debate between universalists and ethical relativists 
usually translates e.g. into the claims made by some authors that values enshrined in the major 
documents in this area are of lesser relevance to many Asian and African countries.1162 It is urged 
that Asian and African bioethics generally emphasise more the society's well-orderdness than 
individual's interest and the fulfilment of corresponding responsibilities and that they lack the 
notion of one unique and absolute God, free will, autonomy, and categorical imperative from which 
to deduce the categories of goodness or justice and such concrete notions as autonomy and 
informed consent prevalent in international human rights standards on bioethics.1163 Others argue 
similarly that human rights' emphasis on individualism as opposed to a focus on “holistic, 
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contextualised thinking, family relationships, sense of duties and the idea of living with nature as 
opposed to ruling it”1164 as well as human rights' focus on the state as the main perpetrator of 
human rights violations reflects an 'ethnocentric bias'. In a similar vein have feminist scholars also 
pointed out that the UDHR and other human rights documents rely on concepts of universality, 
rights, persons, and equality that derive from the logic of fraternity and Enlightenment 
philosophies, including that of 'man's' common sense.1165  
“these concepts … inevitably reflect a certain history of power. In this philosophical 
tradition, moral agency has been marked explicitly as male, white, and European in 
descent. Within this conceptual history women have been defined not as agents but as 
property, the medium of exchange through which bonds of brotherhood are elaborated. 
From Aristotle's account of her as a 'nutritive medium' to Hegel's sequestering of her apart 
from public life in the family where she tends the body, this tradition renders 'woman' a 
supplement to 'man's' agency, lacking the self-consciousness and rational capacities 
necessary for autonomous, self-directed activity. Moreover, as Irigaray has argued, this 
subjection of 'woman' through the denial of women's agency is reflected in other forms of 
subjection and hierarchies of power based on race, class, and ethnicity.1166  
Based on these criticism these authors hold that articulating current 'universal principles' requires 
a “critical recognition of the implication of enlightenment and liberal concepts of persons, rights, 
and equality in the hegemony of particular racial, cultural, and sexual identities.”1167 Failing to 
acknowledge this conceptual history, however, and by relying on abstract concepts of equality the 
UDBHR it is argued  
“obscures the real inequities that characterize contemporary ethical urgencies, and it fails to 
articulate a sense of universality ample enough to address the actual inequalities of power 
and resources that prevail across the globe. Figures of universality ought to call for and 
sustain solidarity without reducing the specificities of experience to any single generic 
form.”1168  
The fear is that the UDBHR by failing to take into account underlying structural inequalities such 
as vast differences and inequities of wealth and power looses its relevance to large segments of 
society and populations in the world. The attempt to set universal norms is laudable yet, according 
to Rawlinson, it can run the danger of missing the realities, needs and 'ethical urgencies' of most of 
the world's human beings. Setting universal standards then at least does nothing to address these 
inequities.1169 
It should, however, be noted that the standards in the area of bioethics recognize the value of and 
the need to pay regard to cultural diversity. The UDHBR for example makes concessions to cultural 
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pluralism and cultural variations for example in Article 12.1170 Yet it also qualifies this respect by 
the injunction that such diversity may not be 'invoked to infringe upon human dignity, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms nor upon the principles set out in this Declaration'1171 hence 
rendering it somewhat unclear to what extent and how notions of cultural diversity and respect for 
human rights might best be balanced. Nevertheless, standards in the area of bioethics are certainly 
eclectic enough, particularly in their wording, to allow for culturally varied approaches to bioethical 
questions and/or for a timely interpretation of its provisions that remedies some of the biased 
premises referred to above.  Moreover, all standards, as discussed above, leave large areas of 
bioethical interest to be regulated by national legislations which can then accommodate particular 
cultural needs.  
 
4.3. The Basis of Universalism 
Given the criticism towards the standards' references to universality it may also be asked why these 
human rights should at all aspire to set universal standards, i.e. on what basis these references and 
aspirations to universal applicability are made. Failing to provide a justification will otherwise give 
further ammunition to those critical voices who challenge the 'universal' outreach of the standards.  
 
4.3.1. Human Needs, Capabilities or Will 
One way to explain and justify human rights' link with notions of universal validity is to ground 
human rights in human needs. According to this view all humans have a common essential nature 
and common essential human needs that determine that certain kinds of goods and behaviours are 
essential to satisfy these needs.1172 A universal right to food and a right not to be tortured for 
example are often cited as essential to meet such universal human needs.  
Yet human needs or human nature generally are difficult to pin down, particularly once one 
ventures beyond basic life sustaining biological needs, such as nutritional needs and it is it not 
always evident which human rights correlate and/or are necessitated by human nature or human 
needs. Until very recently, for example, no human rights standard included a right to water.1173 
Similarly, many 'good' things that seem to correlate with very basic human needs, such as 'loving' 
and 'nurturing' or 'supportive parents' or 'friendships', are not the object of human rights.1174 In 
reverse it is difficult to correlate some human rights with human needs. For example, most of the 
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rights or principles specified in the area of bioethics, except maybe for the right to access to 
medicine, do not seem to be based on immediate human needs.    
A further variation of the needs driven justification of human rights' universal aspirations is to root 
human rights in human capabilities. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, for example understand 
the promotion of human capabilities to be at the core of human rights as they enable humans to 
'live life in a truly human way.'1175 According to Nussbaum, several capabilities have to be made 
possible for all human beings in all societies:  
“The idea of capabilities is that you ask the question: What are people actually able to do 
and to be? … I specify ten central things that I think are central indicators that any decent 
society would make quite pivotal and would guarantee to all citizens up to an adequate 
threshold level. I look at: life, health, bodily integrity; development of senses, imagination, 
and thought through education; practical reason; affiliation; access to recreation and 
play…control over material and social environment and …access to a good relationship with 
nature and the environment… and then emotional health.”1176 
Human rights, according to this view, are among the primary means by which the realization of 
human capabilities can be ensured and they should therefore be universally recognised.1177 Yet 
again, just what kind of universal human rights the promotion of human capabilities gives rise to is 
sometimes difficult to determine. For one, it is difficult to determine a final list of human 
capabilities necessary to lead a life worthy of a human being. Nussbaum herself has frequently 
changed or amended her list of 'essential human capabilities.'1178 Hence the list of correlated 
human rights which supposedly are universal has had to change too which seems to somewhat 
contradict the idea of their universality. Besides, hardly any of the more specific human rights in 
the area of bioethics have been mentioned in Nussbaum's list of human rights that enable a 'life 
worthy of human beings' so that the standards' references to universality cannot be based on a 
need to satisfy basic capabilities needed to life a worthy live.  
One further variation of this overall theme is to justify the philosophical validity of the universality 
claim by reference to a single human attribute, that of the capacity to express free will.1179 Many 
“will theorists” thereby argue that what is distinctive about human agency is the capacity for 
expressing free will and that this ought to constitute the core of any account of rights.1180 Will 
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theorists thus ultimately view human rights "as originating in, or reducible to, a single, constitutive 
right which is that of free will".1181 Because human rights constitute the means through which the 
exercise of free will can be (best) secured they should be universally valid. While this approach 
certainly has its merits it raises some difficult questions. It, for example, leaves it open to what 
extent human rights apply to human beings who are temporarily or permanently incapable of 
acting in a rationally autonomous fashion i.e. individuals who cannot express their free will or to 
embryos and other marginal beings, as discussed above.1182 Human rights for example, might not 
apply to those individuals who are diagnosed to be suffering from dementia, schizophrenia, or 
individuals who remain in a comatose condition.1183 Also babies and toddlers might then be 
excluded from the scope of human rights. Finally, it is again not quite clear which human rights in 
the area of bioethics are correlated to free will other than those relating to autonomy or informed 
consent. It is for example not clear how the protection of future generation or solidarity can be 
based on a will based theory of human rights.  
 
4.3.2. Religious Tenets 
One further way in which human rights' universal aspirations has sometimes been justified is to 
found it on religious tenets, i.e. on the idea of a specific 'natural' or 'human-specific' order foreseen 
by God(s) which humans have to strive to keep up or live up to by means of universally applicable 
human rights. Bishop Schindehütte of the Evangelical Church in Germany on the Anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, claims that the commitment to human 
rights is a matter of Christian obligation  
“….God's love of humankind triumphs by virtue of the resurrection of his Son. The human 
dignity conferred by God…can be violated, perhaps, but it cannot be destroyed. The 
Church, by speaking out against violations of human dignity and advocating for the 
preservation of the rights which are rooted in that dignity, is following the path indicated to 
it by our Lord Jesus Christ himself.”1184  
Similarly, Buddhism, for example, understands the taking of human life as one of the four cardinal 
offences, thus allocating human life and human dignity a special status which deserves universal 
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recognition and universal respect.1185 Human rights, to the extent that they uphold this status and 
the idea of human worth are then also endorsed by Buddhist thought.  
Yet, even though it may be fair to say that all known religions in one way or another endorse some 
concept of human dignity, sanctity of human life and human rights and that this indeed is the 
source of human dignity, it is problematic to root human rights in a common concept of human 
dignity. That is so because different religions differ in their concrete understandings of human 
dignity and human rights in about the same way as they differ in their specific understanding of 
who or what God(s) is/are and in what constitutes righteous or pious behaviour and/or a good 
order of society. Reaching some middle ground so far has been rather difficult as centuries of 
religiously motivated warfare and/or civil war prove even today. To elevate one such understanding 
of a good order over others, however, would likely meet with fierce opposition as well as it would 
defeat the very object of the exercise, i.e. to root human rights in all existing religions.1186 
Moreover, doing so would violate one central tenet of human rights philosophy which is respect for 
all religions and belief systems, including that of atheism or agnostics. While human rights' 
aspirations to universal validity in fact are often justified by reference to human dignity, doing so, 
as was seen above often comes at the price of precision and clarity of what it actually is that is 
protected or universally promoted. That is, in order to be able to speak to people over a long period 
of time and across various cultural backgrounds,  human rights that are based on an idea of human 
dignity have to remain rather abstract and general, such as valuing life, liberty and love. The more 
specific human rights are formulated, such as is the case with the rather specific cases addressed in 
the standards in the area of bioethics, the more problematic it is again to link them to the idea of 
human dignity in any meaningful way.  
 
4.3.3. Common Moral Standards or Good Reasons 
Another related way of explaining human rights' universal aspirations is to combine the idea of 
basic human needs with the idea of common or universal moral standards that are said to govern 
all human relations.1187 According to this scenario there exists in some form or another an 
identifiable moral order the legitimacy of which precedes contingent social and historical 
conditions and which applies to all human beings everywhere and at all times.1188  
Indeed, it appears that all human groups or societies have morally inspired laws, that is, imperative 
norms of behaviour backed by reasons and values, as well as they have concepts of human 
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dignity.1189 If human rights can be shown to exist as norms accepted in all or almost all actual 
human moralities they may then in fact be universal.1190 If, for example, almost all human groups 
have moralities containing norms prohibiting murder, or mandating a model of informed consent 
these norms could constitute the universal human right to life and to informed consent. 1191 Yet 
again, it is extremely difficult to pin down the moralities of all human cultures, societies and other 
groups and it seems almost impossible to make them agree to common standards.1192 Even with 
regard to such universally condemned crimes as that of torture, unfair criminal trials, 
discrimination based on sex, a right to form autonomous decisions and to be treated in a 
beneficiary way by doctors or physicians concrete agreement is sometimes difficult to reach.1193 A 
group or nation may think that deliberately inflicting death on a person is generally condemnable 
and yet consider the murdering of certain human beings, e.g. of a certain sex, or religious affiliation 
or with a certain criminal record to be more justifiable than others.1194 Some states and groups 
accept that people that are unable to consent may be subjected to medical research, others would 
consider doing so to constitute some form of torture.1195 Others see no human rights violation in 
providing more and better health care to certain segments of society or to restrict the exercise of 
autonomous decision making of these segments.1196 Hence it seems difficult to reach a common 
standard of morality that all states could agree on. One further problem with this approach is that 
human rights declarations and treaties are "often intended to change existing norms, not just 
describe the existing moral consensus".1197 As such grounding human rights in existing moralities 
might be too short-sighted.  
One further variation of this justification of human rights' claim to universality is to assert that 
with regard to certain human rights, such as the right against torture or the one to be treated 
according to the first do no harm principle, "there are strong reasons for believing that it is almost 
always wrong to engage in torture"1198 or in preventing persons from making autonomous 
decisions. This approach would view the Universal Declaration as attempting to formulate a 
justified political morality, which was not necessarily trying to identify a pre-existing moral 
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consensus but to create a consensus on how governments should behave that was supported by the 
most plausible moral and practical reasons. 1199 While this approach is compelling the problem is, 
however, that existence of good reasons can be a rather thin line for the existence of universal 
human rights that inhere in a universal human nature and hence should exist independently of or 
beyond good reason.1200  
 
4.3.4. Acceptance 
It is also arguable that no matter their (lack of) commonly shared deeper roots, human rights are 
universal and universally justified as they, in the form of today's human rights standards, have 
been signed or ratified on a nearly universal basis. No matter whether human rights as a concept 
can be found or rooted in all cultures and societies around the world the fact that they have 
subsequently been accepted by almost all states makes human rights universal.1201 In particular 
norms enshrined in the UDHR that have become part of customary international law and hence 
bind states irrespective of whether they have accepted them or not could be mentioned in that 
regard. 
However, as was explained above, that would only apply in so far as states have in fact signed up to 
a standard and only to the limited number of human rights that are actually part of customary 
international law. It does not explain why a whole standard and particularly not the ones in the 
area of bioethics should be universally applicable.  
 
4.3.5. Necessity 
One further reason for why human rights' claim to universality is important and valid is the 
argument that human rights have arisen as a response to conditions created by modernity and as 
such constitute “the only effective remedy against the downsides of this development as it spreads 
around the world.”1202 That is, while the processes connected with modernity, such as the process 
of socio-political individuation and the building of the modern nation state, discussed above, may 
have first been played out in Europe or North America, they are increasingly the rule throughout 
the world. As a result, it is argued that 
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“the structural basis for a society of equal and autonomous individuals and the idea of the 
modern nation state is being universalized too and by this the idea of a society which 
nurtures and conditions the existence of human rights.”1203 
According to proponents of this view individual human rights increasingly appear not merely as 
moral ideals, but as both objectively and subjectively necessary to protect and realize human 
dignity in modern societies. Hence, even if human rights are not of a prima facie universal nature 
that should not keep them from becoming so if necessary.1204  
Yet while this may well mean that human rights should receive universal validity, there is also 
something troublesome to this idea. This is so because the culture “which has given birth to the 
concept of human rights will also be called upon to become universal”1205, a line of thinking that is 
understandably troubling to many since they rightly fear the loss of their own culture. Also, past 
experiences have made it clear that it is highly counterproductive -let alone the question of 
desirability1206- to try to export standards of normative and social ordering in an unqualified way. 
Not only does such an approach tend to produce a backlash against “cultural imperialism” but it 
would also foreclose the possibility of mutual learning from each other's “moral universe”1207 which 
might be necessary to detect truly universal answers that can speak to all cultures and cater for all 
humans' needs equally.  
 
4.3.6. Conclusion 
In effect then, each single justification of human rights' aspirations to set standards of universal 
validity is to some extent problematic. Particularly the less abstract and less general the rights, 
including those in the area of bioethics the more difficult it is to justify an aspiration of these rights 
to general applicability by connecting this statement with a reference to basic human needs or 
capabilities, common moral standards or notions of human dignity.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
While human rights' aspirations to set universally applicable norms may overall be a desirable and 
laudable effort it can result in some unwanted side-effects. Those that do not accept or feel 
threatened by the aspirations to universal validity will not accept the provisions enshrined in these 
standards and continue to criticise them. What is more important is that the standards may in fact 
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miss to answer to the needs and realities of large segments of societies and populations around the 
world which could diminish their relevance and ultimately weaken their impact. It might then be 
more desirable to either better explain what is entailed or implied by using the term universal in 
the standards or to avoid this term altogether. If a more specific consensus on human rights norms 
in the area of bioethics is to be achieved the international community needs to be responsive to the 
needs and experiences of all people. Only by this way can it simultaneously “honour the diversity of 
cultures and build towards common principles that all can support”1208 and hence build a form of 
legitimacy of the provisions that makes them acceptable and most importantly relevant to all.     
 
5. Autonomy 
It was shown above that respect for human beings' autonomy is one central tenet of human rights 
doctrine and that it, in some way or another, means to place the individual and his or her choices 
or decisions in the centre of human rights thought. In bioethical debates it is often synonymous to 
ensuring that a patient gives his or her informed consent to a decision. 
 
5.1. Autonomy vs. Paternalism 
In the area of bioethics respect for patient autonomy has become the discipline's 'ineradicable 
birthmark' and one of its most clearly pronounced principles. As Carl Schneider observes: “It is 
now common to make such strong and categorical assertions as: the fact that the patient bears 
rights as citizens should preclude any form of medical paternalism”1209. And in the words of Arthur 
Caplan, “there are relatively few bioethicists who argue that respect for autonomy is not the 
preeminent value governing the actions of health care providers.”1210 Paternalism, Caplan goes on 
to argue, has become the “Freddy Kruger of bioethics”.1211 
The literature on the topic of autonomy in the area of bioethics thereby provides many convincing 
reasons for why the principle of autonomy should be the reigning principles in bioethics, as respect 
for autonomy of patients is meant to safeguard patients' interests in many different ways.1212 For 
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one, as Janet Garcia remarks "many medical procedures have been introduced which, while 
offering some chance of cure or prolongation of life, are burdensomely painful or expensive"1213 or 
of limited effectiveness or come with unwanted side effects. Patients facing painful procedures or 
procedures with potentially severe side effects or those of high costs should have the option of 
declining such treatment.1214 From the point of view of fairness it also seems right that a patient 
should be adequately informed about effectiveness and risks of proposed medication.1215 Generally, 
the idea, encapsulated in the concept of autonomy (as opposed to paternalism), is to provide 
patients with more control over the course of their medical treatment and with a possibility to have 
their view respected and their wishes taken seriously, a rationale which has also been 
acknowledged in various case law.1216  
Another advantage of patients' autonomy replacing models of paternalism is that apart from 
cherishing an individual's right to form decisions and to be the master of his or her life it also 
protects individuals or minorities against abuse. That is, in pluralistic societies doctors and 
patients sometimes have very different conceptualisations of the good. Fear that the doctor and 
patient may not share the same moral commitments or that doctors, in a paternalistic fashion 
assume that they know what is in a patient's best interest is one of the chief factors undergirding an 
interest in autonomy.1217 Out or this concern Tristram Englehardt therefore for example argues 
that autonomy, as a mechanism and principle in pluralist societies constitutes a robust means 
against the imposition of values by one group on another.1218 Moreover, autonomy also 
necessitates transparency towards the patient which in turn makes it more difficult for doctors or 
carers to act in a paternalistic way and to override a patient's wish. That is, through the processes 
of ensuring that patients have the possibility to take autonomous decisions "medicine is no longer 
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considered an art, the physician no longer an artist"1219, which also means that a physician can no 
longer operate based on authority but has to build his profession on genuine scientific knowledge. 
Having to educate the patient so that he or she may truly arrive at an autonomous decision 
consequently makes medicine more transparent and makes it more difficult for doctors to hide 
behind a perceived authority and to abuse their power.1220  
Besides fostering respect for patient's wishes and safeguarding him or her against abuse there is 
also a more philosophical argument in favour of patient's autonomy, advanced by several 
philosophers who have given support to the idea that only an autonomous life can be a good and 
joyful life. The philosophical deliberations of Kant and Mill are frequently invoked in that 
respect.1221 The ability to form autonomous decisions is to Kant one necessary ingredient to leading 
a good life and human's ability to act autonomously is a source of human beings' dignity, as 
explained above.1222 Paternalism cannot be reconciled with this understanding of the human being, 
his capabilities and worth. Mill's ethics again see one major source of man's happiness in his 
autonomous pursuit of self-defined goals.1223 Individuals should be free to form their moral views 
and life their life accordingly within the limits of not harming others or harming his own ability to 
make free choices1224. Finally, some proponents of autonomy also specifically react against 
utilitarianism or other philosophical strands, which might be construed so as to override the wishes 
and good of the individual in favour of the good of the community.1225 For example, some strands 
of utilitarianism could be interpreted to allow for forced organ transplantation if that could safe a 
greater number of people than those at risk through the transplantation.1226   
In all these instances the principle of autonomy means to empower patients to form their own 
decisions, and acts as safeguard against abuse through doctors or dominant groups in any society. 
 
5.2. Practical Problems with the Concept of Patient's Autonomy 
Yet, while autonomy certainly has its value in bioethical debates on a practical level, it is not clear 
how respect for patient's autonomy has to be translated into day to day practice of doctors and 
physicians. For example, while most scholars and practitioners can agree that the most important 
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goal of informed consent, as one major aspect of autonomy, is that patients have an opportunity to 
be an informed participant in their health care decisions it is not clear how that is to be done. In 
most discussions about the requirements of informed consent some or most of the following 
elements are mentioned as relevant units: (a) the nature of the decision/procedure has to be 
explained to the patients and (b) reasonable alternatives to the proposed intervention have to be 
shown to him or her. (c) The relevant risks, benefits, and uncertainties related to each alternative 
have to discussed and (d) an assessment of patient understanding of the information provided has 
to be undertaken. Finally, (e) the acceptance of the intervention by the patient has to be clear.1227  
Yet for a concept of informed consent that pays regards to all these elements to work several things 
have to be in place. First, doctors need to have and take adequate time to explain to patients the 
procedures and nature of decisions.1228 Evidence however suggest that doctors sometimes cannot 
or do not have or take the time needed to convey to patients the nature of the decision at hand and 
that information provided is often hardly understandable.1229  
Second, the information disclosed must be the right information in the sense of it being relevant, 
true, clear and complete. 1230 The information also has to be sufficient to make it possible at all for 
the patient to form an informed decision. However, it is sometimes not quite clear what relevant, 
true and clear is and how best to disclose it. For example, so Schneider, "some safety warnings 
apparently make people less cautious, not more cautious"1231 and complete information about a 
subject can be too overwhelming to have any real meaning to the patient.1232 It is, moreover, not 
clear, on a technical level, how and what exactly is sufficient information, and how it has to be 
prepared or conveyed, i.e. whether booklets and information sheets in addition to a personal 
conversation are enough to educate patients or whether there is a need for several conversations, 
whether patients can be educated in a group or must have one on one conversations with their 
doctors.1233  
Third, patients have to hear, understand, remember and assimilate the information correctly as 
well as to analyse the information critically and insightfully.1234 Yet, Schneider and others have 
collected evidence that suggests that in many cases patients are utterly unable to cope with the 
abundant information material on certain diseases, that they have been given, particularly if there 
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are aggravating conditions such as that they have just received a severe diagnosis or where they are 
restricted in terms of finances etc.1235 Other studies suggest that certain presupposed ideas about 
treatment prevail that even a considerable amount of information will not change. Many patients, 
for example, when faced with tough decisions regarding their medical treatment often seem to 
rather rely on folk wisdom than on evidence provided in the information.1236  
Fourth, recipients often have difficulty believing what they are told. 1237 Many patients have been 
reported "to shut out information that does not fit their view of the world. Furthermore, recipients 
often have reasons to fear that disclosers are shaping information to serve their own interests and 
not the recipients."1238 For example, patients can be suspicious about the utility of certain cost 
intensive medical procedures if they believe that them paying for it benefits the treating 
physician.1239 
Finally, people must use the information intelligently.1240 That is, if they can be convinced that it is 
useful for them to make an effort to incorporate the information in their decision making structure, 
people still can be carried away by emotions. Advertisements, the media and statistics all help 
influencing people's judgements about the amount of money they should have, the type of car they 
should drive and the type and amount of food they should eat. Even against better judgement 
people overspend in order to buy a new car, eat junk food or believe that they are less worth with 
lesser amount of money in their bank account. To put this "crucial point differently, people's 
decisions often do not change, much less improve, with more information."1241 
On a very practical level it is therefore not quite clear whether at all and if so how the requirements 
of informed consent can be met. Disregard for individual patient preference or “resistance, 
reluctance, or incompetence by physicians can all too easily result in pro forma and useless 
autonomy rituals.”1242 Overall, so Schneider concludes “it has become undeniable that in area after 
area patients remain far from making genuinely autonomous decisions.”1243 Nevertheless, “the list 
of things doctors, hospitals, and researchers must do if they are really and truly to honour patients' 
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autonomy (or ensure his or her informed consent) grows and grows”1244, a trend which is, however, 
not necessarily leading to the desired results.   
 
5.3. Compatibility with Human Nature? 
Moreover, on a more theoretical or anthropological level it may be questioned to what extent a 
focus on autonomy is compatible with human nature. That is, even if doctors and hospitals comply 
with all the requirements and provide the possibility for patients to form informed decisions, as 
discussed above, it is not clear whether patients would then actually form autonomous or rather 
informed decisions. In other words, there is a more philosophical or anthropological question 
about whether or not the image of an individualistic and autonomously acting human being as 
portrayed or reflected in the provisions on informed consent and generally in human rights 
philosophy is at all realistic and tenable.1245   
Schneider cites several case studies in order to show that humans and human decision making 
frequently deviates from the ideal of informed consent. First of all, he shows that "patients make 
poor (autonomous) decisions in that they do not really know what they want."1246 In fact, people 
make “systematic mistakes” in anticipating what they will enjoy. They “regularly miswant.”1247 This 
might be so because patients' preferences are unstable and the intensity of an emotional reaction to 
a situation hard to predict.1248 Another reason might be that patient's values might be too 
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"fragmentary, fractured and febrile to guide their decisions".1249 But most importantly it seems that 
people generally have problems predicting other people's or even their own future preferences on a 
systematic level because humans predict the facts of future situations inaccurately. For example, 
when envisioning terminal stages of a disease people tend to see themselves as “tied to a bed 
wasting away rather than planting flowers in a hospice's garden surrounded by [their] most 
beloved ones.”1250 Such images of what could happen are then taken as the basis of decisions for 
example re the question of the admissibility of euthanasia. Yet, people make decisions based on 
their projected thoughts and not based on what will really happen or based on what is even most 
likely, statistically speaking, to happen to them.1251  
Secondly, Schneider holds that it is often the wrong theory is used to predict personal preferences. 
For example, people base ideas about their future preferences on certain self-images, such as a 
'natural predilection' for variety or stability that have often nothing to do with reality. That is, self-
perception often varies considerably from what people really do, are or want or how they act in 
concrete situations.1252 Using such theories or ideas about oneself in order to make informed 
decisions about the future, for example in a patient will, then can lead to that patients make 
decisions based on what they, on some level, think they should want rather than based on what 
they do actually want. Third, no one can actually predict how he or she is really going to react to an 
event in the future simply because we are not yet in that situation. No one can accurately determine 
how he or she might act if faced with difficult situations and choices such as a choice for or against 
a potentially painful and burdensome operation.1253 What seems worse is that "pondering choices 
does not always improve predictions."1254 In a study, "some of the people researchers instructed to 
pick a poster were asked to think about why they liked or disliked each poster ('deep thinkers') and 
others were not ('shallow thinkers').”1255 The study showed that “the deep thinkers were the least 
satisfied,”1256 which could suggest that patients on the whole might be better off if they formed 
decisions rapidly and intuitively rather than if they are given a prolonged time to think about them. 
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Such and other studies suggest that humans, and more specifically patients, might make decisions 
badly as they often inaptly predict their own "tastes, behaviour, and emotions even over short 
periods and under familiar circumstances." 1257 In that sense it seems that the way humans form 
decisions might not be as compatible with what autonomy in a bioethical context actually requires 
or presupposes them to do which again casts some doubt on the effectiveness of the principle of 
autonomy as a leading principle in the area of bioethics.  
On the other hand it should be noted that none of the so far stated arguments suggests that human 
beings do not or are not capable of forming autonomous decisions. To the contrary, as long as a 
person organises his life according to those principles rules and maxims that he or she has him- or 
herself chosen, it does not matter whether these principles, rules and maxims change over the 
course of a life time or are to some degree incoherent.1258 Yet, what some of the above cited studies 
suggest is that sometimes “people reason in ways that bedevil the work of making medical 
decisions”1259 which, however, doees not impact their capacity to reason.    
 
5.4. Mandatory Autonomy 
It has also been noted that some patients seem to “reject the gift of autonomy”, a fact which again 
meets with some disapproval by those who have over the last century fought hard against 
paternalism in medicine.1260 Yet criticising a patient for exercising his or her autonomy to reject 
autonomy again constitutes an inherent contradiction, sometimes referred to by the notion of 
“mandatory autonomy.”1261 The autonomy principle, so it is argued, "has been transformed from a 
doctrine that entitles, but does not require the patient to take an active role in treatment decision 
making, to a mandatory view that treats patients as morally obligated to act autonomously".1262  
Schneider and others argue that in that respect  
"the doctrine of patient autonomy has gone beyond a principle of medical conduct, that 
is, from prescribing how doctors should treat patients to prescribing how patients 
should conduct themselves. This refocusing edges towards imposing on patients the 
duty of freedom, the moral obligation to make their own medical decisions Not only 
have patients lost the right to decide not to decide, but a refusal to assume the 
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obligations and responsibilities of mandatory autonomy is viewed as a moral failing 
deserving of contempt and blame.1263  
In the worst case, so Schneider, the need to act autonomously can be "pursued regardless of patient 
preference, reluctance, or incompetence to assume an autonomous role in the medical 
relationship".1264 
Yet, so Schneider argues many people and particularly sick people deliberately do not want 
autonomy. That is so because "patients want something more, or different, than autonomy in their 
relationship with their physician.”1265 As Debra Roter summarises this point:  
"In lamenting the small and perhaps even shrinking likelihood of achieving an optimal 
level of autonomy for each patient, Schneider suggests that patients prize other more 
attainable goals Patients … want and value competence and the kindness of solicitous 
personal care above all else."1266  
They want "to be informed, to know something of their physicians' values, to be assured the 
physician is acting in their interests, to retain veto power, and to enjoy the degree of autonomy best 
suited to each as individuals."1267 This is, however, "a far cry" from the notion of unrestrained self-
governance and much closer to the idea of providing patients with a veto power.1268  
 
5.5. Limited Paternalism 
Much in line with this conclusion do some scholars, patients, nurses, and physicians question the 
moral validity of unrestrained autonomy as the centrepiece of the patient-nurse-physician 
relationship. Some thereby argue for the need to balance the autonomy equation “in light of the 
complex emotional and psychosocial exigencies associated with making decisions in the 
predicament of human illness.”1269 It is in this context that it could be argued that in some cases 
paternalism can actually be well-suited to medicine as doctors are indeed best situated to know 
what is in their patients' interests.1270  
These views can be said to be supported in the literature by such renowned scholars as Martha 
Nussbaum who, for example, champions an approach of limited paternalism. To her, people have 
to be able to exercise certain capabilities, such as “being able to live to the end of a human life of 
normal length”, “being able to have good health and to be adequately nourished or “being able to 
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move freely from place to place; to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault and 
domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of 
reproduction.”1271 Yet Nussbaum explains that “my own view is that health and bodily integrity are 
so important in relation to all the other capabilities that they are legitimate areas of interference 
with choice up to a point.'1272 This statement must be read so as to open up the possibility for some 
paternalistic curtailing of individual's autonomy. If, in doubt, it is legitimate to interfere with a 
person's choice when that choice limits his or her important capabilities.1273 Moreover, there may 
also be good reasons for why someone should obey or defer to a doctor's opinion. William James 
for example holds that  
“experience shows that there are times in everyone's life when one can be better counselled 
by other than by one's self. Inability to decide is one of the commonest symptoms of 
fatigued nerves; friends who see our troubles more broadly often see them more wisely 
than we do; so it is frequently an act of excellent virtue to consult and obey a doctor, a 
partner or a wife.1274 
The idea of limited paternalism is also supported to some extent by the fact that there are many 
instances in day-to-day life in which certain forms of paternalism seem justified and it is difficult to 
see where the line between justifiable and unjustifiable paternalism is. For example, school or 
university curricula can oblige students to take certain courses, the civil law may declare certain 
contracts to be against public morals, there exist mandatory pension systems and health care 
insurances in countries. The consumption of certain drugs or the performance of certain sexual 
conduct is prohibited by law in many countries. In fact, there are many rules, policies, and actions 
justified solely on the grounds that the person affected would be better off, or would be less 
harmed, that seem justifiable and that are paternalistic and there is no coherent rationale that can 
explain why in the one case an individual is allowed to choose a painful procedure for himself while 
in the other he or she is not.  
In all these instances at least to the extent that people choose paternalism and paternalistic 
treatment they should not be prevented from doing so by human rights standards. 
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5.6. Autonomy versus Morally Good Choices 
A further point of note that has already been made above in relation to rights and principles is that 
simply opening up the possibility for making autonomous decisions does not necessarily lead to 
morally good choices of patients. In discussion of cases, so Garcia "bioethicists will often argue in a 
way that suggests that once it is ensured that the patient's choice is autonomous, the work of the 
bioethicist or the treating doctor has been done."1275 This comes back to the critique of rights 
mentioned above in that they lack an overall telos.1276 Similarly autonomy, without being read 
against some overall morality and by merely providing a process, lacks a telos and cannot ensure 
that decisions are formed in a way that is somehow conducive to a greater good of the patient. 
Much of the bioethical literature today seeks to set standards for determining and ensuring that 
patients give their informed consent, that they act autonomously and that their privacy is 
protected. Yet, a bioethicist concerned with that a patient makes a good moral choice would be 
attempting to explain the principles which might help forming a choice that is morally valuable and 
to find just ways to persuade the patient to accept these principles and to apply them to his or her 
choice.1277 According to Garcia "less and less of bioethical literature, however, argues the ethics of 
procedures and practices while more and more is directed towards finding means to ensure that 
choices are autonomous." 1278 Good moral choices have thus thereby been exchanged with concerns 
for the autonomous choice.1279 Of course it cannot be the aim to present the patient with a moral 
framework that forces him or her to arrive at a certain decision, yet, like is the case with most 
ethics committees, it might be a better use of doctors' and bioethicists' time and resources to 
discuss with the patient moral argument and moral implications and to thereby help patients form 
sound and good decisions that they will not regret than to simply ensure that consent to a 
treatment is free and informed. 
An objection that points to a similar direction has been made by those that understand the idea of 
autonomy "to have been subject to the tendency of the human mind to be extrapolated to 
extremes."1280 The argument is that in the last decades, patient autonomy has been extended by 
some to a moral right to demand specific treatments, including the administering of death and 
other highly contentious demands, even sometimes over the declared interest of others, such as 
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physicians' moral or ethical objections.1281 In those cases, patients' autonomy might have been 
stretched too far. In the same way has it been argued that while the principle of autonomy is likely 
to empower patients it also on the other hand allows the physician to detach him or herself from 
his task. He or she can still achieve technically good results while leaving the substantial decision to 
the patient. This then reiterates the critique that the individualistic nature of human rights in the 
area of bioethics induces un-social conduct and lessens the sense of responsibilities and self-
imposition of duty.1282 The consolation for patients according to Schneider, is "a formalization of 
patient rights and of administrative due process".1283 However,  
“rights exacerbate the impersonality of the relations between doctor and patient ... and the 
process is self-reinforcing: Trust wanes as relationships become more bureaucratic and less 
personal. This creates a call for rights. The rights solution further alienates doctor and 
patient because it distances them and because the doctor resents the distrust that 
motivated the solution.”1284  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
The points made in the above sections suggests that the emphasis on 'informed consent' and 
autonomy in bioethical contexts might be less relevant and less suitable to achieve what it actually 
seeks to ensure than some bioethicists or human rights lawyers would like to see it. Rather than 
changing patients' decisions and increasing patients' satisfaction, evidence suggests that the only 
thing more information such as booklets, pamphlets, and articles change are levels of knowledge. 
This analysis, of course, is not to say that it would be better to return to paternalism, where doctors 
unquestionably make decisions for patients without consulting them. Nor does this imply that 
information is unnecessary or unwanted or always wrongly perceived. It merely suggests that the 
growing reliance on such principles as autonomy might be in need of some modification and that 
we should not forget that the only cure for some of the problems associated with autonomy is not 
necessarily more autonomy.”1285  
 
6. Conclusion  
This chapter has shown that discussing bioethical concerns in the language of international human 
rights, their legal norms and ethical propositions, has several implications for how these issues are 
thought of, conceptualised and resolved and why this is so.  
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It has shown that discussing questions of bioethical interest in a framework of human rights has 
several implications. Using a language of human rights or principles can be overtly simplistic and 
rigid or too narrow for it to capture the concerns it seeks to address. Rights also often tend to be 
too indeterminate to offer any substantive guidance with regard to specific questions and rights can 
conflict with each other, thereby often opening the back door to structural inequalities underlying 
the rights discourse. On the other hand, using a human rights framework, means using the “lingua 
franca” 1286 for resolving ethically loaded problems at an international level and as such a language 
that is widely accepted and respected. International human rights law is also empowering and a 
tool for action. Using human dignity as an ethically concept in human rights discussions can be 
equally challenging. While it certainly provides the principle that each and every state can agree 
upon and hence can be used as starting point for any debate it is also a rather vaguely stated 
principle which leaves it unclear who exactly the bearer of this dignity is, which actions are in 
conformity with it and what role the state has in relation to the concept of dignity. Moreover it is 
not quite clear whether and how the concept, in respect to the way it is presently used, really adds 
anything to current debates or whether it should not or de factor already has been replaced by the 
concept of autonomy. 
Having to factor in the sovereign state as the agent that agrees on human rights standards and that 
is principally bound by them has certain implications for how issues of bioethical interest are 
usually construed in a human rights framework. That is, standards that are agreed upon in this 
environment are either minimalist, vague or do not exist at all or leave out those areas of concern 
where no agreement can be reached. Alternatively they factor in some form of hegemony. 
Moreover, acts of non-state actors cannot be taken into account in this discourse. 
Discussing bioethically relevant issues by reference to a framework that claims to be universally 
valid also has certain implications. While the claim to universality is necessary for human rights to 
claim universal support and validity it is, for example, not quite clear what universality really 
means in that debate, nor how to justify its claim and how the concept should be positioned in 
relation to that of respect for diversity or how universal human rights fare when in conflict with 
other rights, such as those enshrined in WTO TRIPS standards. Finally, using the concept of 
autonomy in the way it is currently claimed and charged has implications for the bioethical 
discourse. For one, it is not quite clear how that concept is to be translated or realised into day to 
day medical practice. It is also not quite clear whether it really is compatible with human nature 
and whether it might result in an unwanted obligation on patients to form autonomous decisions 
even if they would rather not exercise their right to autonomy. Finally it is not clear whether 
autonomous decisions are necessarily good decisions.
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 Chapter VIII Conclusion: The Success of the Standards 
The preceding chapters have shown that using a legal discourse in the area of bioethics has several 
implications for how issues of bioethical relevance are approached and dealt with and that these 
implications result from the way bioethics is approached through international legal standards in 
the area. According to discourse theory the way discourse deals with a certain matter is neither 
good nor bad. That is, discourses always just represent one way of dealing with issues at hand 
which in itself is neither good nor bad but a mere representation of power.  
In this final chapter some evaluation, however, as to whether engaging in that type of discourse is 
at all a valuable enterprise seems in order. This chapter assesses this question by seeking to 
understand whether or not standards directly addressed to questions of bioethical relevance 
actually achieve or are likely to achieve what they set out to do, i.e. whether they are successful 
relative to their own objectives. As far as is relevant to this question will this thesis offer some 
thoughts on whether law as a means is at all overall suitable to solve the questions and issues that 
are aimed at being solved through this discourse. 
 
1. A Caveat on Methodology 
The question of whether or not the standards achieve the objectives they stipulate for is to a large 
extent an empirical question. That is so because success most easily is measured relative to what 
has manifested in terms of actual results. However, as such this question cannot be sufficiently 
answered at this point.1287 That is so mostly for two reasons. For one, except for a few rather 
unsatisfying indices and standards, discussed below, there are hardly any universally agreed 
methods or benchmarks by which to measure the success of human rights standards in an 
empirical way. Secondly, even if there were such benchmarks, there hardly exists sufficient data on 
the various matters involved, i.e. data necessary to judge whether benchmarks have come to be 
achieved. Gathering such data singlehandedly would go far beyond the scope as well as time and 
resources available for this project. Finally, it is not clear whether standards have yet had enough 
time to develop the force necessary to have any impact at all. 
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1.1. Quantitative Data and Indices 
One way success of legal standards is sometimes measured is simply by referring to the existence of 
a standard in a certain area.1288 Showing that there exists a standard at all is thereby often already 
depicted as the actual solution to the problem or at least as a sign of success. Yet the mere existence 
of a standard does not necessarily say anything about how or whether that standard is successful 
nor does it say anything about the degree to which results are satisfying.  
One further similar empirical method of measuring success has been to analyse how quickly and by 
how many governments a certain standard has been signed or ratified.1289 The fact that over the 
last 11 years so far 23 states have ratified and 11 have signed the Oviedo Convention as well as that 
all UNESCO member states have adopted the UNESCO standards directly addressed to bioethics 
by acclamation is seen as a success of the standards which is then usually and impliedly taken to 
testify to the success of the standards. Yet again it is not quite clear whether the ratification or 
signing of standards really has any positive influence on success or outcome at all. Several studies 
suggest in fact the opposite in that they show that despite the growth and proliferation of legal 
instruments for the protection of human rights, there is a continuing and sometimes even growing 
disparity between such proclamation and actual implementation of or performance with regard to 
human rights protection.1290 States, so the argument, sign or ratify standards, in as much as they 
speak about human rights so as to avail themselves of further responsibilities and so as to 
quiescence lobbying or other interest groups.1291 In any event, whether the signing or ratifying of a 
standard really attest to that standards' success, has no effect at all or has the opposite effect 
cannot be simply deduced from the act of signing or ratifying.  
Another empirical way of measuring success often used by NGOs or International Governmental 
Organisations in the field of human rights in order to prove their success is to refer to their internal 
“churn”.1292 That is, they count the numbers of meetings, numbers of reports, mentionings in the 
press, responses from governments, and so on in relation to them or a certain topic that they 
pursue. The assumption thereby obviously is that the higher the number of meetings, conferences, 
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(last visited 27.04.2012) and Amnesty International, The State of Human Rights – Annual Report 2010, at: 
http://thereport.amnesty.org/ (last visited 27.04.2012). See also P. Alston, Promoting Human Rights 
through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives, 2000 and L. Keith, "The United Nations International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Does it Make a Difference in Human Rights Behavior?", 36 Journal of 
Peace Research, 1999, 95 et seq. 
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 T. Landman, "Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy", 26 Human Rights Quarterly, 2004, 906, 
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being. Nor can anyone say whether the existence of the UDHR did not prevent many more abuses that would have 
taken place had the UDHR never come into existence. 
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 T. Buergenthal, "The Evolving International Human Rights System", 100 American Journal of International Law, 
2006, 791 et seq.  
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attendees of conferences, mentionings in the press, etc., the more successful a standard is. Relevant 
data in this respect is available with regard to the activities of the IBC, IGBC and the Council of 
Europe. The webpages of both organizations account for numerous meetings, activities, 
conferences and several press clips that all focus on matters of bioethical interest.1293 These 
activities, however, at the most show that UNESCO and the Council of Europe are concerned with 
issues of bioethical relevance and that they are active in that area as well as that their activities in 
this area involve other actors as much as they are reviewed or acknowledged by the media or other 
bodies. Yet, counts of the frequency of meetings and conferences say little about the actual 
implementation or success of standards. It is for example absolutely unclear whether more 
meetings and activities will help to reach a broader audience of people nor does a mentioning in a 
newspaper of one of the standards guarantee that some or in fact anyone has read the newspaper 
article, whether, as a result of that mentioning the standard has improved the proliferation of the 
ideas in the standards, and whether more meetings concerned with the issues of bioethical interest 
really help promoting issues of bioethical relevance.1294  
 
1.2. Qualitative Data and Indices  
Evaluating standards empirically through qualitative analyses is therefore very much in order. 
Doing so, however, is also much more challenging.1295 One problem with such an analysis is 
certainly that measuring achievements in the area of human rights, raise many logistical and 
methodological difficulties. In terms of the former it is, for example, notoriously difficult to ensure 
that data is correctly reported. 'Measurable' figures, such as rate of infanticide, death rate due to 
certain types of illnesses or government spending in certain areas, such as health care, are in many 
cases difficult or impossible to obtain. Hospitals sometimes lack the means to adequately aggregate 
such data, for example when they are severely understaffed or do not exist at all in certain areas, or 
different countries, states or areas within nations have differing monitoring or reporting systems 
and/or aggregate data differently which can hamper the collection of relevant data and make the 
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 UNESCO has for example established and well documents the Ethics of Science and Technology Programme which 
forms part of UNESCO's Division of Ethics of Science and Technology in the Social and Human Sciences Sector. It has 
also in 2004 established as part of its capacity building programme the Ethics Education Programme which aims "to 
reinforce and increase the capacities of member states in the area of ethics education." Through its initiative called 
"ethics around the World" UNESCO is also organizing a series of ethics conferences in various countries. See 
UNESCO, Ethics of Sciene and Technology, at: http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-
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data useless for comparison.1296 Moreover, until today no adequate measurement of human 
suffering has been elaborated. It is unclear whether it is complacent to speak of real progress in the 
area of bioethics as long as a single person remains subject to exploitative research arrangements 
or a single child dies due to lack of access to medicine that would be available in another country or 
due to lack of transfer of relevant knowledge to developing countries.  
In addition human rights issues, including those in the area of bioethics, also raise conceptual 
problems in that measuring progress in any area of human rights involves great conceptual 
complexity. For example in various countries, scholars, politicians and physicians have argued over 
an exact definition of 'informed consent' and on how to ascertain whether informed consent has 
been obtained. The exact propositions of 'informed consent' are nowhere clearly defined, apart 
from general guidelines discussed above, and hence data relating to these propositions cannot be 
clearly aggregated. The same might be said for such 'basic' terms as the very term “bioethics”, 
“health” or what constitutes a “natural” or “original” state of being of for example the human 
genome. In fact as was seen throughout this thesis, many terms used in the context of bioethics are 
vague and indeterminate.1297 And even if all conceptual problems were to be resolved with regard 
to the terms used in the standards there still does not exist the necessary empirical data to evaluate 
the success in relation to these terms.  
One final problem with any empirical analysis of success is the question of correlation versus direct 
relation.1298 That is, in many cases it is difficult to ascertain whether a state changes its national 
legislation as a result of an international agreement in that area, because of public pressure, 
prevalent religious or other convictions, because it thinks that doing so will offer other trade-off 
rewards, such as a most-favourite nation status, or for all or several or none of the above 
mentioned reasons. For example, even if states de facto might change their national patent laws by 
reference to the TRIPS agreements that does not necessarily mean that they have done so because 
of the TRIPS agreement. Similarly, it is not clear whether states engage in less human rights abuses 
because they have signed the UDHR or other relevant documents or because they fear public 
repercussions or because of some ethical conviction that prevents them from doing so.  
                                                          
1296 Barnett/Newberg, note 1295, 268. M. Ignatieff/K. Desormeau, Measurement and Human Rights: 
Tracking Progress, Assessing Impact, 2005, 4, stating that "unsure how to square this conviction with the 
more utilitarian task of setting benchmarks for success, the human rights community has traditionally 
avoided the endeavour altogether, preferring instead to measure rights problems and progress anecdotally, 
focusing on the individual story, the illuminating testimonial." 
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explanatory memorandums on the standards in the area of bioethics and other human rights standards. The ICESCR, 
note 341, has for example, in several comments to the ICRSCR, shown that progress can be measured even on such 
conceptually complex and logistically difficult to measure topics as "health" or "poverty". See for example CESCR, 
General Comment 9, note 311. Yet similar work lacks for the area of bioethics, i.e. for the terms used in this respect. It 
should also be kept in mind that with regard to relatively new or emerging terms and subjects, such as genomic research 
it might sometimes be difficult to arrive at stable definitions of the subject itself and therefore any measurement of 
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An assessment of the presently examined standards' success will therefore largely have to be 
carried out on the basis of general, theoretical considerations and subjective intuitions. 
 
2. Success of the Standards 
The objectives of the respective standards were discussed above.1299 In particular standards aimed 
first at promoting respect for human dignity and to protect human rights in the area of relevance to 
the standards. Secondly, they aimed to provide a framework of principles and procedures. Thirdly, 
all standards in one way or another aimed at fostering multidisciplinary and pluralistic dialogue 
among all stakeholders. Fourth, standards also generally aimed at the establishing of national or 
international ethics Committees. Fifth, most standards in the words of the UDBHR aim to promote 
equitable access to medical, scientific and technological developments as well as the greatest 
possible flow and the rapid sharing of knowledge concerning those developments and the sharing 
of benefits, with particular attention to the needs of developing countries. Sixth, all standards in 
some way or another seek to enhance regional or international cooperation. Finally, most 
standards aim to safeguard and promote the interests of present and future generations.  
 
2.1. The Meaning of Success in Relation to the Objectives 
Despite these stated aims it is rather unclear what success actually means with regard to each of 
these objectives, and how to measure it. For example, the aim to promote respect for human 
dignity and protection of human rights could be taken to mean anything from thereby wanting to 
merely remind states and non-state actors of the value of human dignity and human rights over to 
wanting to shape states' and non-state actors' ideas and legislation about the promotion of respect 
for human dignity and human rights to wanting to design a full blown, enforceable blueprint for 
the protection of human dignity and human rights in the area of bioethics that is then to be the 
model for all national legislation in the area. The report on the possibility of the elaboration of a 
universal standard in the area of bioethics remains vague regarding a specification of this aim as 
does the explanatory memorandum on the previous draft of the UDBHR. The former states that 
the instrument to be (that is the UDBHR) should have a content that contributes to a code of  
“universally recognized general principles of bioethics (such as human dignity, solidarity, 
freedom of research, autonomy, respect for privacy, confidentiality, non-discrimination, 
informed consent, integrity of research and intellectual honesty) insofar as these principles 
pertain to bioethics.”1300  
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 See Chapter IV, 2.2. in this thesis. 
1300 Report on the Possibility of Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics, note 128, para 45.  
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The latter is equally nebulous, specifying merely that “the declaration promotes respect for human 
dignity and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”1301 None of the standards 
or explanatory memorandums, however, provide benchmarks for how success could be measured 
in relation to this aim nor any clear indices or timelines for the realisation of this aim.  
Similarly, without further clarification it is absolutely not clear whether the aim of providing a 
universal framework of principles for the area of bioethics seeks to endorse a detailed, specific and 
comprehensive framework of principles that is then endorsed at each national level or whether it 
merely seeks to set some pointers for national regulations in the area. The Report on the Possibility 
of Elaborating a Universal Instrument in the area of Bioethics reflects on the importance of this 
aim, stating in para 7 that “the need for universal ethical guidelines covering all issues raised in this 
field is increasingly felt by specialists and decision-makers as well as by civil society and the 
international community.” The explanatory memorandum on the previous draft of the UDBHR in 
relation to Article 3, is more cautious, stating that  
“the declaration is not intended to conclude ongoing bioethics debates. Instead, its major 
aim is to inspire and stimulate further ethics debates and their resolution within the 
Member States in order to expand the scope of this declaration and its usefulness.”1302  
In the light of these explanatory notes it is not quite clear what the objective “to provide a 
framework or principles and procedures” really means. That is, it is not clear how detailed these 
procedures and principles have to be, how tailored they should be to specific concerns arising in 
the area, and how universal the framework is supposed to be in terms of its scope. And again it is 
left unclear how success looks like in relation to this aim. It is for example not clear to what extent 
states have to reference or implement the standards in case they enact legislation in an area of 
bioethical relevance, i.e. whether they have to take them as a blueprint upon which to formulate 
their legislation, only take some guidance from when they come across a specific problem or may 
check once their legislation is done whether it is compatible with the framework or whether states 
should actually look at their existing acts and status and analyse their compatibility with the 
framework.  
With regard to the aim of fostering dialogue in the area of bioethics the report on the possibility of 
a declaration in the area of bioethics states in para 47 that  
“a universal instrument on bioethics must call strong attention to the importance of 
awareness-raising, information, education, consultation and public debate …[]….These 
activities are essential and fundamental to the pursuit of all research in this field in a spirit 
of solidarity, humanity, reason and harmony. Harmony can only exist if fears, hopes and 
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 Ibid., para 31. 
1302 Ibid., para 29; para 40 further states "legal rules cannot pretend to encompass all fields and cases of 
bioethics nor to judge or to interfere in every moment of the lives and individual choices of persons. At any 
level, laws accompanied by effective control should be adopted in order to facilitate personal choices, and 
only a few substantial issues should be regulated through international rules. In other words, the aim should 
be to maximize moral evolution and to minimize the need for legislation. 
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questions are taken into account in the drafting of public policies, laws and regulations. 
This means that the processes of elaboration and implementation of scientific applications 
must be accompanied by an ongoing, more accessible and transparent public debate that is 
open to the lay public and covers both the potential benefits and the hazards of scientific 
applications. …[]… UNESCO can also take the opportunity to encourage Member States to 
involve their scientific community, universities and other academic centres, the media, 
non-governmental organizations, politicians and civil servants in this dialogue; to promote 
the active participation of everyone affected by these issues; to provide the means for all 
citizens to receive clear and precise information on the impact of the procedures available; 
to ensure that populations can give truly free and informed consent in every circumstance 
or, if they so wish, decline such procedures; and to publish reports on the agencies and 
activities that have been put in place to promote bioethics education in their countries. 1303 
Yet again, these specifications do not clarify entirely who has to be involved in that dialogue and to 
what extent, whether the 'lay public' that has or should be included in the debate, includes every 
single citizen, the elderly, children, the mentally handicapped or those with Altzheimer disease or 
all or only parts of these population segments. It is also not clear what a public debate has to look 
like. That is, 'public debate' could mean anything from disseminating some information to those 
segments of society that are interested in the debate through occasional informative press coverage 
or reports on matters of interest over to holding obligatory informative meetings at schools or 
community centres to interactive webpages that allow every citizen to 'appropriately discuss' or 
comment on the matters of interest. It also remains rather vague with regard to the question of 
how education and training relating to these subjects looks like, and it is equally unclear by whom 
and in what format it has to be imparted.  
There are also various questions regarding the meaning of success in relation to the objective of 
setting up bioethics committees. That is, it is not clear whether success means that each country 
should simply set up an ethics committees or whether success must also be measured in relation to 
how these committees work, how many meetings and what material they produce, etc.1304  
Clarifying what success means in relation to the promotion of equitable access to health care and 
with regard to the aim of sharing of benefit is again beset with difficulties. Regarding access to 
health care the explanatory memorandum explains in that respect that 
serious inequalities in access to health care worldwide increase the importance of including 
solidarity as one of the principles of the declaration…. ….Five specific elements were singled 
out: Access to quality health care, including reproductive health care and the health of 
children; access to adequate nutrition and water; improvement of living conditions and the 
                                                          
1303 Ibid., para 49. Cf. also the report on the Round Table of Ministers of Science on "Bioethics: International 
Implications" (Paris, 22-23 October 2001) at the 32nd Session of the General Conference point in the same 
direction, at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001309/130976e.pdf (10.12.10).  
1304 Ibid., para 46. The report states in that respect that "The declaration will no doubt contribute to a 
strengthening of the role and the degree of participation of ethics committees at national and institutional 
levels: those that are designated by laws or regulations to authorize medical interventions or scientific 
research and to evaluate the results achieved. The national committees or similar bodies that exist or are 
being created in many countries represent a rich variety of cultures and experiences; they can be harnessed 
as an international forum in the preparation of the declaration and in the implementation of its 
recommendations." 
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environment; and the elimination of the marginalization and exclusion of persons on the 
basis of any ground, and reduction of poverty and illiteracy. … The list is not closed.1305 
Despite the elaboration of these elements it is still, however, fairly unclear whether the duty to 
provide such health care resides only within the national state vis a vis its own national citizens or 
whether anyone staying or living in a certain place must have access to health care provided by that 
state. It is also not clear in how far states have a duty to help one another setting up such adequate 
health care, whether or to what extent health care standards may be different across or within 
countries and whether different forms of services may be provided in case of higher payments.  
With regard to the sharing of knowledge and benefits the report reiterates that “benefit-sharing 
and equal access to the advances of science and technology for all humanity it is a truly urgent and 
universal issue.”1306  
Sharing will in practice take place within the framework of international law and domestic 
law governing such matters. … Six concrete elements and one general element are enlisted 
as forms of sharing benefit: (1) special and sustainable assistance to the persons and groups 
that have taken part in the research; (2) access to quality health care; (3) provision of new 
diagnostics facilities for new treatment or medical products stemming from the research; 
(4) support for health services; (5) access to scientific and technological knowledge; (6) 
capacity-building facilities for research purposes; and (7) any other form consistent with 
the principles set out in the declaration.1307 
Yet again, it is left unclear how and to what extent sharing of knowledge and benefits has to be 
facilitated. No benchmarks for success are offered so that it is not clear whether occasional 
research cooperation of for example research institutes will be counted as success in relation to this 
objective, whether it needs a more substantial and institutionalised form of exchange and how that 
should look like.  
Finally, as was already mentioned above the aim to safeguard future interests is rather vague, 
intangible and not very well defined. The explanatory memorandum states on that subject that  
Human beings are an integral part of the biosphere and that they have responsibilities and 
duties towards other forms of life. Although the principles set out in this declaration apply 
to human beings, … human beings have responsibilities towards other forms of life in the 
biosphere. The concept of human relations with the biosphere underwent substantial 
changes by the recognition of interdependence between humans and their environment. 
…With regard to responsibility towards the biosphere, a special reference to future 
generations is made in the text to the safeguarding of interests in biodiversity and the 
biosphere that extend beyond the present generation.1308 
Yet the document does not specify how and to what extent such responsibilities towards the 
biosphere have changed, nor what the biosphere exactly means or how present and future 
generations should be safeguarded. 
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2.2. The Success of Standards  
In the absence of concrete benchmarks for success in relation to the above described objectives and 
in the absence of a baseline from which to start measuring incremental successes this section can 
merely offer some very general observations. First of all with regard to all obligations imposed on 
states it seems fair to suggest that states in analogy with other human rights standards and the 
obligations they impose on states at least have to take immediate steps to progressively implement 
the provisions of the standards even if they only dispose over limited resources.1309 It is, however, 
also fair to say that it is left to states which steps they take first in that respect and what they see fit 
that should, could or has to be done in order to realise these aims.1310 Yet while these reflections 
generally specify the process by which aims are to be realized it does not make any clearer what is 
required with regard to each single objective. 
It can then merely safely be said that the standards promote some sort of a human rights agenda. 
As was discussed at length above, the standards are framed as human rights instruments and 
endorse human rights principles, including that of the promotion of the protection of human 
dignity as regards questions of bioethical relevance. Similarly, it certainly must be acknowledged 
that all standards at a very high level provide principles regarding questions of bioethical relevance 
as discussed above, even though it is not always clear what they actually mean, how they have to be 
interpreted, and what scope they have. It has also been submitted that the standards at the very 
least constitute “a rallying cry, an effective political instrument for noble ideas” and to some extent 
“authoritative guidance – something that open-ended philosophical discussion, for all its value, 
cannot do.”1311 There also certainly takes place some form of dialogue at the national level in the 
area of bioethics – at least within some states and among certain segments of society. That is, in 
many states such as for example Germany issues of bioethical relevance are discussed within ethics 
committees, relevant experts are invited to discuss bioethically relevant issues on TV talk-shows 
and governmental agencies, NGOs or research institutions raise issues and publicly debate ethical 
questions as well as they disseminate information so that citizens in principle have some means to 
attain information and participate in debates if they so wish.1312 With regard to the establishing of 
research committees, to the extent that these have not already existed in states the ABC has 
certainly helped setting up a variety of ethics committees over the years, many of which meet 
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 See CESCR General comment 9, note 311.  
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 Ibid. 
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 Benatar, note 1113, 223.  
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 See for example Interessengemeinschaft Kritische Bioethik, at: http://www.kritischebioethik.de/ (last visited 
27.04.2012); Infoportal zum Thema embryonale/adulte Stammzellen, therapeutisches/reproduktives Klonen, 
Nabelschnurblut-Stammzellen, at: http://www.stammzellen-debatte.de/ (last visited 27.04.2012); Evangelische Kirche 
in Deutschland: Bioethik, at: http://www.ekd.de/bioethik/bioethik.html (last visited 27.04.2012). 
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regularly and produce reports etc.1313 It can finally also be safely assumed that there are meetings 
and many attempts to facilitate access to medicine and benefit sharing as well as technology 
transfer.1314 With regard to all these points and as far as attributable to the standards the standards 
can be said to have produced successful outcomes. 
However several points of note speak against an overtly enthusiastic evaluation of the success of 
standards. For one, it is not clear in how far the standards directly addressed to matters of 
bioethics – in the same way as all other human rights standards - really do or will affect states' or 
non-state actors' behaviour in the field of bioethics. As mentioned above, even if states act 
according to what has been set out in the standards it is never clear whether or not states or non 
state actors deal with issues of bioethical relevance in a manner that is congruent with human 
rights principles and promote respect for human dignity in the area of bioethics because of the 
standards or for other reasons. Given the standards' vagueness and the ambiguity of the concepts 
used in this discourse, it is also questionable whether the standards really provide enough 
guidance, content, and substance to constitute a framework of guiding principles for the area of 
bioethics. Moreover, standards are a far cry from offering comprehensive guidelines in the area. 
For one, the subject area covered in the standards is just a fracture of what could be considered 
“issues of bioethical or biomedical relevance.” As was pointed out above, many issues of concern, 
including those of patent rights or trade rights related to questions of bioethical interest are not 
even mentioned in the standards.1315 Moreover, aside from what is left to other international legal 
frameworks, the standards notoriously eschew to provide guidance on many issues that are of very 
real relevance to any bioethical debate, such as for example questions related to abortion and 
assisted suicide. In those cases where issues are covered the standards are moreover often so vague 
and ambiguously worded that they hardly provide any real and definite answer to states seeking 
guidance. As long as standards serve as a platform for states to read into provisions their individual 
versions of what is required by them, the standards can hardly be said to offer any real guidance or 
a framework for decisions. National legislations with regard to such issues as cloning, stem cell 
research, transplantation etc. have been and continue to be diverse and often in outright opposition 
with each other which also seems to call into doubt the framework setting function of the 
standards.1316  
With regard to the fostering of dialogue it is also not quite clear in how far dialogues so far really 
serve or involve more than just a handful of people, i.e. those people that are concerned or 
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 UNESCO, ABC Country by Country Project and Report, SHS/EST/ABC/03/REV., 2010, at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001528/152825e.pdf#page=14 (last visited 27.04.2012). 
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interested in these matters anyway, either in a professional or personal capacity. Few lay people 
seem to understand the details of such issues as stem cell research in the same way as only few 
people really seem to be interested enough in these debates to even seek to understand these issues 
to an extent that they could participate in the debate at all. Moreover, it is even less clear in how far 
people could influence the debate when it comes to resulting legislation. It is also not quite clear in 
how far for example developing countries or least developed countries foster such debates and 
whether or how such debates are meant to and take place across states.  
With respect to the question of how successful ethics committees are it must first be noted that 
many of these committees already existed before the standards called for their coming into 
existence. Moreover, it is far from being clear to what extent these ethics committees work 
successfully nor what successful means, i.e. whether these committees are heterogeneous or divers 
enough in terms of experts and lay people involved, whether they assign enough time to a thorough 
discussion of matters, whether their opinion is at all taken into account by their respective 
governments, whether they meet regularly, are staffed with independent members, produce 
objective reports etc.1317  
With regard to the question of access to medicine or health care and benefit sharing it should 
moreover be noted that despite many honourable attempts to increase access to medicine and 
health care and to share benefits the health indices of many developing countries have far from 
improved since the standards came into being.1318 Overall it seems that as long as such financially 
sensitive issues as access to medicine and patent laws are primarily decided within the WTO and 
TRIPS agreement human rights standards in the area will have little impact.  
Finally, the objective to reach a sustainable future is certainly too indeterminate to have much 
meaning at all. Here the UDBHR seems to do little more than merely raising this issue on paper. 
While doing so might stimulate awareness and thereby help in the process of the protection of 
future generation as things stand at the moment it seems as if the UDBHR has done little to 
actually achieve this objective. 
In all these instances it seems that international human rights law seems somewhat overrated in 
that it hardly has the impact or success rate that those advocating for its use would have it. It also 
seems that speaking about human rights and putting claims about human rights protection is 
easier than enforcing them.1319 That is, UNESCO and the Council of Europe have been active in the 
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 See Vöneky, Recht, Moral und Ethik. Grundlagen und Grenzen Demokratischer Legitimation für Ethikgremien, 
note 15, 2010 for a thorough evaluation of ethics committees and, in particular their democratic legitimacy. See also 
Nida-Rümelin, Ethische Essays, note 77, 341-343 on the role of ethics committees. 
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 See for example Report of the WHO Commission on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, at: 
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pharmaceutical companies' performance with regard to increase in access, at: 
http://www.accesstomedicineindex.org/content/index-2010-0 (last visite 10.12.10). 
1319 Benatar, note 1113, 223. 
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area of bioethics. Yet whether they have actually helped transform the problems that undergird 
many bioethical debates or offered real and workable solutions to them is somewhat questionable 
and, in the absence of benchmarks also impossible to assess. 
Having said all that it should however also be noted that international human rights while not 
necessarily successful, so far constitutes the only established way in which states can and do 
communicate regarding such issues as those in the area of bioethics. States have to or want to 
negotiate and communicate with each other, if they want to coexist peacefully, to accommodate 
mutually conflicting interests and to prosper in an international society where common interests 
and norms are scarce.1320 Even if they are in outright disagreement about e.g. the question of 
whether or not the cloning of human beings should be permissible, they need or want to 
communicate with each other because they need or want to understand a variety of things, such as 
whether another state will engage in human cloning processes, how and whether doing so will 
affect the other states in the community, and how the state will e.g. treat scientists from countries 
with less permissible regulations undertaking research within its own territory. Also questions 
about the conditions under which and terms to which states might be willing to agree to a 
compromise are important factors to know and understand for states. International law and 
international human rights discourse can and often does provide the only common language and 
framework within which such communication processes can take place.  
Resorting to international law, moreover, signals that states are ready to settle conflicts via a 
standard procedure and through a framework which is generally known to all states. This means 
that no state needs an explanation about the “rules of the game”, in that all states generally know 
substance and processes of law.1321 For example, states understand the limits of a legal's admissible 
discourse, i.e. which arguments may count as legal, the timing and setting within which legal 
arguments may or must be made and, generally, which legal arguments may be most promising. In 
the negotiations on regulations of the conduct with regard to Genetic Data, for example, it is 
inconceivable that states openly refer to religiously inspired objections to genetic manipulation 
processes. Instead they have to focus on the 'legal' issues involved, such as the question of whether 
or not the storage of data complies or infringes a right to privacy.   
Secondly, legal discourse provides a highly developed, conceptually fertile and precise language for 
thinking about bioethical issues. 1322 This language has over time been elaborated to include a rich 
vocabulary not just of terms but of concepts and other ideas that help name and systematically 
approach bioethical problems, such as the concept of informed consent.1323 Although such 
concepts, ideas and structures are likely to be in need of further elaboration and specification when 
                                                          
1320
 Yasuaki, note 777, 112. 
1321
 Schneider, "Bioethics in the Language of the Law" note 21, 20. 
1322
 Ibid. 
1323
 Ibid. 
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applied to newly emerging issues, they at least set a certain standard upon which such specification 
work can then be undertaken. International human rights is also apt and well experienced in 
dealing with both, converging but also with conflicting and diverging interests of states and with 
those that involve starkly contrasting ethical and religious points of view.  
Finally and most importantly law, as pointed out above, is a widely shared and widely accepted tool 
for resolving ethical, inter-cultural and social conflict. Its' power derives from a general, widely 
held believe in law and its powers. It is this common belief that makes individuals and states accept 
and comply with many of law's regulations and hence increase human rights law's suitability to 
resolve conflict in a determinate way, thus often making law one of the few successful tools that are 
at states' disposal.1324  
As such law is certainly here to stay and for the foreseeable future it seems the only tool available or 
accepted enough to deal with questions of bioethical interest. As such human rights discourse in 
the area of bioethics is unavoidable. Being aware of the implications that flow from using this 
framework might help improve it or can be used to enhance its success.  
 
3. Conclusion 
This last chapter showed that success is difficult to measure with regard to the objectives that have 
been set out in the standards. That is mostly so because so far there exist hardly any indices and 
benchmarks, nor sufficient data that could help in that assessment. Generally, it will have to be left 
to time to show whether and to what extent the standards are successful and whether and to what 
extent they have real impact. 
                                                          
1324
 Ibid. 
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